Ku Klux Rising : toward an understanding of American right wing terrorist campaigns by Brister, Paul D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2011-09
Ku Klux Rising : toward an understanding of
American right wing terrorist campaigns
Brister, Paul D.

















KU KLUX RISING: 
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN RIGHT 









 Dissertation Supervisor: Maria Rasmussen 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 
0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the 
time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and 
reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of 
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of 
Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2011 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Dissertation 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Ku Klux Rising: Toward an Understanding of 
American Right Wing Terrorist Campaigns 
6. AUTHOR:  Paul D. Brister 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol Number: N/A 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Since 1866, the Ku Klux Klan has been able to muster three distinctive and sustained campaigns of terrorism, 
commonly referred to as the three “waves” of Klan violence. The first occurred between 1866 and 1871, the 
second between 1915 and 1928, and the third from roughly 1954 to the mid-1960s.  Subsequent to the third wave, 
the Klan unsuccessfully attempted another resurgence in the mid-1970s/early 1980s but was snuffed out before a 
campaign could be triggered.  By studying  the three most successful Klan campaigns of the past (granting that 
each varied in scope, intensity and outcome) alongside the failed campaign attempt of the 1970–1980s, this 
dissertation will investigate which commonly cited factors and conditions were, in fact, associated with the rise of 
the KKK’s campaigns of terrorism. 
Ultimately, the dissertation finds that four factors—the presence of a safe haven, organizational structure, 
leadership, and recruitment techniques—are necessary and jointly sufficient to explain Klan campaign emergence.  
By combining these factors in a manner which better reflects their interplay, a model offering greater explanatory 
value emerges.  The first significant set of correlates is the presence or absence of safe havens and their relation to 
the organizational structure chosen by Klan leadership.  The second set of correlates is the ability of the Klan to 
downplay its core ideology and effectively frame a recruitment message which resonates with a pre-existing 
dominant social narrative—a narrative usually based on mythologized history or an unfalsifiable belief system.  As 
will be explained in concluding chapters, the probabilistic model that emerges when these factors combine proves 
more effective in explaining and predicting campaigns of Klan terrorism than simply listing these factors as if they 
are not consciously combined for effect.   
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
292 
14. SUBJECT TERMS:  Terrorism, Domestic Terrorism, Right Wing Terrorism, Ku Klux Klan   

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
KU KLUX RISING: 
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN 
RIGHT WING TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS 
 
Paul D. Brister 
Major, United States Air Force 
B.S., U.S. Air Force Academy, 1998 
M.S., Naval Postgraduate School, 2005 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 









Paul D. Brister 
 
Approved by:  
 ______________________ 
 Maria Rasmussen 
 Associate Professor of National Security 
 Dissertation Supervisor 
 
______________________ _______________________ 
Jeff Knopf Maiah Jaskoski 




Anna Simons Douglas Porch 
Professor of Defense Analysis Professor of National Security 
 
Approved by: _________________________________________________________ 
Harold Trinkunas, Chair, Department of National Security Affairs  
 
Approved by: _________________________________________________________ 
Douglas Moses, Vice Provost for Academic Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Since 1866, the Ku Klux Klan has been able to muster three distinctive and sustained 
campaigns of terrorism, commonly referred to as the three “waves” of Klan violence. The 
first occurred between 1866 and 1871, the second between 1915 and 1928, and the third 
from roughly 1954 to the mid-1960s.  Subsequent to the third wave, the Klan 
unsuccessfully attempted another resurgence in the mid-1970s/early 1980s but was 
snuffed out before a campaign could be triggered.  By studying  the three most successful 
Klan campaigns of the past (granting that each varied in scope, intensity and outcome) 
alongside the failed campaign attempt of the 1970–1980s, this dissertation will 
investigate which commonly cited factors and conditions were, in fact, associated with 
the rise of the KKK’s campaigns of terrorism. 
Ultimately, the dissertation finds that four factors—the presence of a safe haven, 
organizational structure, leadership, and recruitment techniques—are necessary and 
jointly sufficient to explain Klan campaign emergence.  By combining these factors in a 
manner which better reflects their interplay, a model offering greater explanatory value 
emerges.  The first significant set of correlates is the presence or absence of safe havens 
and their relation to the organizational structure chosen by Klan leadership.  The second 
set of correlates is the ability of the Klan to downplay its core ideology and effectively 
frame a recruitment message which resonates with a pre-existing dominant social 
narrative—a narrative usually based on mythologized history or an unfalsifiable belief 
system.  As will be explained in concluding chapters, the probabilistic model that 
emerges when these factors combine proves more effective in explaining and predicting 
campaigns of Klan terrorism than simply listing these factors as if they are not 
consciously combined for effect.   
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Yesterday, Today, Forever,  
Since Eighteen Hundred and Sixty Six, the KU KLUX KLAN has been riding and 
will continue to do so as long as the WHITE MAN LIVETH.1  
 
1860s  
The Ku Klux Klan is so extensive, and so well organized and armed, that it is 
beyond the power of any one to exert any moral influences over them.  Powder and ball is 
the only thing that will put them down.2 
 
1920s  
Outside business, the Ku Klux Klan has become the most vigorous, active, and 
effective organization in American life.3 
 
1960s  
Klan involvement in kidnappings and beatings, arson, bombings, and outright 
murder in recent years compels the committee to view a klan as a vehicle for death, 
destruction, and fear.4 
 
1980s  
Perhaps the most telling commentary of the Ku Klux Klan’s status as the last 
decade of the twentieth century began to unfold was that other, more radical white 
supremacists had begun to ridicule it openly.5 
 
In the years following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, race-based hate groups 
experienced a dramatic and steady resurgence.6 Within a decade of the bombing, the 
number of racial hate groups—including Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, and 
                                                 
1 As quoted in: David Mark Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan, 3rd ed. 
(Durham:Duke University Press, 1987), 438.  
2 As quoted in R. Millett & Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (New York:The Free Press, 
1994), 260.  
3 As quoted in: Nancy MacLean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry : The Making of the Second Ku Klux 
Klan (New York:Oxford University Press, 1994), 10. 
4 United States. Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities., The Present-Day Ku Klux 
Klan Movement; Report, Ninetieth Congress, First Session (Washington,U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), 136. 
5 Bill Stanton, Klanwatch : Bringing the Ku Klux Klan to Justice, 1st ed. (New York: Weidenfeld, 
1991), 266. 
6 Claims of resurgence are based on the number of groups, not necessarily in the amount of terrorist 
activity. 
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Neo-Confederate organizations—exploded from 241 in 1996 to over 750 by 2006.7  
Given America’s near-exclusive fascination with Islamic terrorist groups, this dangerous 
trend has gone largely unnoticed by the citizenry and, due to political reasons, goes 
woefully underreported by government institutions. In 2009, a leaked report from the 
Department of Homeland Security briefly brought the issue of non-Islamic domestic 
terrorism back to the forefront of American concerns, only to be immediately swept aside 
by politicians who claimed the report was an attack on conservatives and veterans.8  By 
early 2010, the DHS section responsible for producing the report was gutted and all links 
to the report were removed from government websites.9  The report generated more 
political turmoil than neutral analysis and the report has yet to be either considered or 
challenged on its merits.  To those versed in the history of American domestic terrorism, 
the report harkens back to multiple dark periods of America’s past.   
The factors upon which the report draws—economic downturns, the influx of 
returning military veterans, and the presence or introduction of “left wing” policies and 
organizations—have long been used to predict terrorism from the right, but are rarely 
subjected to the types of cross-case analysis needed to determine causality.  In addition to 
the structural explanations for terrorism and extremism cited in the DHS report, this 
dissertation will also test organizational and sponsorship theories that are widely 
employed in the field of terrorism studies.  The goal of this dissertation is to examine 
how useful these three theoretical lenses are for explaining America’s most intense 
campaigns of right wing terrorism.              
                                                 
7 Stuart A. Wright, “Strategic Framing of Racial-Nationalism in North America and Europe:  An 
Analysis of a Burgeoning Transnational Network,” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 2 (2009): 192. 
8 DHS Report on Rightwing Extremism. Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political 
Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment. Available from 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/5410658/DHS-Report-on-Right wing-Extremism; Accessed 05 June 2009.  
Newt Gingrich reacts to this document in: Jake Tapper, “Conservatives Decry Homeland Security Report 
on “Rightwing” Extremism,” ABC News.com 2009.  Accessed 18 July 2011, 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/04/conservatives-d.html.  
9 SPLC News, “Inside the D.H.S. : Former Top Analyist Says Agency Bowed to Political Pressure,” 
Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed 07 June 2011, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/inside-
the-dhs-former-top-analyst-says-agency-bowed-to-political-pressure. 
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Right wing extremism—and the terrorism that frequently accompanies it—is 
nothing new to the American political landscape.10  Right wing violence is as old as the 
country itself and is virtually guaranteed to remain a factor for the duration of American 
existence. From as early as 1780, militant organizations were created to protect America 
from the supposed evil machinations of the Bavarian Illuminati and other related secret 
enterprises bent on world domination.11  Concerns about American men becoming 
“disciples of Voltaire” and American women the “concubines of the Illuminati” spread 
throughout the fledgling country with alarming speed and strength.12  The 1797 book 
Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All the Religions and Governments of Europe, Carried on 
in the Secret Meetings of Free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies caught hold in 
the United States and, soon thereafter, Americans were convinced of a triple 
Illuminati/Mason/Intellectual conspiracy to destroy religion and public order.13   
In response, so-called “pure American societies” were organized to root out the 
spread of immorality by these enlightened European sinners and return America to what 
was deemed its proper, morally superior position in the world.  Organizations such as the 
Anti-Masons, Know-Nothings, and Native Americans would promote themselves as 
patriotic defenders of American values as prescribed primarily by the Protestant church.  
These groups directed a full-scale war against the conspiratorial undertakings of the 
                                                 
10 For narratives on the history of right wing movements see: Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant 
Crusade, 1800-1860; a Study of the Origins of American Nativism (New York,: Rinehart, 1952); David 
Harry Bennett, The Party of Fear : From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History, 1st 
Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics 
of Unreason : Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1977, 2d ed., A Phoenix Book P75 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978); Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and 
Other Essays, 1st Harvard University Press pbk. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); 
John H. Bunzel, Anti-Politics in America; Reflections on the Anti-Political Temper and Its Distortions of 
the Democratic Process, [1st ed. (New York,: Knopf, 1967); Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein, 
Danger on the Right (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976); Carleton Beals, Brass-Knuckle Crusade; 
the Great Know-Nothing Conspiracy, 1820-1860 (New York,: Hastings House, 1960). 
11 Even today, the Bavarian Illuminati remains central to many of the right wing extremist conspiracy 
theories.  The Illuminati was an organization developed in the late 1700s that advocated reason over 
religion in solving societal problems.  Many right wing conspiracy theorists credit the Illuminati as the 
driving force behind the French Revolution, while others insist that the Illuminati, in conjunction with 
Jewish power holders, are now manipulating world politics through an entity they refer to as the ZOG 
(Zionist Occupation Government).   It is not uncommon for the Illuminati, the Freemasons, immigrants, 
and Jews to be used interchangeably in right wing extremist discussions concerning the world’s ills.  
12 Lipset and Raab, The Politics of Unreason : Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1977, 36. 
13 Ibid., 35. 
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Catholics, Masons, Illuminati, immigrants, and anyone deemed un-American.  Even prior 
to the Civil War, “murderous battles were marked by barricades of carts and hurled 
paving stones, assaults with knives, brickbats, bludgeons, teeth, and fists.”14  Violence 
was further fueled by stories of Catholic priests kidnapping young American women and 
killing the infants born of sadistic sexual acts.  Books “proving” such tales became best-
sellers throughout the United States.15  Although right wing groups were numerous 
during the early 1800s, none were able to sustain their existence for any considerable 
amount of time.  This would change in the aftermath of the Civil War with the birth of an 
organization that would become the epitome for domestic right wing terrorism for over a 
century thereafter.    
   Whereas antebellum America produced several flash-in-the-pan extremist 
organizations, the post-Civil War era gave rise to an organization capable of weathering 
over one hundred and forty years of societal changes.  In 1866, six young Confederate 
veterans “hungering and thirsting for amusement” created what would become one of the 
most formidable politico-terrorist organizations in American history.16 Adhering to 
traditional Greek methods of naming social clubs—in particular the fraternity Kuklos 
Adelphon or “old Kappa Alpha”—the group of men dubbed their organization the Ku 
Klux Klan, and reveled in “its novelty, its alliterative content, and its uncertain 
meaning.”17  The Ku Klux Klan, originally designed to be nothing more than a quirky 
social club aimed at overcoming the unyielding boredom of small-town life, would 
quickly and unexpectedly transform itself into an organization capable of systematically 
weaving together acts of terrorism into sustainable campaigns.   Responding to societal 
issues of the day—be they perceived assaults on Southern institutions or transgressions 
against the sanctity of white womanhood, serving to defend Americanism or acting as a 
bulwark against school segregation—and offering cleverly crafted ideas about how to 
                                                 
14 Bennett, The Party of Fear : From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History, 38. 
15 For instance, see: Maria Monk et al., Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk : As Exhibited in a 
Narrative of Her Sufferings During a Residence of Five Years as a Novice, and Two Years as a Black Nun, 
in the Hotel Dieu Nunnery at Montreal (New York: Howe & Bates, 1836). 
16 Allen W. Trelease, White Terror; the Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction, [1st 
ed. (New York,: Harper & Row, 1971), 3. 
17 Ibid., 4. 
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rally supporters, the Klan would soon become a right wing terrorist organization par 
excellence, capable of spurring Americans to violence for over a century. 
 Since 1866, the Ku Klux Klan has been able to muster three distinctive and 
sustained campaigns of terrorism, commonly referred to as the three “waves” of Klan 
violence. The first occurred between 1866 and 1871, the second between 1915 and 1928, 
and the third from roughly 1954 to the mid-1960s.  Klan activity continued in one form 
or another in the years between these waves, but did not achieve a similar ongoing pattern 
of organized and sustained violence.  Subsequent to the third wave, the Klan 
unsuccessfully attempted another resurgence in the mid-1970s/early 1980s but was 
snuffed out before a campaign could be triggered.  Today, the Klan remains a 
marginalized entity within a highly atomized brew of competing right wing extremist 
organizations.  By studying  the three most successful Klan campaigns of the past 
(granting that each varied in scope, intensity and outcome) alongside the failed campaign 
attempt of the 1970–1980s, this dissertation will investigate which commonly cited 
factors and conditions were, in fact, associated with the rise of the KKK’s campaigns of 
terrorism. 
 The intensity and duration of successful Klan campaigns have varied.  During its 
existence, the Klan has spearheaded a successful insurgency (1860s), gained political 
power that reached the highest levels of government (1920s), and—most recently—
suffered setbacks that may permanently constrain the organization from rising to such 
heights again (post 1960).  Despite its white supremacist ideology, the Klan has also 
demonstrated remarkable flexibility in marketing, recruitment, networking, and 
organizational design. Framing itself and its organizational aims in a variety of manners 
(and sometimes even in contradictory ways), the Ku Klux Klan has shown tremendous 
resilience and an innate ability to appeal to a large swath of the American population.   
This dissertation seeks to answer two fundamental questions: Does one of the 
theoretical approaches in the field of terrorism studies prove adequate in explaining 
surges of Klan terrorism? And, if not, is there a combination from among these 
approaches that yields a better understanding of Klan violence? One impetus for this 
dissertation is the belief that a better understanding of terrorism in the past can assist in 
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preventing terrorism in the future. By understanding the nature of the Ku Klux Klan’s 
terrorism campaigns, by extension, we should better understand the trajectory of 
contemporary right wing terrorism.  With such understanding, it should be possible to 
highlight policy choices that minimize the success of any future domestic terrorist 
campaigns.  
Before going further, it must be emphasized that this dissertation does not purport 
to explain individual or isolated incidents of Klan terrorism; a certain level of racist 
violence has unfortunately been a continuing feature of American society.  Instead, this 
dissertation seeks to explain and understand campaigns of Klan terrorism.  This is more 
than a nuanced distinction.  Terrorism will never be completely eradicated.18  Terrorism 
is a tactic that has been used since ancient times and will continue to be used for the 
duration of human existence.  Although it will never be fully eliminated, it may be 
possible to prevent organizations from stringing together acts of terrorism into a sustained 
campaign, the concern of this dissertation.  Preventing campaigns is important as a way 
to reduce the total amount of violence and keep terrorist organizations from achieving 
their objectives.  
Terrorist campaigns are routinely mentioned throughout the literature, but hardly, 
if ever, actually defined.19  Providing such a definition on which to build is the first 
contribution of this dissertation.  From a military perspective, a campaign is defined as “a 
series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a military strategic or 
operational objective within a given time and space.”20  Adapting this definition, a 
                                                 
18 As explained in detail in Chapter II, terrorism is defined as the systematic use or threatened use of 
violence, directed against targets chosen for their symbolic or representative value, as a means of instilling 
anxiety in, transmitting one or more messages to, or altering the behavior of a wider target audience. 
19 For seminal works in terrorism studies which rely on the concept of a terrorist campaign without 
actually defining it, see: Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends : Understanding the Decline and 
Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). Martha Crenshaw, 
Terrorism in Context (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); Mark 
Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God : The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 3rd ed., Comparative 
Studies in Religion and Society 13 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Walter Laqueur, No 
End to War : Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Continuum, 2003). Christopher Hewitt, 
The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984).; Robert Anthony 
Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Random House Trade Paperback ed. (New 
York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006). 
20 United States Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-0: Chapter 4 Planning, Operational Art 
and Design and Assessment,” ed. Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC : 2006). 
 7
terrorist campaign will be defined as a series of systematic terrorist attacks aimed at 
accomplishing a specific objective within a given time and space.  The objectives of the 
Klan have changed dramatically over time: the overthrow of Republican government 
during the 1860s; maintenance of a nebulous “100% American” concept during the 
1920s; and opposition to desegregation efforts during the 1960s.  In order to send its 
message, the Klan targeted specific groups of people in hopes of achieving these goals: 
supporters of the Republican Party in the 1860s; bootleggers, Catholics, and perceived 
communists during the 1920s; and those who promoted Civil Rights during the 1960s.  In 
one study—the 1860s—ways and means were aligned effectively, resulting in the 
eventual attainment of Klan strategic ends.  For the vast majority of its life, however, the 
Klan has been unable to achieve its goals through the use of terrorism.  For over 80% of 
its life, the Klan has generated only small amounts of localized violence, but at other 
times, it has expanded the scope and scale of its terrorism.  The Klan almost universally 
falls short of goal achievement, but it has nonetheless been able to surge and sustain a 
series of terrorist acts aimed at accomplishing a specific objective—or, put more simply, 
to wage a terrorist campaign.  To further refine the scope of this study, only consecutive 
years in which ten or more documented acts of Klan terrorism occurred are considered. 
Additionally, as we are concerned with threats to national security, only periods in which 
the Klan was able to generate and sustain enough terrorism to generate a national 
response (either in terms of deployment of federal soldiers, or condemnation by national 
leaders) will the case be considered a campaign.  
It must also be kept in mind that this dissertation acknowledges the fact that there 
have always been peaks and lulls in racial tensions which result in sporadic outbreaks of 
violence.  This violence is usually constrained locally or regionally, and unless under the 
direction of an organization, has no stated political end.  At times, however, the Klan has 
taken advantage of societal unrest to generate sustained terrorist campaigns.  This has 
given the Klan the opportunity to take the normally localized violence and translate it into 
a program which generates national effects, which have in turn elicited a dedicated 
counter-campaign.  It is here—where the Klan has been able to generate systematic 
terrorist activity on a regional or national scale, and for extended periods of time—that 
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this dissertation focuses. This is not to say that at the start of each campaign the Klan had 
a theory of victory. Each of the campaigns studied in this dissertation had its trigger 
points and its objectives. However, this dissertation does not claim that the repertoire of 
Klan terrorism was the result of a rational calculation of means and ends. Rather, this 
dissertation implicitly argues that the violent output of a terrorist organization may start 
with concrete political objectives, but quickly becomes influenced by a host of other 
factors.21   Psychological pressures, the need for revenge, survivor guilt, political in-
fighting among factions within the group, even an abundance of resources, have all been 
cited as factors which influence and in some cases determine the actions of terrorist 
groups. As Jerrold Post once humorously quipped, “the cause is not the cause.”22 
Scholars and political leaders alike have sought explanations for how campaigns 
of terrorism emerge. Some approaches point to structural variables—a depressed 
economy, the presence of a left wing opponent, or the return of veterans from wars—
while others focus on the support given to terrorist organizations by sympathetic states or 
political parties.  Many advocate the need to treat the terrorist group as a rational actor, 
driven by specific decision-making processes and affected by the choices the group 
makes within a specific environment. By systematically comparing four cases—three 
campaigns and one negative case—according to the logic of Mill’s Methods of 
Agreement and Difference, the study rules out some existing causal explanations for Ku 
Klux terrorism; the study’s second contribution to the literature. This dissertation’s third 
contribution to the existing literature is to develop a new theory for explaining Klan 
terrorism. Specifically, the study uses the comparisons to ascertain what factors were 
necessary in enabling the Klan to coordinate sustained terrorist campaigns and how those 
factors interact with one another to achieve joint sufficiency.  Necessity will be 
determined via cross-case comparison using the logic of Mill’s Methods.23  Factors 
                                                 
21 The classic discussion of instrumental (strategic) versus organizational views of terrorism is Martha 
Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” in David C. Rapoport 
(ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
22 Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic:  Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological 
Forces,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich 
(Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 35. 
23 Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1961), 355-66. 
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determined to be necessary to explain Klan terrorist campaigns will be further scrutinized 
to determine joint sufficiency and to identify the mechanisms by which the necessary 
conditions combine to produce campaigns.   
Ultimately the dissertation finds that four factors—the presence of a safe haven, 
organizational structure, leadership, and recruitment techniques—are necessary and 
jointly sufficient to explain Klan campaign emergence.  By combining these factors in a 
manner which better reflects their interplay, a model offering greater explanatory value 
emerges.  The first significant set of correlates is the presence or absence of safe havens 
and their relation to the organizational structure chosen by Klan leadership.  The second 
set of correlates is the ability of the Klan to downplay its core ideology and effectively 
frame a recruitment message which resonates with a pre-existing dominant social 
narrative—a narrative usually based on mythologized history or an unfalsifiable belief 
system.  As will be explained in Chapter 8, the probabilistic model that emerges when 
these factors combines proves more effective in explaining and predicting campaigns of 
Klan terrorism than simply listing these factors as if they are not consciously combined 
for effect.   
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF DISSERTATION 
This dissertation aims to provide readers a better understanding of Ku Klux Klan 
terrorism as a way to shed light on the actual threat posed by contemporary right wing 
terrorist organizations.  Armed with more accurate analytic tools, scholars and policy 
makers should be better able to address the contemporary threats arrayed against the 
American government and society.   
For example, is it possible, in a country led by a liberal, mixed-race President 
governing amidst a global economic recession, that right wing terrorist organizations 
won’t resort to terrorism?  Are the values of 21st century America different enough from 
those of earlier generations to constrain the rise of right wing extremist movements?  Do 
the organization and ideology of modern right wing extremist organizations self limit 
future recruitment, or have these groups adapted enough to be able to broaden their 
appeal to a contemporary population?  Lastly, considering the recent downfall and 
marginalization of the Ku Klux Klan within the radical right, what conclusions can be 
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reached about the state’s ability to confront and constrain domestic terrorism?  Drawing 
on the example of the Ku Klux Klan phenomenon—the epitome of right wing terrorist 
organizations—this study attempts to shed light on these questions.  
The dissertation aims for relevance in both the realms of academia and counter 
terrorism policy.  From a scholarly perspective, this project breaks ground in at least two 
ways.  Most prominently, it is the first attempt to craft a model capable of explaining the 
“three waves” of Ku Klux Klan terrorism.  Many works have documented a specific 
wave of Ku Klux violence, while others have provided a broad historical narrative of 
Klan existence, but none has systematically compared the distinct waves with an eye to 
elucidating theory.   
Another scholarly aim of this study is to test theories found within terrorism 
studies.  Most works in the field focus almost exclusively on one of four dominant 
theoretical perspectives.  This dissertation will systematically compare three of these 
approaches to determine the relative weight each holds in predicting and explaining Klan 
terrorism.  The fourth approach—which focuses on individual motivations—is discussed 
in the following chapter but not tested, because the objective here is to explain why an 
organization collectively decides to systematically employ terrorism.   
From a practitioner’s point of view, this research could prove both timely and 
useful should recent warnings of racial hate resurgence be true.  According to the 
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), recent political and social developments have led 
to “the most significant growth [of right wing extremism] we’ve seen in 10 to 12 
years.”24  A leaked report from the Department of Homeland Security supports this 
statement, adding that the return of disgruntled veterans, along with the military skills 
they possess, “have the potential to boost the capabilities of extremists to carry out 
                                                 
24 Larry Keller, “The Second Wave: Return of the Militias,” in The Second Wave: Return of the 
Militias: A Special Report from the Southern Poverty Law Center (Montgomery, AL: SPLC, August 2009) 
, 7. The Southern Poverty Law Center is a non-governmental organization dedicated to tracking and 
exposing the activities of ‘hate groups.’  Founded in 1971 by lawyer Morris Dees, the SPLC proves to be 
an excellent source of information on recent right wing extremist movements.  For a history of the SPLC 
see the opening chapters of: Morris Dees and James Corcoran, Gathering Storm : America's Militia Threat, 
1st ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996). 
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violence.”25  In both reports, analysts emphasize the importance of environmental 
preconditions to support their claims of looming right wing resurgence.  Unfortunately, 
no analysis thus far has commented on the organizational design and dynamics of the 
movement, the networks they are using to propagate it, the recruiting techniques and 
ideology used to attract others, or the resources available to these groups.  Little has been 
said about the efforts and strategies of American law enforcement agencies or the 
significance of watchdog organizations like the SPLC or Anti-Defamation League 
(ADL).  It is likely that, once such variables are considered, the approaches taken to 
combat the current strain of right wing extremism would be modified in several ways.  
The model built in this dissertation aspires to provide useful guidance to aid policy 
makers effectively allocate resources to curb domestic terrorism. 
B. CASE SELECTION 
Readers of this study will undoubtedly ask “why study the Ku Klux Klan?”  The 
Ku Klux Klan was chosen for a number of reasons.  Among the most important is the 
Klan’s tremendous lifespan.  For over one hundred and forty years, American society has 
experienced both peaks and lulls in Klan terrorist activity.  Additionally, throughout this 
time, the Klan has altered its organizational design, shifted recruitment techniques, and 
operated during times when it attracted both social sympathy and outright hostility.  The 
Klan has tried to be all things to all people and—with varying degrees of success—has 
offered violent remedies to cure the perceived ills of society.  Amazingly, despite a white 
supremacist ideology at its core, the Klan has even managed to recruit African-
Americans into its ranks.  In short, this incredible lifespan provides the opportunity to test 
multiple theories about terrorism by focusing on a single organization.  Given the 
relatively short life span of other terrorist organizations, this is a rare opportunity.   
A focus on the Klan also proves interesting given the variations in its 
geographical reach and campaign intensity over four distinct periods of time.  In the first 
period, the 1860s, the Klan waged a very intense campaign of terrorism, but achieved 
                                                 
25 DHS Report on Rightwing Extremism. Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political 
Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment. Available from 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/5410658/DHS-Report-on-Right wing-Extremism; Accessed 05 June 2009. 
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influence only in southern states.  In period number two, the 1920s Klan launched a 
campaign with nationwide reach.  In contrast, the 1950–1960s reveals a period of limited 
campaign reach for the Klan, despite (or perhaps due to) more lethal weaponry and 
tactics.  In the fourth period studied, the 1970–1980s, we see the absolute marginalization 
of the Klan during a period when, at least theoretically, it should have flourished.  Given 
this wide differentiation across time, geographical space, and in levels of campaign 
violence we shall see certain recurrent variables.  
The Ku Klux Klan is also a useful organization to study thanks to the voluminous 
literature that has been produced about it over the years.26  This abundance is both a 
blessing and a curse, as authors range from those sympathetic to the Klan to those who 
despise it.  There are those who view the Klan’s activity as uncoordinated mob violence, 
a product of the social conditions of a given era.  Others portray Klan authority “leading  
 
 
                                                 
26 For histories of the entire lifespan of the Klan see: Chalmers, Hooded Americanism : The History of 
the Ku Klux Klan; Wyn Craig Wade, The Fiery Cross : The Ku Klux Klan in America (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1987); Michael Newton, The Ku Klux Klan : History, Organization, Language, Influence and 
Activities of America's Most Notorious Secret Society (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2007). Sara 
Bullard, Southern Poverty Law Center., and Klanwatch Project., The Ku Klux Klan : A History of Racism 
and Violence, 4th ed. (Montgomery, Ala.: Klanwatch, a project of the Southern Poverty Law Center, 1991). 
Robert P. Ingalls, Hoods, the Story of the Ku Klux Klan (New York: Putnam, 1979).For history of the 
1860s Klan see:  Trelease, White Terror; the Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction; 
Stanley Fitzgerald Horn, Invisible Empire; the Story of the Ku Klux Klan, 1866-1871 (Boston,: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1939); John C. Lester, D. L. Wilson, and Ku Klux Klan (19th cent.). Ku Klux Klan: Its 
Origin, Growth, and Disbandment (New York,: AMS Press, 1971). For the 1920s Klan see: MacLean, 
Behind the Mask of Chivalry : The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan; David A. Horowitz and Ku Klux 
Klan (1915- ). La Grande Klan No. 14 (La Grande Or.), Inside the Klavern : The Secret History of a Ku 
Klux Klan of the 1920s (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999); John Moffatt Mecklin, The 
Ku Klux Klan: A Study of the American Mind (New York,: Harcourt, Brace and company, 1924); Charles 
C. Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965); Patrick 
O'Donnell, ed. Ku Klux Klan: America's First Terrorists Exposed, vol. 1, Shadow History of the United 
States (West Orange, New Jersey: Idea Men Productions,2006); Shawn Lay, The Invisible Empire in the 
West : Toward a New Historical Appraisal of the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s, 1st pbk. ed. (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2004); United States Congress, The Ku Klux Klan, ed. First Session Sixty 
Seventh Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Rules (Washington DC: Government Print Office, 
1921).  For the 1950-1980s Klans see:  James Graham Cook, The Segregationists, 1st ed. (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962). Raphael S. Ezekiel, The Racist Mind : Portraits of American Neo-Nazis 
and Klansmen (New York: Viking, 1995); John George and Laird M. Wilcox, Nazis, Communists, 
Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe : Political Extremism in America (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 
1992); Stanton, Klanwatch : Bringing the Ku Klux Klan to Justice. Activities., The Present-Day Ku Klux 
Klan Movement; Report, Ninetieth Congress, First Session. Michael Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right 
: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement, Rev. ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1997). 
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to one great center, with one common head who, in the interest of any political party, 
governed and directed the dreadful machine.”27  The truth, undoubtedly, falls somewhere 
between these two extremes. 
The primary point of dissention about the Klan’s organization and ability to 
coordinate activity revolve around the Reconstruction era.  Those who wrote about the 
Ku Klux Klan between 1870 and 1910 tended to paint the Klan as a highly-coordinated 
entity, with every action controlled by a central authority.  Later authors (writing during 
or immediately after the “third wave” Klan) took a different perspective, relying heavily 
upon the 1870-1871 Congressional investigation into the Ku Klux Klan.  These authors 
dismissed the writings of earlier authors, asserting they were flawed and overly-
sympathetic of the Klan.  This ignored the fact that the KKK Reports produced by 
Congress were equally biased, written by Republican officials that despised everything 
about the Klan.  Contemporary (post-1960) histories of the Reconstruction era Klan 
routinely fail to consider that the national hierarchy of the Klan had already largely 
disappeared by the time of the investigations, and what was left following this 
disbandment were (as the reports accurately capture) autonomous vigilante units clinging 
to the image of Forrest’s Klan.  To navigate the conflicting currents in as neutral a 
manner as possible, primary source documents—from Klansmen, law enforcement 
agencies, non-governmental organizations, political leaders, and private citizens are also 
used.   
Finally, a focus on the Ku Klux Klan is relevant for policy reasons.  The type of 
terrorism represented by the Klan has been responsible for some of the deadliest violence 
in U.S. history.  Today, this form of terrorism remains a topic of great concern for 
counter terrorism policy analysts.  Armed with a better understanding of this violence, 
policy makers will be better equipped to craft strategies to counter it.  Although the 
choice to study this topic is partly driven by this normative consideration, the dissertation 
aims to treat the waves of Klan activity in an objective and clinical manner.  While the 
                                                 
27 The Nation's Peril. Twelve Years' Experience in the South. Then and Now. The Ku Klux Klan, a 
Complete Exposition of the Order: Its Purpose, Plans, Operations, Social and Political Significance; the 
Nation's Salvation  (New York,: Pub. by the friends of the compiler, 1872). For books, remove commas 
before parenthses. 
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author rejects the Klan’s ideology, objective analysis demands the dissertation be devoid 
of moral evaluations and pejorative labels in order to better understand how the Klan has 
persisted (and occasionally thrived) over such a substantial length of time. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This project differs from previous works on the Ku Klux Klan in that it 
systematically compares four different periods of time—three periods which represent 
campaigns of violent activity and one that does not.  This will facilitate testing the most 
common explanations of right wing terrorism alongside one another.  Numerous detailed 
histories have been written about the Klan, but none has performed a systematic 
comparison in an effort to explain why, where, and when the Klan was capable of 
stringing together terrorist violence into a sustained campaign.  This dissertation seeks to 
fill that void.     
This dissertation is a work of analysis, intended for a terrorism studies audience, 
rooted in the logic and methods of the political scientist, specifically utilizing 
comparative methodology.  Stephen Van Evera submits that “dissertations in political 
science can serve seven principal missions.”28 He delineates dissertation types as theory 
proposing, theory testing, literature assessing, policy prescriptive, historical explanatory, 
historical evaluative, and predictive.  Van Evera further explains “most dissertations 
perform several of these missions, and are thus hybrids.”29  This manuscript will fall 
among the realm of the hybrids by testing modern theories on the causes of terrorism, 
proposing modifications that better explain surges in Ku Klux violence, and 
recommending policy prescriptions to minimize the chances of future terrorist campaigns 
emerging.  By Van Evera’s definition, this thesis is therefore a theory testing, theory 
modifying, and policy prescriptive effort.  
In order to achieve these aims, the dissertation will utilize a qualitative, 
structured-focused analysis of Klan activity.  This approach is adopted for several 
reasons.  Primarily—as numerous scholars observe—the field of terrorism studies has 
                                                 
28 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 89-93. 
29 Ibid., 89. 
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long been plagued by non-cumulative efforts resulting in knowledge “highly contestable 
and largely unsupported by empirical research.”30  The inability to systematically 
compare and accumulate knowledge in studies of terrorism has caused at least one expert 
to lament “after 30 years of study, we simply should know more about terrorism than we 
currently do…that we continue to languish at this level of ignorance on such a serious 
subject is a cause of grave concern.”31  The shortage of cumulative terrorism knowledge 
has resulted in the political acceptance of recycled, speculative half-truths and narrow 
theories which eventually form the foundation of (usually ineffective) counter terrorism 
policy.  
In fairness to modern terrorism scholars, the post 9-11 explosion of terrorism-
related works has pushed the field to correct deficiencies and has reinvigorated research 
on terrorism in general.  As expected, the overwhelming majority of this work has 
focused on Islamic or Jihadi terrorism.  The emphasis, unfortunately, has done little to 
promote cumulative knowledge or theory development about domestic right wing 
terrorism, especially terrorism from racially-motivated extremist groups like the Klan.      
A structured, focused comparison should begin to rectify this problem.  The 
approach taken here seeks to “guide and standardize data collection, thereby making 
systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the case possible.”32  In short, 
the structured, focused approach was chosen in order to “draw the specific explanations 
of each case study into a broader, more generalized theory” and build a foundation that 
encourages cumulative future efforts.33   
Although the study’s approach helps remedy the problem of non-accumulative 
knowledge, there are potential shortcomings to this methodology worth mentioning.  
Foremost amongst these is the issue of selection bias.  If cases are not carefully screened 
and specifically selected, the findings of a study may grossly overstate the importance of 
                                                 
30 Richard Jackson, “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies,” European Political 
Science 6(2007): 245. 
31 Andrew Silke, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): 13. 
32 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, Bcsia Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 67. 
33 Ibid. 
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different variables examined within it.  Concomitantly, there is a danger of generalizing 
the findings of a specific case study to phenomena that may not be related to the focus of 
the original study.  In the field of terrorism studies, this is a common occurrence.  For 
example, Marc Sageman’s recent book Leaderless Jihad has been used to show the 
dangerous efficacy of fluid, cellular networks operating without a centrally established 
leadership core.34  Sageman’s book focuses almost exclusively upon Al Qaeda, yet his 
findings have been extrapolated to show how dangerous a non-hierarchical, cellular 
organization can be—an interpretation this dissertation directly challenges.  When 
commenting on the danger posed by cellular terrorist organizations, such a perspective 
confuses survival of an organization with its ability to sustain a coherent campaign.  As 
Sageman himself suggests, the organizational design may reflect terrorist desperation 
rather than signaling strategic success.35  The fact that several terrorist groups have 
experimented with cellular, leaderless forms of organization in the past and demonstrated 
a limited ability to sustain campaigns is rarely considered by those declaring we face an 
undefeatable foe; the modern Klan is but one example of the ultimate impotence of such 
foes. 
By singularly focusing on Ku Klux terrorism this dissertation mitigates many of 
the problems associated with choosing cases of different subclasses; as each of the 
campaigns studied is an example of Ku Klux terrorism, they all belong to exactly the 
same subclass.  The challenge then becomes choosing cases that “provide the kind of 
control and variation required by the research problem.”36  Specifically, it is important 
that periods of time be selected that are useful for testing the most common theories 
about the causes of terrorism.    
To those ends, the time periods to be examined were chosen because they 
represent either sustained spikes or unanticipated lulls in Ku Klux terrorism.  In line with 
Mill’s Method of Agreement, three cases share the same dependent variable (a spike in 
Klan terrorism), but each of those cases varies in terms of the “score” of several 
                                                 
34 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad : Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
35 Ibid., Chapter 7. 
36 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 83. 
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hypothesized independent variables in the literature used to explain terrorism.  Using the 
Method of Agreement, therefore, enables us to rule out those hypothesized causes.37  The 
fourth study was chosen because it was a failed campaign effort, thus rendering it a 
negative case, during a period of time when multiple theories of terrorism would expect 
campaign initiation.  I therefore call this anomalous period the “non-campaign.”  
Immersed in economic turmoil, with several ideological opponents to mobilize against, 
and with emerging capable leaders, the 1970–1980s study serves as a “most likely” case 
of a Klan campaign.38  This negative case enables us to employ Mill’s Method of 
Difference, whereby we can seek to isolate promising independent variables—that is, 
factors that co-vary with the dependent variable.  The use of both the Method of 
Agreement and Method of Difference to explain any given phenomenon is commonly 
known as the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference.  The Joint method, in effect, 
“affords a higher probability to the conclusion” reached in the analysis.39  In short, this 
dissertation has chosen specific periods of time—guided by Mill’s Methods of 
Experimental Inquiry—to minimize the possibility of overstating or understating 
findings.40   
Founded upon the logic of Mill’s Methods, the dissertation employs a structured, 
focused method of qualitative analysis.  This dissertation is “focused” because it does not 
seek to describe or explain all aspects of the Klan’s history.  Rather, it deals exclusively 
with the phenomenon of Ku Klux Klan terrorism and, specifically the ability and inability 
of the Klan to mount a sustained terrorist campaign.  While Ku Klux terrorism is the 
exclusive focus, it is hoped that the findings may trigger follow on study and prove 
applicable in broader areas.  The Ku Klux Klan is representative of domestic right wing 
terrorist organizations, so the study may—by extension—also provide insight into other 
identity motivated terrorism within the United States.  Of course, as one moves from the 
specific topic of Ku Klux Klan terrorism outward (to racial right wing terrorism, to right 
                                                 
37 Copi, Introduction to Logic, 364. 
38 Harry Eckstein”Case Study and Theory in Political Science.” In Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. 
Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7, 79–137 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975). 
39 Copi, Introduction to Logic, 415. 
40 Ibid., 355-66. 
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wing terrorism in general, to terrorism broadly defined), it is possible the findings in this 
study will lose much of their explanatory power.  Basically, policy implications with 
regard to domestic right wing terrorism will not be uniformly applicable to other forms of 
terrorism or political extremism.  In short, this dissertation is focused on Ku Klux 
terrorism in particular and domestic right wing terrorism in general.  Any further 
generalizations about terrorism at large must be viewed with appropriate caution.  
The dissertation is “structured” in that specific, standardized sets of questions will 
be asked for each time period.  For each period studied, the same set of questions—drawn 
from long-established theories of terrorism—will be posed.  Giving each case study the 
same organization and structure, rather than crafting a distinct historical narrative for 
each time period, facilitates comparison of variables across the cases.  Variables that have 
routinely been used to explain the emergence of right wing terrorism will be examined 
alongside one another to determine their relative weight in explaining Klan terrorism.  
Variables will be extracted from three leading approaches—structural, sponsorship, and 
organizational—all of which are reviewed in the following chapter.  For instance,  by 
applying structural theories in each case study the presence or absence of an economic 
recession, the presence of veterans returning from war, and the presence or absence of an 
ideological enemy will be considered.  Sponsorship and organizational theories will be 
broken down and explored in similar fashion.        
Although Mill’s Joint Method is intended to assist clearing up the muddied waters 
of causation, reality often throws a wrench into attempts at clean scientific analysis.  
Reality presents us with the problem of having different intensities of outcomes in 
positive cases, as well as different outcome intensities in negative cases.  Fortunately, the 
methods described above are also useful in describing concomitant variation between 
causal variables and the outcome produced.41  And again, the case studies selected are 
helpful in discovering the impact each variable has upon resultant levels of terrorist 
activity.  A detailed analysis of findings using the Joint Method of Agreement and  
 
 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 424-27. 
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Difference, blended with the Method of Concomitant Variation, is provided in the 
findings chapter, with political and academic implications discussed in the concluding 
chapter.   
D. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is divided into three sections.  The opening section, which 
includes Chapters I and II, serves as the conceptual, definitional, and analytic framework 
for the remainder of the study.  Chapter I identifies and highlights the central focus of this 
dissertation—namely, how to best understand the sustained campaigns of Ku Klux 
terrorism and how to apply this knowledge to undercut similar right wing efforts.  
Chapter II defines concepts relevant to the study, provides characteristics of right wing 
terrorism, and explains why the Ku Klux Klan was chosen as the dissertation’s focus. 
Chapter II also details why the field of terrorism studies is best suited for research on the 
Klan and concludes with an overview of the field’s dominant explanatory approaches—
broadly defined as individual, structural, sponsorship, and organizational. Following this 
literature review, the dissertation changes gears and begins deeper analysis of Klan 
campaigns.  
The second section, Chapters III through VI, presents the four studies of Ku Klux 
Klan terrorism used to test the three dominant explanatory approaches.  Each chapter will 
open with a narrative providing historical context in an attempt to highlight the dominant 
social nuances of the given time.  Chapter III details the 1866 birth of Ku Klux terrorism, 
its meteoric rise, and eventual downfall around 1871.  Chapter IV presents an analysis of 
the “second-wave” Klan which emerged in 1915 and achieved national prestige and 
power by the mid-1920s.  Chapter V follows the structured format and investigates the 
“third wave” of Klan terrorism during the 1950s and 1960s.  Chapter VI deviates from 
the previous three chapters in that it explores a negative case.  This chapter will seek to 
explain why the Ku Klux Klan was unable to lead or coordinate a terrorist campaign 
during the 1970–1980s—a presumably ripe era which produced Posse Comitatus, the 
“Christian Patriots,” and lone-wolf terrorists.   
The final section—Chapters VII, VIII, and IX—offers the overall findings, as 
well as political and academic implications of the dissertation.  Chapter VII provides test 
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results and determines the necessity of each factor tested.  Chapter VIII seeks to establish 
joint sufficiency and offer a more nuanced explanatory tool for understanding Klan 
terrorism campaigns which builds atop the management field’s work on contingency 
theory and the social movement field’s work on strategic framing.  To close, Chapter IX 
offers several implications of the project, suggests avenues for further research on right 
wing terrorism, and recommends policy prescriptions based on the findings.   
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CHAPTER II. DEFINING, UNDERSTANDING, AND 
REVIEWING PREVALENT THEORIES OF RIGHT WING 
TERRORISM  
 As with any project, how one views and analyzes a subject is determined largely 
by the perceptual lenses one uses.  This dissertation asserts the label right wing terrorist 
organization is most fitting to describe the Ku Klux Klan.  It is through the perceptual 
lens offered by terrorism studies that campaigns of Ku Klux terrorism will be analyzed.  
Other scholars may disagree with both this categorization and the literature that yields it.  
For starters, some might disagree that the Ku Klux Klan should be described as an 
“organization.”   
 Many see the Klan as a movement, best understood by social movement 
scholars.42  In a similar vein, others label the Klan a conspiracy, which represents the 
merging of both legal and illegal groups seeking the same political endstate.43  What  
these perspectives do, however, is erase distinctions amongst individual groups and paint 
that all organizations on the racist right as elements of a Ku Klux movement.  In other 
words, viewing the Klan as a movement or conspiracy implies that several different 
groups and organizations adopted a shared ideology and work—not necessarily in a 
coordinated manner—to achieve some shared desired ends.  But if this is true and the 
Klan is indeed a movement, we should then expect no real hierarchy, and no rules or 
regulations established to govern daily operations.  And indeed, there is evidence to 
support such a view.  During the 1860s, the actions of several organizations—the Knights 
of the White Camilla, the Black Cavalry, and the Men of Justice to name a few—came to 
be labeled Ku Klux, even though each organization had its own leadership and self-
regulatory processes.44  The presence of such groups, while an indicator of a burgeoning 
social movement aimed at rejecting Republican policies, does not invalidate the notion 
                                                 
42 The Anti-Defamation League – a leading watchdog group focusing on  radical right wing extremists 
– as well as several scholars (Rory McVeigh and Stuart Wright) label the Ku Klux Klan as a “movement.”   
43 For example see: Trelease, White Terror; the Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern 
Reconstruction. 
44 Ibid., xlvi. 
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that the Ku Klux Klan had a distinct and unique organization, their own support networks 
with political parties, and links with various state and local law enforcement 
organizations.  
This dissertation acknowledges the social movement view of the Ku Klux Klan.  
In fact, the dissertation borrows insights regarding strategic message framing from the 
social movement literature.  However, I argue that the Klan is better understood as an 
organization which operates within a broader White Supremacist/White Nationalist 
movement.45  As will be shown, the Klan has effectively moved into and out of what 
could be rightfully labeled movements, but when doing so has done so for strategic and 
organizational reasons.  This thesis maintains the Ku Klux Klan is best viewed as an 
organization because of its established hierarchy, which prescribes duties and functions 
of “dens” operating at the local level up to “realms, dominions, and provinces” at the 
district, state and national levels.46  Additionally, Klan members pay dues, adhere (in 
some instances) to a rigid code of secrecy, and participate in Ku Klux-specific 
ceremonies and rituals.  An oath of allegiance is required from each member, following 
an interrogation and acceptance of an obligation to the Klan.47  Such demands simply do 
not exist in a movement, but are inherent to an organization.  
Additionally, the adjective terrorist should precede the term organization when 
describing the Ku Klux Klan.  As will be explored in greater depth in the sections that 
follow, the terrorist label is appropriate to describe the organization’s overwhelming 
reliance upon the use or threatened use of violence to send messages to a wider target 
audience.  Klan violence became so normalized at some points, that the term “Ku 
Kluxed” became interchangeable with floggings, lynchings, or whippings.  Although the 
term right wing terrorist organization is valid to describe the Ku Klux Klan, it is not  
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without its own definitional problems.  In order to better understand what a right wing 
terrorist organization is, we must deconstruct the term into its individual parts and 
clearly establish definitions for each.          
To achieve value-neutrality, it is critically important to establish definitions 
devoid of pejorative insinuations or negative moral associations.   As will be explained, 
each component of the term right wing terrorist organization possesses uncertainty, 
negative connotations, and lends itself to propagandistic use.  To minimize this 
ambiguity, a clinical approach must be taken to more precisely explain certain 
phenomena, more accurately categorize data, and better understand the topic of inquiry—
in this case, right wing terrorism as exemplified by the Ku Klux Klan.  This will be 
accomplished by defining how the term terrorism will be used throughout this work.    
Defining Terrorism 
Any terrorism study worth the paper it has been written on begins with an 
overview of the definitional problems within the field of terrorism studies.48  This work is 
no different.  Terrorism—a violent form of political extremism—is a term that has 
evaded broadly accepted definition.  In what is regarded as the most extensive survey of 
the field, Alex Schmid and A.J. Jongman note the existence of over one hundred different 
definitions of terrorism containing at least twenty different definitional elements amongst 
them.49  Governments, for obvious reasons, tend to emphasize the defining feature of 
terrorism as the involvement of sub-national groups.  This emphasis allows governments 
to avoid any of their own state-directed violence being labeled terrorism.  Others 
emphasize that terrorism is directed against “innocents,” “soft targets,” or “passive” 
military targets.  The emphasis on these features prompts the question: who is innocent or 
what is a passive military force?  The answer, of course, is entirely subjective.  Still 
 
 
                                                 
48 Those that do not are apt to quickly sidestep the definitional issue, submit their version as correct, 
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49 Alex Peter Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism : A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
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others assert terrorism is simply a tactic “that terrorizes,” a tautological view that clouds 
analytical waters, introduces unquantifiable psychological components, and prevents 
cumulative study.     
Terrorism, for purposes of this study, is defined as “the use or threatened use of 
violence, directed against targets chosen for their symbolic or representative value, as a 
means of instilling anxiety in, transmitting one or more messages to, and thereby 
manipulating the perceptions and behavior of wider target audiences.”50  According to 
this definition’s architects, “regardless of whether one sympathizes or abhors the 
underlying motives or proclaimed causes—a terrorist can be identified purely by the 
methods he or she employs.”51  Bale and Ackerman further explain: 
The best way to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence 
is to recognize that most acts of violence are dyadic—that is they involve 
only two parties or protagonists, the perpetrator(s) and the victim(s).  In 
contrast, all bona fide acts of terrorism are triadic in that they involve not 
just perpetrator(s) and victim(s) but also wider target audience(s), whose 
attitudes and behavior the terrorists are consciously seeking to 
influence…the most important nexus is between the perpetrator(s) and the 
target audience(s) they are trying to influence.52 
To clarify the concept, let us begin with the hypothetical bombing of an 
automotive plant in Detroit.  The bombing, which killed ten senior executives, was the 
work of a recently laid-off worker.  When taken into custody, the perpetrator tells police 
“those damn people ruined my life…my wife and kids have left me, I lost my house, and 
everything in my life fell apart…I wanted them and their families to feel the same pain I 
felt.”  Although tragic, this scenario is not an example of terrorism.  The perpetrator was 
simply lashing out in order to hurt the people that he felt were responsible for his 
misfortunes.  This is an example of a dyadic relationship between the perpetrator and the 
victim(s).  Violence, in this case, was an end unto itself and the perpetrator achieved his 
objective through the murder of his former employers. 
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 To understand how this same bombing scene could be considered an act of 
terrorism, the comments made by the perpetrator need to be different.  The perpetrator 
would have to tell police, for instance, that “this attack is the first strike against 
industrialization and exploitation of the modern workers…to regain our dignity, we must 
be prepared to fight and destroy this evil system…workers unite…industries beware, 
your days of worker enslavement are numbered.”  In this example, the killing of the ten 
senior executives was a means to an end.  The bomber used the violence to send a 
warning message to industries while simultaneously attempting to stir others to violent 
action.  This scenario is an example of terrorism—a triadic relationship in which the 
perpetrator (the bomber), sends a message through representative victims (the ten slain 
executives) to wider target audiences (industries and possible sympathizers).  With the 
concept clarified, the task of differentiating types of terrorism can now be undertaken.            
Typologies of Terrorism 
Developing a useable typology could prove remarkably beneficial to researchers 
studying terrorism.  Unfortunately, the task of standardizing the categorization of 
different types of terrorism has proven elusive.  The difficulty cannot be attributed to a 
lack of ways to categorize terrorism.  In fact, the opposite problem exists; difficulty 
springs from the fact that there are simply too many ways in which to categorize 
terrorism.  In 1978, Chalmers Johnson lamented “there are almost as many typologies of 
terrorism as there are analysts.”53  In the thirty years following his comment, little 
progress has been made in synthesizing different approaches into a widely-accepted 
typology.   
Although the number of classifications is enormous, the vast majority fall into one 
of four predominant approaches. These include actor-based, means-based, purpose-
based, and political orientation-based typological approaches.  For instance, a study on 
the use of suicide terrorist attacks would likely utilize a means-based typology that better 
refines data regarding the use of suicide.  In short, the typology used must meet the needs 
of the researcher and his particular research project.  Here it must be noted that most 
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studies utilize a hybrid approach that blends multiple aspects of the four pure approaches 
into a form that best suits the needs of a particular research project.  This dissertation 
likewise uses a hybrid blend of the actor-based and political orientation-based typologies.  
The pure types of these approaches will be discussed below.         
Most typologies in terrorism studies start with an actor-based distinction of 
protagonists, which begins by differentiating state terrorism (terrorism from above) from 
non-state terrorism (terrorism from below).  Relying upon an actor-based categorization, 
state terrorism can be further broken down in a variety of manners.  In the non-state 
category, we find actor-based studies that focus on Palestinian insurgent terrorism, Indian 
sub-state terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, Jewish terrorism, lone-wolf terrorism, or 
any distinction made based on a group’s location or a distinguishable physical attribute 
(i.e. color of skin).  A recent branch of actor-based typological study has focused on 
transnational terrorists—sub entities that, due to the effects of globalization, draw 
adherents across state boundaries and generate international effects.    
A second method is to use a means-based classification.  This method focuses on 
either the types of weapons used or the preferred method of the terrorist act. This 
classification is frequently used by those focusing on how terrorist attacks are carried out.  
A means-based classification is especially helpful to those who wish to understand 
suicide terrorism, biological terrorism, hijacking, assassinations, or any specific type of 
terrorist attack without regard to the perpetrators, their motivations, or their ideology.   
The third approach worth mentioning is the purpose-based approach.  Here, terms 
such as instrumental terrorism, organizational terrorism, or inspirational terrorism are 
used to describe the desired endstate of terrorism.  These purposes may include: (1) 
attrition, attempting to persuade your enemy of your long-term resolve and strength; (2) 
intimidation, attempting to prevent an undesired behavior from your enemy through the 
use of threats, costly signals, and selective violence; (3) provocation, attempting to goad 
the enemy into a response that is heavy-handed in the attempt to persuade your audience 
that the enemy is evil and untrustworthy; (4) spoiling, the use of violence to ensure any 
peace negotiation fails; and (5) outbidding, the competition against other organizations 
 27
for popular support among a certain audience.54  The purpose based approach considers 
terrorism to be a rational act carried out following a cost/benefit analysis by the 
organization’s leadership (based on an economic theory of terrorism).  This dissertation 
agrees with the assertion that terrorism is a rational act, but will not use a purpose-based 
typology.     
The final method of categorizing terrorism—and the one this dissertation draws 
on most—is based on a political-orientation typology.  This method most commonly 
relies upon a linear “left-right” conception of the political spectrum.  Although the left-
right paradigm has changed dramatically over time, it is appropriate to revisit the origins 
of the term to better understand how the concept has evolved to its present usage.  To do 
so, one must turn back history some two-hundred years to the Age of European 
Enlightenment.  In this period, the political terms “right” and “left” referred to the circa-
1780 seating arrangements within various French legislative assemblies.  The parties 
loyal to the monarch sat on the right, while liberal pro-Enlightenment parties sat on the 
left.55  The differences, however, went well beyond the physical location of their seats.  
The leftists believed that human reason and the inherent goodness of mankind were 
capable of solving most social problems, a belief that many rightists interpreted as anti-
religious.  The left maintained some ties to religion, but promoted the concept that—
following creation—God left humans the necessary abilities with which to govern society 
without continued interference.  Leftists tend to support equal representation, universal 
suffrage, free markets, and autonomy from religious and cultural authority.56  The 
rightists, on the other hand, asserted that human reason would fail to solve the problems 
facing society.  Only empowered social institutions could restrain evil human impulses 
and prevent a self-interested society from destroying itself.  Displaying an extreme 
pessimism about the eventuality of human progress, the right emphasized that societal 
order—usually in line with religious edicts—is best established and maintained by 
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empowered elites.  From these roots, the right commonly champions empowered rulers, 
class-based economies, and the societal role of the church.57   
Of course, times have changed, and the “monarchists versus reformists” basis of 
the right-left spectrum has changed them.  As will be discussed, modern right wing 
terrorism is generally fueled by conceptions of “conservatism, religiosity, patriotism, 
nationalism and racism,” whereas hints of “liberalism, secularism, internationalism, 
collectivism, and egalitarianism” can be found in incidents of left wing terrorism.58  
Ironically, despite their polar-opposite political goals, when put into practice by close-
minded individuals, the outcomes of these ideologies are virtually identical.   
Characteristics of Right Wing Ideology 
Right wing extremism should not be depicted as a unified entity.  As Eatwell and 
O’Sullivan note, “the right should be conceived as not one monolithic right, but a 
collection.”59 Highlighting the point, some describe the extremist right as a “secret 
collective of paramilitary survivalists, tax protestors, bankrupt farmers, bikers, prisoners, 
Odinists, and devotees of the Identity Church, linked together by an elaborate network of 
computer boards, desktop publications, and telephone hotlines.”60 It might appear that 
trying to link these disparate groups together in any manner would be an exercise in 
futility.  Although the attempt proves difficult, it is not wholly impossible.  Right wing 
extremism is best differentiated from other brands of extremism by its propensity to 
exhibit ultra-nationalist tones, its expression of “anti-ideologies,” and a paranoid belief in 
global conspiracies.    
As one may expect, expressions of ultra-nationalism are the most common of 
right wing extremist calling cards.  The central concept of ultra-nationalism is that “only 
people belonging to a particular nationality have a right to reside within that group’s 
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country.”61  Additionally, all others possessing that nationality around the world have the 
right to relocate and live within that established country.  The great majority of right wing 
extremists espouse a unique and intense loyalty to specific “in-groups” based almost 
exclusively upon that particular group’s definition of nationality (or other collective 
identity, such as religion).  The key to answering several questions about a particular 
group rests with understanding its member’s conception of nationality.  For most of these 
groups, one’s nationality goes well beyond one’s country of residence.  Instead, it is 
better as a shared set of traditions, cultures, beliefs, or heritage.  A misunderstanding of 
the concept has led to several broad generalizations of all right wing extremists being 
racist, xenophobic, or fascist.  But these characteristics are simply manifestations of ultra-
nationalism. In many instances—the Ku Klux Klan being a perfect example—extremist 
organizations do determine nationality largely by race.  This has led many scholars to 
“regard the entire right wing from moderate conservative to Neo-Nazi as objectively 
racist.”   However, this broad assertion is “simply not justified.”62   
For some right wing groups, “nationality” reflects a person’s legal status, 
regardless of race.  Such groups pay little attention to race and instead focus on the 
legality of an individual’s immigration into the country and whether or not that individual 
took the “proper” legal steps to attain citizenship.  If an individual is deemed an illegal, 
then, according to the extremist group, he or she should have no rights or privileges 
prescribed by that nation’s government.  This leads to the sweeping generalization that 
right wing groups are blatantly xenophobic.  However, although xenophobia is a 
characteristic of some groups, it would again be incorrect to assert that it is true of all 
right wing extremists.  Other right wing groups define nationality by adherence to a 
specific religious doctrine.  Hence, pan-Islamic, pan-Jewish, or pan-Christian state 
formations are the aim for some right wing extremist groups.  These particularly 
dangerous groups care less about race or citizenship status, but instead fight for the 
advancement of their religion and fellow co-religionists.  From these groups, the 
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misconception that all right wing extremists are religious zealots is born.  In sum, what 
seems safest to say is that a group’s conception of nationality—be it “The Nation of 
Islam,” “The Aryan Nation,” or “America for Americans”—and the degree of loyalty 
exhibited to that conception are perhaps the strongest indicators of future extremist 
action.   
The second major characteristic of right wing extremism is similarly difficult to 
contextualize.  Perhaps the easiest way to view it is as actions born of an ‘anti-
ideology.’63  Right wing extremists are notoriously anti-Marxist, anti-capitalist, anti-
intellectual, anti-liberal, anti-bourgeois and, in some specific instances, anti-clerical.64  
Unlike left wing extremists who can draw upon the writings of Marx, Lenin, Mao, 
Bakunin, Marighella, and/or Fanon, there has been no “long-term intellectual evolution of 
right wing theory” for right wing extremists to use.65  There is no established intellectual 
tradition for them to draw upon.    Instead, right wing ideology is most often articulated 
in contradistinction to other forms of political thought, which reveals why right wing 
terrorism is commonly viewed as a “reactive” form of violence.   
Finally, right wing extremists commonly justify their acts as necessary steps to 
expose and defeat conspiratorial efforts that threaten their nation.  Thus, understanding 
the conspiratorial nature of right wing extremism offers researchers insights into the 
targets and strategies of right wing extremist organizations. Understanding a particular 
group’s conception of nationality—and the in-groups and out-groups that result—is 
critical to understanding the role that particular conspiracy theories play in group 
dynamics and activities.  For domestic groups that base their conception of nationality on 
religion, it is common to find references to the “Zionist Occupational Government”—a 
Jewish cabal that has purportedly taken over the federal government and bends policy to 
benefit Jewish interests. For groups that base their conception of nationality on the 
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legality of American citizenship, there is a perception that the New World Order—an 
eclectic band of international communists, Jews, and/or bankers—is plotting to take over 
the United States with the help of the evil armies of the United Nations.  These groups 
proclaim the existence of UN-created concentration camps scattered throughout the 
Pacific Northwest that will be used to systematically eradicate Americans who resist the 
creation of a global government.  Groups that hold this belief urge their members to 
become self-sufficient survivalists, stockpiling food, weapons, and ammunition for their 
eventual clash with the UN armies.  Many right wing organizations promise to resist 
some world transformative force.  From an organizational perspective, a belief in 
conspiracies helps the group hold on to its members, and the lack of evidence supporting 
its claims only goes to show how crafty its opponents are at covering everything up. 
Now that the definitional foundations for the dissertation have been laid, this 
chapter will turn to a review of the approaches and theories that have been used to 
explain and predict campaigns of right wing extremism.  It is from these theories and 
commonly espoused explanations that the factors tested within this thesis were drawn.  
A. THEORIES OF TERRORISM 
There is a trend in terrorism studies to label previous research as misguided, 
statistically flawed, ahistorical, politicized, overly passionate, or—in some cases—
completely wrong.  This dissertation argues that previous work contains, at a minimum, 
kernels of truth that point to a more accurate understanding of terrorism.  Instead of 
dismissing past works outright, scholars should instead seek to blend the truths of each 
perspective and work towards a more synthesized understanding of terrorism.  Open and 
unbiased comparison of differing theories is therefore necessary to determine the relative 
weight each approach offers to best explain the terrorism phenomenon in question—Ku 
Klux terrorism in this case. Before attempting this comparison, it is necessary to discuss 
each approach individually to determine their individual strengths and weaknesses.   
This section will open with a review of the individual-level approaches to 
understanding and explaining terrorism.  Although individual-level explanations of 
terrorism will not actually be tested in this dissertation—as they tend to focus on 
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individual motivations to carry out terrorist attacks and not on group efforts—they are 
nonetheless worth reviewing.  As progress is made in understanding the human mind and 
the cognitive processes involved in identity formation these approaches should prove 
ever-more valuable in explaining and predicting terrorist behavior.  Unfortunately, as the 
conclusions chapter will discuss, this understanding still requires further research.   
The section will then turn to an overview of structural approaches, which argue 
terrorism is the byproduct of a specific environment.  Economic distress, presence of left 
wing opposition, and the return of veterans from war are the variables that will be tested 
using this particular approach.  Following the review of structural theories, the 
sponsorship approach will be examined.  These theories share the view that an external 
sponsor—either a state or a political party—is key to understanding terrorism.  The 
sponsorship approach will be parsed into two tests: the first determining whether or not a 
terrorist organization relies heavily upon a third party sponsor that provides direct, active 
support, the second test dealing with a more limited form of support in the form of tacit 
support.  Finally, this section will examine of the organizational approach.  
Organizational approaches view terrorism as products of organizational design, 
leadership, and proper messaging. According to these approaches, a better understanding 
of decision-making processes within the terrorist group, the capability of leaders, and 
membership sustainment techniques help explain when terrorism will emerge and for 
how long it can be sustained.  Before focusing on the four approaches individually, the 
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to sustain operations 
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antisocial personality 
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they have kinship or 
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Della Porta 
Table 1.   Approaches to Understanding Terrorism 
1. Individual Approaches 
If we consider structural and sponsorship approaches to primarily focus on macro-
variables found within society at large, and organizational approaches to focus on the 
meso-level variables involved with a group’s internal dynamics, then individual 
approaches focus on those micro-level factors that compel humans to join terrorist 
organizations and carry out violence on their behalf.  From the earliest studies of 
terrorism, questions of why an individual would resort to such violence deeply interested 
psychologists.  This interest ultimately set the foundation for terrorism studies.  
Beginning as early as 1870, research into the causes of terrorism focused on the 
individual psychology of terrorists.  By modern standards, early research was 
questionable in both its scientific approaches and underlying assumptions.  Scholars of 
the time viewed terrorism primarily as a deviant activity and hypothesized that only 
mentally disturbed individuals were capable of carrying out such heinous acts.  Scholars 
who focused on individual approaches considered “terrorism to be expressive rather than 
instrumental political behavior” and asserted terrorism was carried out by “people acting 
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out their emotions, not from rational calculators.”66  Given this assumption, it was only 
natural for experts to search for shared physical or mental abnormalities amongst 
terrorists.  Therefore, early terrorism studies dedicated a significant amount of effort to 
uncovering the inner workings of a presumed terrorist mind. 
From the physiological perspective, the late 19th century works of Cesare 
Lombroso, a pioneer of scientific criminology, were considered path breaking.  
Lombroso argued criminals could be identified by physical attributes, and he established 
a checklist of biologically-inherited traits that could be used to identify the fringe 
elements of society: sloping foreheads, asymmetrical faces, and ears and arms of unusual 
size were but a few.67  David Hubbard, who posited that abnormal vestibular functions 
play a part in the making of a terrorist, based his argument on the medical examination of 
over eighty terrorists from eleven countries and findings that over 90% of those examined 
possessed defective vestibular functions in the middle ear.68  He later went on to 
emphasize the roles of chemical imbalances in the formation of a terrorist.69  Yet another 
unique idea was derived from a study exploring aggression in rats.  Biochemist Paul 
Mandel discovered suppressed levels of gamma-aminobutyric acid and serotonin led to 
an increase of aggression in rodents.  These findings, in turn, were used to explain 
aggressive behavior in terrorists—despite the fact no tests were actually done on human 
subjects.70  Although society may equate terrorists with rats, scholars remained 
unconvinced by this extrapolation and turned elsewhere for insight.  Instead of 
investigating physical defects, psychologists proposed that mental defects were a more 
appropriate explanation for terrorism.              
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The earliest psychological work on terrorism was based on the assumption that 
terrorists possessed some degree of mental disorder.  Psychologists initially viewed 
terrorism as an abnormal behavior; a behavior that “is often consistent with the presence 
of some psychological disorder or distress, at the very least, suggestive of a debilitating 
condition adversely affecting the well-being of the sufferer.”71  As Horgan affirms, 
classifying terrorists as abnormal “seems plausible, and makes us feel at the same time 
more comfortable and capable in understanding extreme behavior.”72  Indeed, since it is 
easier to think of terrorists as monstrous psychopaths, the mental disorder perspective of 
terrorism became an ever more attractive focus for terrorism scholars.    
In his 1981 article, R.R. Corrado reviewed the pre-1980 theories which 
presuppose terrorist behavior stems from antisocial personality disorders—primarily 
psychopathy and sociopathy.73  Cooper and Pearce, the foremost proponents of the 
antisocial personality disorder theory both viewed a terrorist as “an aggressive 
psychopath who has espoused some particular cause because extremist groups can 
provide an external focal point for all the things that have gone wrong in his life.”74  
Cooper goes on to note that terrorists “might more accurately be described as 
psychopathic or sociopathic personalities for whom political terrorism provides a vehicle 
for impulses that would otherwise find another outlet.”75  According to his line of 
thought, a personality disorder is what drives a person to commit terrorism.  
Unfortunately, this hypothesis does not stand scrutiny, and Cooper and Pierce’s findings 
were swept aside on the grounds of extremely shaky evidence.   
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Although the notion of a terrorist as psychopath/sociopath has been largely 
rejected, work continues on several possible psychological explanations of terrorism.  
Much psychologically-based terrorism work rests upon the popular frustration-aggression 
hypothesis advocated by a team of Yale scholars in 1939.76  They asserted that 
“aggression is always a consequence of frustration” and that “the existence of frustration 
always leads to some form of aggression.”77  Unlike the modern use of the term, 
“frustration” was defined then as an external occurrence that causes “an interference with 
the occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in the behavior 
sequence.”78  The inability of a person, or group of people, to achieve their life goals thus 
leads to terrorist behavior in order to remove the source of goal frustration from their 
path.  Ted Gurr expounded and built upon on the frustration-aggression hypothesis, 
introducing a theoretical synthesis that—according to several scholars—has proven 
helpful in understanding terrorism.79  Gurr’s relative deprivation theory argues that it is 
“the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of 
collective value satisfaction that disposes men to violence.”80  Primarily a sociological 
theory built atop the frustration-aggression hypothesis, Gurr’s blended theory will be 
discussed again in the structural approach section that follows.  
The final psychological hypothesis to be discussed is the narcissistic rage 
hypothesis, a theory most vocally championed by Jerrold Post.  “As a general rule, 
narcissism may be viewed as a range of psychoanalytic orientations, impulses, or 
behavioral patterns either wholly or overwhelmingly subject to ego concerns, as opposed 
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to object concerns.”81  Based largely on Sigmund Freud’s 1914 On Narcissism: An 
Introduction, Post argues that a narcissistic personality is developed when one over-
invests in oneself at the expense of emotionally investing in others.82  According to 
Pearlstein, another advocate of the narcissistic-rage hypothesis, “political terrorism may 
be regarded as an excellent example of narcissistic object manipulation” that allows a 
terrorist to resolve inner ego conflicts through pathological public acts and, 
simultaneously, defend or repair his/her own self-image and conceptions of self-esteem.83  
According to champions of this approach, terrorist behavior is the result of adolescent 
psychological “externalization and splitting” that results in an inability to “integrate the 
good and bad parts of the self.”84  The inability to rectify the self during adolescence thus 
produces a “condition of helpless defeatism…and a wish to destroy the source of 
narcissistic injury.”85          
Although individual and psychological theories of terrorism maintain large 
degrees of support from the general population, amongst terrorism experts there is an 
established and ever-growing sense of pessimism about this approach.  The most 
common rebuttal to this approach is that, although the findings it offers may be somewhat 
helpful in explaining a specific individual’s reasons for committing terrorism, they cannot 
account for the vast majority of people who have suffered frustration, have narcissistic 
personalities, or have psychopathic or sociopathic issues but do not resort to violence.  
Additionally, the hope of discovering the “terrorist personality” has been dashed by 
studies indicating the general absence of psychopathy, narcissism, or sociopathy in 
individual terrorists.  The field, in turn, has thus largely coalesced around the idea that 
“the the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality.”86   
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By the mid-to-late 1980s, psychological explanations of individual terrorist 
behavior had been called into question and largely discredited.  Those interested in 
individual approaches to understanding terrorism began to focus on friendship and 
kinship networks, an approach more sociological than psychological.  Relying on access 
to the terrorists themselves, scholars such as Ferracutti, Della Porta, Moyano, Waldmann, 
Alonso, and Post have successfully argued that an individual’s radicalization process 
begins with participation in social or political organizations such as mountaineering 
clubs, church groups, or political parties.87  
From these perspectives, radicalization and militancy must be understood in terms 
of an individual’s interactions with fellow travelers, family, and friends.  More recently, 
Marc Sageman utilized this approach to explain the coming together of the September 
11th plotters and, more generally, the phenomenon he calls the “global salafi jihad.”88  
This line of theorizing appears to be applicable to the modern Klans, as membership 
increasingly appears to be generationally based.  However, because interviews of 
Klansmen were impossible to conduct across the time periods under study (beginning in 
the 1860s), this approach cannot be used here.   In the findings chapter, I briefly consider 
whether some alternative approach drawn from psychology, but not focused on abnormal 
personality disorders, could contribute to a better understanding of terrorism.  
2. Structural Approaches 
Unlike the individual-level approach, structural theories of terrorism search for 
macro-level variables to explain terrorism.  Structural theories seek “to identify social 
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conditions (structures) that affect group access to services, equal rights, civil protections, 
freedoms, or other quality of life measures,” and by doing so, explain the outbreak and 
duration of terrorism. 89  For proponents of the structural approach, terrorism is born from 
the environment and emphasis should be placed on identifying variables within that 
environment that coincide with terrorist violence.  Ideas based on these approaches have 
had significant policy consequences of late.   
Among policy makers, structural theories have become one of the most popular 
explanations for the emergence of terrorist threats.  In fact, the approach has been 
adopted and promoted by numerous political elites in order to justify counter terrorism 
initiatives.  Former President George Bush once remarked, “we fight against poverty 
because hope is an answer to terror.”90  Former British Prime Minister Blair added, “the 
dragon’s teeth of terrorism are planted in the fertile soil of wrongs unrighted, of disputes 
left to fester for years or even decades, of failed states, of poverty and deprivation.”91  
Former South Korean President and 2000 Nobel Peace Prize recipient Kim Dae Jung 
further emphasized the point, asserting that “at the bottom of terrorism is poverty.”92 
Proposed structural remedies to terrorism—improving education, reducing poverty, or 
making social services available to wider sets of the population—are popular because 
they can do no harm.  As a rule, they are beneficial to society, and as such, are easily 
adopted by politicians seeking political support or scholars bent on crafting a more 
egalitarian society.  
The state of the economy is one oft-used predictor among the various structural 
explanations of terrorism.  Terrorism theories focused upon economic variables are 
primarily founded on work within the field of criminology, in particular, Arthur Raper’s 
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1933 work.93  Raper suggests a strong correlation between economic conditions and the 
emergence of political violence.  Other criminology studies bolstered his hypothesis and 
further linked poverty to an increased likelihood of crime.94  From these results, a 
spurious link was made between crime and terrorism, and the argument that terrorism 
arises out of poverty gained significant traction.   In their piece “Some Roots of 
Terrorism,” Ehrlich and Liu suggest that differing poverty levels among nations are 
responsible for driving the surge of terrorism.95  This argument is derived from Ted 
Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation.96  The argument is that, less developed countries 
steeped in poverty serve as breeding grounds for terrorists and are, therefore, more prone 
to violence and disorder.  David Keen has strengthened this idea, suggesting that the 
absence of a viable economy creates a pool of willing recruits for violent organizations.97  
Considering the Ku Klux Klan is often portrayed as a band of poor, uneducated rednecks, 
it seems reasonable that economic factors would play a role in its activity.    
Alongside poverty, measures of gender equity, health, education levels, and 
average purchasing power parity are used as potential indicators of terrorism.98  The 
obvious implications of these studies urge a reduction in both global and interstate 
“economic insecurity, inequality, and poverty” while stressing “more generous welfare 
provisions” as a means to combat terrorism.99  In support of this thesis, Azam and 
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Thelen’s 2007 study suggests that an influx of foreign aid—with a special emphasis on 
support to education—will reduce the amount of terrorism that flows from the recipient 
country.100 
Yet another strand of the structural approach asserts that terrorism is born from 
the displacement of a specific class of people as a result of increased globalization and 
modernization.  Scholars have long pointed to the importance of modern societies in 
encouraging terrorism.101  Modernization, in turn is being accelerated by the 
phenomenon of accelerating globalization.  Globalization, according to Gotchev, is 
“regarded as a phenomenon brought about by technological and social change, furthering 
the links of human activities across regions and continents.”102  The increased linkages of 
these human activities have created friction points in society, which, according to several 
scholars, are the root cause of terrorism.103  One such outcome of this particular theory is 
the perception that rich countries—like the United States—tend to get richer while the 
poorer countries work harder yet fall farther behind.  This produces a feeling of relative 
deprivation on an international scale and, in turn, highlights rich nations as targets for 
terrorist acts.  Rich nations are portrayed as the beneficiaries of an unfair international 
system, and terrorism becomes the only weapon available by which poorer countries can 
seek justice.  Martha Crenshaw even comments on and frames the globalization argument 
in the form of a “globalized civil” war.104  Her argument is that terrorism may be viewed 
as “a strategic reaction to American power” and U.S. foreign policy may create structural 
conditions that favor terrorism.105  Globalization theories become problematic when 
applied to domestic groups such as the Klan, as the Klan has existed and thrived during 
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times of intense globalization as well as years of limited globalization.  Whether 
globalization theories are accurate remains open to question.  Additionally, globalization 
hypotheses prove difficult to test as American history, broadly defined, is a narrative of 
constant technological and societal change—a variable that is present, in some form or 
another, at all times of American existence.  The march towards progress and increased 
human linkage across regions and continents is a constant, and by comparative logic, not 
necessarily a “difference that makes a difference” between the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of Klan campaigns.  For that reason, tests of globalization’s impact on 
campaigns of Klan terrorism will be set aside.   
The final structural theory to be reviewed deals with the type of political system a 
government employs.  In the late 1970s to early 1980s, scholars submitted that 
democracies were most victimized by terrorism.106  This may be due to many factors, one 
being that authoritarian regimes are less likely to report terrorism, as they have the 
controls in place to manage and manipulate information in media outlets.  Secondly, 
authoritarian regimes are more likely to resort to brutal repression to crush terrorist 
organizations—an approach not afforded liberal democracies.107  Additionally, 
democracies tolerate a diverse set of political views, ethnicities, and social norms.  
According to some, this diversity creates more dyads from which conflict could be 
sparked.  In essence, “the more ethnically diverse the country, the more terrorism it 
experiences.”108  Others mention that the level of democratic development affects the 
level of terrorism, but the view has been criticized by other studies.109  Yet another line 
of argument challenges all of these notions, claiming that democracy and increased 
political participation and an expanded marketplace of ideas actually decreases the 
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prospects of terrorism.110  While political systems and their effect on terrorism are 
interesting topics for further research, this project benefits from the fact that the Klan has 
always operated within the confines of the United States.  Thus with the political system 
a constant variable, this dissertation does not consider it.              
Of the four broad sections of terrorism theories presented here—individual, 
structural, sponsorship, and organizational—structural theories are notable for producing 
arguments especially well-tailored to be examined in light of the emergence of right wing 
terrorism.   Notably, most of these have been generated by European scholars interested 
in the phenomenon of inter-war European fascism.  The study of fascism, widely 
considered the quintessential example of a far right movement, is valuable for this project 
as many of fascist recruitment strategies, themes, and ideas closely resemble those of 
American right wing groups and, in particular, those of the Ku Klux Klan.  Additionally, 
many of these theories have been adopted and used by organizations such as the Southern 
Poverty Law Center, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Department of Homeland 
Security to serve as predictors of future surges in right wing terrorism.   
In one of the most well-known publications on fascism, Stanley Payne reviews 
nine distinct theories to explain fascism and, as useful as these are for explaining the 
European phenomenon, they have little applicability to the study of American right wing 
terrorism 111  This owes largely to the fact that many of his theories rest on conditions 
that are purely European in nature.  Ideas about the birth of fascism more adaptable to 
American conditions can be found in a 1976 edited work by Walter Laqueur, in which 
Juan Linz provides a strong argument to explain the emergence, rise, and eventual 
success of fascist organizations. Three of the structural factors Linz suggests that are 
preconditions to fascist success project are: (1) a sudden state of economic crisis within a 
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country, (2) the return of war veterans, and (3) the presence of an ideological 
opponent.112 All three will be tested in this dissertation. 
The economic recession explanation can be nested within Gurr’s relative 
depravation theory.  By broadening the scope of the scope of Gurr’s theory to a national 
level, scholars and policy makers have predict campaigns of right wing terrorism will 
emerge in the wake of sharp national recessions.  Focusing the theory on the Ku Klux 
Klan, arguments exist on both sides of the divide.  One explanatory narrative asserts that 
the Ku Klux Klan phenomenon—in one study at least—was an outcome of economic 
prosperity.113  More prominent, however, are explanations of the Ku Klux Klan as 
products of economic deprivation and accounts which paint Klansmen as “white trash.”  
These studies usually focus upon the rural aspects of the Klan phenomenon (where the 
economic situation is typically bleaker than in an urban environment) or paint all periods 
of the Klan in the light of the contemporary Klan.114       
Like every other term thus far, “economic recession” requires clear definition in 
order to permit unbiased testing.  Although one would think this would already be well 
defined, it appears the economics field is rife with its own definitional debates.  The 
running joke amongst economists is that you can only tell the difference between a 
recession and a depression in one way: in a recession your neighbor loses his job, in a 
depression, you lose yours.  The theory being tested here deals with sudden economic 
crisis that is both harsher than a mild recession, yet milder than a complete depression.  A 
recession is usually said to begin at two quarters worth of economic downturn (usually 
less than 5% drop in GDP), while a depression is noted for a drop of 10% or more in 
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GDP over a much longer time span.115  For purposes of this dissertation, an economic 
recession of significant magnitude will be defined as an economic downturn of at least 
four quarters and/or coinciding with a drop of at least 3% in GDP.  While these 
parameters may be debatable, the definition provided will, at a minimum, provide a solid 
understanding of how recessions are coded as either present or absent.        
The return of war veterans is commonly used as an explanation for right wing 
terrorism outbreaks thanks to the conviction that military members were somehow 
disillusioned by their wartime experiences, and upon returning home, were either victims 
of war neurosis, or upset that the civilian populace had “stabbed the military in the back” 
by pulling out of a winnable war.116  Other explanations suggest that the masculine 
nature of military service somehow makes right wing movements and organizations more 
appealing to returning veterans.117  Historians of the Klan suggest that lack of jobs and 
the resultant boredom from unemployment were causes of surges in terrorism, while 
others argue that the liberalization of soldiers while overseas (particularly black soldiers) 
played a role in the resultant violence.118  Still others suggest returning veterans were not 
pleased with the role of the United States in the wake of war, and took actions to correct 
the situation.119  This dissertation does not seek to prove or disprove any of these 
theories, but will test for the mass return of veterans in each study in order to determine 
potential causality by employing comparative logic.     
The presence of an ideological opponent as a precursor to terrorism campaigns is 
based upon the belief that a symbiotic relationship is built between the two groups, 
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allowing each to justify their activity on the actions of the other.  This theory is derived 
from studies of fascism, many of which indicate the power of the radical right 
organization was predicated on the presence of a radical left organization.  The ensuing 
struggle between the two organizations produces a centrifugal effect, pushing the two 
organizations to extremes, escalating the rhetoric and actions each takes against the other, 
and thus,  causing the state to “burn from both ends.”120  Here it is important to note the 
differences between actual organizations and perceived threats.  The latter is what a craft 
terrorist organization relies upon for recruitment purposes, while the former serves as a 
potential justification for sustained terrorism.  Similar to the argument made for 
globalization, perceived threats are a constant factor, used by terrorist groups of all 
shapes and sizes.  Tests conducted within this dissertation will seek out a more concrete 
manifestation of an ideological opponent.       
This theory has been used in explaining the terrorism and eventual rise of Hitler 
and the Nazis as well as the emergence of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain.  From a 
terrorism studies perspective, the theory has also been used to explain the campaigns of 
the Red Brigade, the Tupamaros, and the Monteneros.  For purposes of the thesis, an 
ideological opponent will be noted if and when the Klan actually mobilizes in opposition 
to it.  An ideological opponent will be coded as present if it is organized on a similar 
scale (usually national) as the Klan and actively targets the Klan in either its rhetoric of 
its actions, in turn generating a counter-response by the Klan.  Here, I am looking for an 
organization that the Klan defines itself in contradiction with; a group that the Klan can 
point to and say “if they disappear, we will go away as well.” As structural theories are 
put to the test in this research project, it will be these three variables - drawn primarily 
from the fascism studies literature—that will be key indicators for assessing the accuracy 
of the approach.    
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3. Sponsorship Approaches 
Sponsorship theories of terrorism stem primarily from the idea that terrorist 
organizations require either a state sponsor or the support of an established political party 
to craft and sustain terrorist acts.  In sponsorship theories, a primary focus has been on 
state or political party actors that serve as the “puppet-masters” of a specific terrorist 
organization.  In this light, terrorist organizations are simply viewed as one tool—among 
many—for a larger entity to wield at its discretion.  Also referred to as “conspiracy 
theories of terrorism,” these theories highlight the prominent role that state support plays 
in terrorist campaigns.  More recently, however, research has delineated the different 
levels of support that a state can provide a terrorist organization and how these varying 
levels affect the group’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks.  Theories which emphasize 
sponsorship carry significant policy weight as leaders seek to determine how and when 
they should confront a state interacting with terrorist organizations, and what policy 
prescriptions could be used to curb and end these interactions.  Significant amounts of 
time, money, and resources are dedicated to countering state support of terrorism and, for 
this reason, the theories supporting these policies will be reviewed and tested in this 
dissertation with regard to Klan terrorism.     
Predominantly espoused during the 1980s, the sponsorship approach held sway 
among many who argued that all terrorism originated from an evil cabal of communists 
within the Soviet Union.  For example, according to Possony and Bouchey, “there is 
virtually no terrorist operation or guerrilla movement anywhere in the world today, 
whether communist, semi-communist, or non-communist…with which communists of 
one sort or another have not been involved.”121  In 1980, the hypothesis was lent further 
credence with the publication of Claire Sterling’s The Terror Network.122   During an era 
of widespread anti-communist sentiment, the idea that terrorist organizations were 
nothing more than the puppets of an organized communist cabal gained significant 
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traction amongst American politicians.  Even respected terrorism scholars, such as Walter 
Laqueur, wrote that terrorism of the early 1970’s involved “close cooperation between 
small terrorist groups in many countries, with the Libyans, the Algerians, the North 
Koreans, and the Cubans acting as paymasters, suppliers of weapons, and other 
equipment.”123   Near the tail end of the Cold War, definitions of terrorism emerged 
which suggested terrorism was impossible without the support or backing of an external 
sponsor.  One such definition, submitted by Cline and Alexander, defined terrorism as 
“the deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign 
states or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted by sovereign states to attain strategic 
and political objectives by acts in violation of law.”124  That numerous terrorist groups 
existed without state sponsorship was conveniently ignored. 
As could be expected, alternative theories emerged that while also positing a state 
sponsor, differed by contending that all terrorism was the handiwork of the United States’ 
Central Intelligence Agency.  Chomsky and Herman, for instance, claimed that 
“Washington has become the torture and political murder capital of the world.”125  This 
line was likewise been adopted by jihadi groups, as Ledeen goes on to note that “modern 
Islamic terrorism is above all else a weapon used by hostile nation states against their 
enemies in the Middle East and the West.”126  As history has proven, however, the 
conspiracy-laden terrorism-as-a-weapon-of-superpowers theory carried insufficient value 
in interpreting terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s, and, likely, even less today.  Even 
with the Cold War long over, both Marxist and right wing hyper nationalist groups were 
still committing violence around the globe.  If outside support is not always necessary, 
the problem becomes explaining how and when the support of external actors benefits 
terrorist organizations.  Fortunately, a more clear-eyed perspective of state/non-state 
interactions has emerged. 
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While Cold War inspired theories of state sponsorship have been largely 
discredited, new research suggests that external support is indeed a prominent variable in 
the emergence of terrorism.  What is critically important, however, is how one defines the 
term “support.”  As recent work on the subject acknowledges, “sponsorship” is a broad 
category that “is often applied casually and imprecisely to completely different levels of 
state interactions with non-state actors, ranging from providing rhetorical support and 
encouragement, at one pole, to engaging in hands-on logistical or operational activities on 
the other.”127  At the same time, new studies recognize that “states are not monolithic 
organizations either.”128  It is therefore possible—even in authoritarian regimes—for a 
terrorist organization to receive support from various branches of the state apparatus 
without the approval of the state’s leadership.  In the case of the Klan, for example, 
several accounts document collusion between the Klan and state law enforcement—state 
law enforcement agencies, of course, being a part of “the state.”  On other occasions, law 
enforcement agencies simply turned a blind eye while Klansmen went about their grisly 
tasks.  Neither example represents the “Sterling ideal,” based on Claire Sterling’s 
assumption a group must be actively assisted by state sponsorship, yet both require the 
scholar to admit state interaction and assistance were present as Klansmen carried out 
terrorist acts.  To study the interaction between states and terrorist groups more fully, a 
new approach and understanding must be adopted.          
In order to better understand the dynamics between a terrorist organization and its 
external supporters, one must be willing to accept that levels of support from an external 
actor can range from “active” support to more “tacit” forms.  Active forms of support—
as depicted in the “Sterling ideal”—are more infrequent than tacit forms of support.  
Active forms of support require a state to directly assist a terrorist organization with 
logistics, intelligence, coordination, and/or operational planning.  Tacit support, on the 
other hand, requires far less.   
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 There is a famous quote, attributed to many, according to which “all that is 
necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”129  The same could be 
said about the triumph of terrorism when states fail to act.  Bale calls this form of support 
“state-sanctioned terrorism,” defined as “when elements of the security forces simply 
ignore or fail to punish acts of terrorism carried out independently by civilian vigilante 
groups against targets that are perceived to be enemies of the state.”130  This dissertation 
takes the position that whether or not a state—or appendage of the state—directly or 
indirectly supports a terrorist organization by ignoring the transgression, the end result is 
what will be called a safe haven in which terrorist groups can operate freely.  
 This, then, brings us to definitional issues and debates surrounding the use of the 
term safe haven.  The traditional use of the term revolves around conceptions of 
geography and control of that territory.  This definitional framework is derived from 
studies of counterinsurgency, where a safe haven is broadly regarded as a patch of 
territory in which insurgents are safe; their enemies cannot touch him.  Safe havens 
exhibit six general characteristics: (1) they are embedded within the structures of states, 
(2) they are geographical phenomena, linked to physical territories of states, (3) they are 
primarily rural phenomena, (4) they are isolated, yet accessible, (5) they provide terrorists 
the time, space, and resources to gather, organize, learn, rehearse, test, and implement 
plans, weapons, skills, beliefs, and so on, and (6) they serve as bases for numerous types 
of activities.  As Michael Innes concludes, “taken in the aggregate, these six pieces of 
conventional wisdom offer a conceptual point of departure that is incomplete, awkward, 
sometimes misleading, and often conflicting.”131  
 This dissertation takes the counterinsurgency conception of a safe haven as its 
jumping off point, and follows other terrorism scholars in adapting it for application to 
the terrorism domain. A broader view of safe havens—created when unique legal, 
judicial, law enforcement, or social variables permit an organization to operate within a 
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narrow bound of acceptable behavior—makes the term useful shorthand for capturing the 
modern threat environment.  From this perspective, the terrorist organization need not 
control the area, nor use it for logistical, recreational, or organizational purposes.  The 
“enemy” may be able to touch the terrorist organization quite easily, as the terrorists the 
authorities are after may live right next door.  A 2007 work entitled Denial of Sanctuary: 
Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens details the issues with the terrain-centric 
conception of the term, especially when applied in the realm of terrorism studies.132   
 The need to revisit the meaning of safe haven arose when counterterrorism 
officials began to realize terrorists, in many instances, were hiding in plain sight.  Further 
exposing the limits of the terrain-centric conception of the term was the fact that, if a safe 
haven was conceived as a geographic space from within terrorists operated, then the 
proper remedy was to send in a force capable of controlling that territory.  The solution 
proffered was far too often the application of “boots on the ground” with a large military 
force.  Following this, and after the military reported back to officials that they now 
controlled the territory in dispute, policy makers were left scratching their heads, unable 
to comprehend why terrorist violence continued to flare up (sometimes with greater 
intensity).   Only once it was realized that control of territory no longer held the answer to 
resolving issues involving terrorist safe havens, the term was re-examined and re-crafted. 
 Contemporary work on terrorist safe havens predominately revolves around 
whether terrorists need to acquire al-qa’ida al-sulba (a solid base), or whether they can 
achieve a safe haven simply understanding the societal, legal, and judicial specifics of a 
given umma (community) and conducting operations within the limits of what that 
community will tolerate.133  All indications point to the latter.  Consequently, the terms 
safe haven and sanctuary will be used interchangeably in this dissertation.  Aspects of 
legal, judicial, and societal in communities within which the Klan might operate will be 
considered.  Because the Klan has never received full state sponsorship, this dissertation 
tests the sponsorship approach by considering more limited forms of support: support 
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from a national political party, and the tacit support of local law enforcement 
organizations which leads to the existence of a safe haven.  Support will be coded as 
active when a political party (or third party sponsor) provides logistical, operational, or 
financial support to the Klan, or if it participates in developing strategy with regards to 
the employment of terrorism.  According to Bale’s typology of potential state support, 
these active forms of support will fall into the first four categories: state-directed, state 
sponsored, state-supported, or state manipulated terrorism.  A safe haven will be coded as 
present when and where law enforcement units turn a blind eye, when society encourages 
vigilante behavior by manipulating the judicial system to prevent convictions, or when 
the community attributes acts of terrorism to false perpetrators.  The safe haven coding 
will fall in line with Bale’s final three levels of support:  state-encouraged, state-
exploited, or state-sanctioned terrorism.134                    
4. Organizational Approaches 
Unlike structural and sponsorship approaches which seek to explain terrorism by 
macro-level variables, organizational approaches focus on meso-level explanations.  
Organizational approaches begin with the assumption that “terrorist acts result from 
decisions made by individuals who are members of identifiable organizations with 
distinctive characteristics.”135   Accordingly, organizational approaches focus upon the 
organizational design, recruitment strategies, and leadership of a given terrorist 
organization.  Owing largely to the prominence of the scholars who advocate this 
approach, organizational explanations have gained significant traction, resulting in 
increasing popularity as an avenue to explaining terrorism.   
Most prominent among these proponents, Martha Crenshaw submits that 
“terrorism is the result of an organization’s decision that it is politically useful.”136  From 
this perspective, terrorism is interpreted as “a willful choice made by an organization for 
political and strategic reasons, rather than as the unintended outcome of psychological or 
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social factors.”137   By this logic, terrorism is simply a tactic, rationally chosen by an 
organization, to achieve its political goals.  This approach has been embraced by other 
influential theorists such as Robert Pape with his explanation of suicide terrorism as a 
tactic to drive out foreign occupiers.138  According to these theories, the “central problem 
is to find when extremist organizations find terrorism useful” and how to go about 
altering the cost-benefit ratios to minimize terrorism outbreaks.139   
The organizational perspective demands that a terrorist organization be treated 
like any other organization.  Organizational structures, recruitment strategies, retention 
strategies, competition with other groups, and decision making processes are important 
considerations in explaining outbreaks of terrorism.  For proponents of organizational 
theories, terrorism is simply a form of costly signaling—a strategy that works in some 
cases while it backfires in others.140  The difference between success and failure is, 
therefore, largely dependent upon the choices made by the terrorist organization.  Most 
important is the acknowledgement that the aim of many terrorist groups is simply 
survival.  As the RAND Corporation notes, “the immediate objective of many of the 
world’s hard pressed terrorist groups is the same as the immediate objective of many of 
the world’s hard pressed corporations—that is, to continue operations.”141  Thus, it is 
imperative to understand the internal dynamics of a terrorist organization in order to 
understand why and how the group initiates and sustains terrorism.   
The structure of the organization also dictates when a group will use terrorist 
tactics and how long terrorism can be sustained in efforts to achieve its desired political 
ends.  Tucker explains the advantages and disadvantages to different organizational 
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types, and how these designs affect decisions to employ and sustain terrorist tactics.142  
Each different option for design of an organization—whether it is networked or 
hierarchical—offers different strengths and weaknesses and, as Tucker argues, some will 
be more successful in some environments than in others.  The key for the leaders of 
terrorist organizations, therefore, is to implement an organizational structure that best 
suits the operational environment in which the group operates.  This argument has 
recently been advanced by Abdulkader Sinno as he explains the activities, successes, and 
failures of Afghani militant groups.143 
Additionally, effective terrorist leaders must be expert recruiters, leaders, and 
managers.  They “must invent appropriate incentives to attract members, and must have 
an exceptional commitment to the group’s purposes coupled with an exaggerated sense of 
likely efficacy.”144  Effective and charismatic leadership is crucial.  Max Weber 
discusses—at length—the profound effect charismatic authority and personal leadership 
can have on an organization.145  The proponents of organizational theories would argue 
the same holds true for terrorist organizations.  Also within the purview of leadership, 
and best couched under management skills, are decisions a leader makes with regard to 
recruitment messages and propagation techniques used by his/her organization, two 
factors that directly impact the size and activity of the group. 
This dissertation will focus exclusively upon three organizational factors.  
Specifically, the analysis will look into the organizational design, the leadership, and the 
recruitment techniques used prior to and during the campaigns being analyzed.  The 
dissertation assumes that organizations use terrorism as a rational strategic choice, and 
focuses on why the group continues to use terrorism in a systematic manner over the 
 
                                                 
142 David Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong,” 
Homeland Security Affairs IV, no. 2 (June 2008). 
143 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008). 
144 Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” 481. 
145 Max Weber, Guenther Roth, and Claus Wittich, Economy and Society : An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
 55
course of multiple years.  Although this selection excludes several variables within the 
organizational approach, these three factors are ones frequently discussed in the 
literature.   
B. SUMMARY   
As Jongman and Schmid once cynically quipped, “the reader may at this point 
rightfully ask: Is that all there is?”146  The answer: yes and no.  The treatment of the 
individual-level, structural, sponsorship, and organizational approaches to terrorism have 
been purposefully broad in order to present an overview without bogging the dissertation 
down too deeply into any one approach.  Strict adherence to one approach often leads to 
myopic studies which overvalue specific variables.  Additionally, as theory becomes 
more specifically tied to a particular theoretical domain, it becomes increasingly 
unhelpful to political leaders tasked with crafting a response to the phenomenon in 
question.  It would be foolish to claim any one approach is wrong or inadequate, as each 
provides critical insight.  More foolish, however, would be to claim that any one of them 
provides the necessary insight to adequately explain and predict terrorism overall.           
This dissertation contends that it is more valuable to consider many approaches, 
test them against one another in order to determine the relative weight each approach 
possesses in explaining the terrorist phenomenon, and then develop a synthesized 
explanation from that analysis to assist policymakers in crafting more suitable responses.  
With that in mind, this dissertation tests the sponsorship, structural, and organizational 
theories of terrorism against one another in order to craft a more inclusive and broader 
explanation of Ku Klux terrorism campaigns.  The intent is to generate a synthesized, 
multivariate explanation of Ku Klux Klan terrorism surges in order to better understand 
and appreciate what needs to be taken into account when examining the broader spectrum 
of domestic right wing terrorism.   
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CHAPTER III. DEO VINDICE—THE RECONSTRUCTION 
ERA KLAN  
Thodika Stevika! Radical Plan 
Must yield to the coming of the Ku Klux Klan! 
Niggers and leaguers, get out of the way; 
We’re born of the night and we vanish by day; 
No rations have we, but the flesh of man – 
And love niggers best—the Ku Klux Klan; 
We catch ‘em alive and roast ‘em whole, 
Then hand ‘em around on a sharpened pole, 
Whole Leagues have been eaten, not leaving a man, 
And went away hungry—The Ku Klux Klan; 
Born of the night, and vanish by day; 
Leaguers and niggers, get out of the way!147 
 
In 1867, the Ku Klux Klan launched the most violent terrorist campaign ever 
experienced in the United States, one which marks it as one of the most active and 
effective terrorist groups in history.  With a century of hindsight, theorists of all schools 
might have predicted a surge of post-Civil War violence: structuralists might have argued 
that economic depression, the presence of an ideological opponent, and a tsunami of 
returning war vets made a Klan campaign highly likely; proponents of sponsorship 
explanations would have been able to point to the Democratic Party’s sponsorship of the 
Klan as a means to defend its political base; finally, proponents of organizational 
explanations assert the Klan’s structural design, leadership, and effective messaging were 
bound to make it the most effective violent organization of the period.  But, that is all 
with hindsight.   
This chapter offers a brief historical examination of the “first wave” Ku Klux 
Klan, then, three theoretical approaches, containing eight separate factors, will be tested 
side by side to determine their contribution to explaining the “first wave” Klan terrorist 
campaign.  The intent of this chapter is to demonstrate how the study of the 1860s Ku 
Klux Klan offers support for each of the three approaches discussed in chapter two.     
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Though not its original intent, the 1860s Klan ultimately became the “radical 
flank” to a Democratic-led resistance to Radical Reconstruction.  The organization 
systematically targeted all who supported the Republican party, creating an environment 
of political and social intimidation that effectively regained power for Southern 
Democrats within a half decade.  The Klan was not afraid to use terrorism to achieve its 
desired ends.  Freedmen (especially Union Leaguers), scalawags, Radicals, and 
schoolteachers received special attention from the Klan as they most directly represented 
the manifestation of Reconstruction policies in the South.   
A. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE     
Although shots rang out as late as June 1965, the surrender of the Army of 
Northern Virginia on April 9th is widely regarded as the “official” end of the American 
Civil War.   While April 1865 marks the cessation of conventional warfare, attempts by 
Washington to institutionalize Appomattox would trigger violent insurgency—a 
phenomenon that goes woefully under studied.    Reconstruction, the political program 
designed to reintegrate the former Confederate states back into the Union, was a fairly 
inconsistent initiative, ranging from an 1863-1867 “soft policy, to a much “harder” 
Radical Reconstruction Plan begun in 1867.  Complicating the efforts, Reconstruction 
meant different things to different segments of Southern society.  While the North was 
recognized as the “winner” of war, the Southern population proved unwilling to adopt the 
Reconstruction policies demanded by Republican political leaders in the wake of Lee’s 
surrender.  Begun as early as 1863, Reconstruction efforts frequently made naïve 
assumptions about Southern receptiveness to Northern ideals and values.  Most 
distasteful was what Southerners perceived to be an attempt to destroy the societal 
foundations of the South and turn “a white man’s country” into a more egalitarian society 
in which former slaves were allowed to own and work their own land.  Even more 
problematic in the eyes of white Southerners was that these former slaves would be 
recognized as legitimate and equal voters in state and national elections.  The turn of 
events was too much for many Southerners to stomach.  So blatant was Southern 
disregard for Northern policies that the postwar 1865 Louisiana Democratic party 
platform openly proclaimed “that we hold this to be a Government of white people, made 
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and to be perpetrated for the exclusive benefit of the white race; and…that people of 
African descent cannot be considered as citizens of the United States, and that there can 
be, in no event, nor under any circumstances, equality between the white and other 
races.”148 
The society from which the Klan emerged could hardly be considered 
homogeneous.  Though broadly depicted as a war between North and South, the Civil 
War created such a complex array of societal schisms that both political and actual 
guerrilla wars had to be dealt with by both Northern and Southern leaders as major 
conventional operations took place.149  Society was torn as Northern Democrats 
attempted to undermine Radical Republican initiatives, conservative and moderate 
Republicans took issue with both Democrats and Radical Republicans, Southern 
Republicans begged for support and received little from their Northern party, and small 
farm planters took issue with the gains of both blacks and plantation classes in the South.   
Though the North had its own share of societal schisms—owing primarily to 
immigration influxes—the antebellum South was forced to deal with a worldview that 
had been upended by the war.  In the name of efficient resource mobilization, the South’s 
wartime “series of executive directives and national legislation regarding conscription, 
suspension of habeas corpus, impressments of supplies and slaves, and tithing of 
agricultural production” left virtually no part of Southern society unaffected by the 
war.150  To overcome material shortfalls, the South ramped up efforts to increase 
manpower, lowering conscription ages to seventeen and raising upper limits to fifty.151  
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As the war dragged on, Southern infrastructure fell into disarray, as only remnants of the 
labor workforce remained to maintain it. 
 Once post-war Reconstruction efforts began, antebellum social classes found 
themselves also disrupted; economic and social power shifted to merchants, putting 
established paternalistic labor relations in jeopardy.152  The planter class simultaneously 
fought efforts to industrialize the South—or failing in that effort, attempted to control 
industry itself—forcing future southern industrialists to confront long-established 
Southern  power structures.153  Further destabilizing the post war Southern society was 
the heterogeneous makeup of returning war veterans; some black, some Unionists, some 
Confederates, many yeoman, and officers from a privileged Southern class.  Each 
possessed a unique view of the war and what it meant in terms of the future South—
views that conflicted in ways often leading to violence.   
 It is an understatement to say that American society was a fractured one in the 
wake of the war.  There was one aspect, however, that both the North and the South could 
agree upon: the widespread belief in white supremacy.  Masterfully captured by Michael 
Hunt in his 1987 work Ideology and Foreign Policy, United States society—in line with 
predominant Western views of the time—maintained an almost universal belief in white 
supremacy and the hierarchy of races.154  The North frowned upon the issue of slavery, 
but there was little disagreement between whites that the white race was a superior one.  
The belief in white supremacy was given credibility through the “scientific” works of 
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Gliddon, Josiah Nott, and Ephraim Squier offered scholarly support for beliefs that the 
races were created separately, with the white race representing the masterpiece of the 
Creator’s design efforts.155         
From the political standpoint, during the two years following Lee’s surrender, the 
South enjoyed a rather lenient transition from defeated entity back to a normalized 
existence.  A soft peace envisioned by Abraham Lincoln was carried out in even softer 
fashion by Andrew Johnson.  Presidential Reconstruction plans extended statehood to the 
former Confederate states under conditions that required little—if any—real changes to 
Southern social structures.  President Johnson, whose “main objection to slavery was that 
it benefitted a few white men, but not all of them,” drew the pointed ire of Radical 
Republicans when he pardoned over 14,000 former Confederate soldiers and political 
leaders.156  Northerners bemoaned the fact that Johnson was simply putting antebellum 
Southern leaders back into positions of power.  Those pardoned would fulfill the 
Republicans’ worst fears, returning to government offices working to rebuild their 
respective states according to an antebellum societal mold.   
President Johnson allowed the former Confederate states a free hand in 
reestablishing their governments, under the single stipulation that the states recognize and 
ratify the slavery-abolishing Thirteenth Amendment.  Following ratification and 
acceptance into the Union, states were largely free to do as they pleased to rebuild 
Southern civil society.  As Southern states were admitted back into the national 
government, Democratic representatives and senators began to tilt political power in 
Washington.  In the eyes of Radical Republicans, this was politically unacceptable.  They 
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soon realized the future of their party rested upon the establishment of an electoral 
alliance with freedmen and known union men in the South.  Particularly important were 
the votes of freedmen.   
The Thirteenth Amendment established that the black population—once counted 
as a three-fifth vote per individual—would be considered equal to the white population.  
To Southerners, as long as the black population remained under their control, this 
stipulation could be interpreted as a positive turn of events.  Immediately, the voting 
population of the South swelled to the point where ex-Confederate states would receive 
an extra fifteen representatives in Washington.  However, the fact that the African-
American vote would be controlled by the Democrats and their loose bands of enforcers 
horrified Republicans.  In essence, the South would now be politically stronger than it 
was before the Civil War without having to alter the racist foundations upon which that 
society was built.   
As could be expected, Southern states reconstituted their governments upon the 
basis of “Black Codes,” a system which again subjugated the freedmen to the whims of 
their former white masters.157  In many instances, now that the freedmen were no longer 
considered the property of whites (and as such, something to be protected), African 
Americans suffered even greater cruelties than when working on the plantations.  Radical 
Republicans were outraged by the fact that, in essence, the blood and treasure expended 
on the Civil War had been for naught.  Northern Republicans, in turn, prepared for 
political war, declaring the Congressional elections of 1866 to be their battlefield.  
Surprisingly, the greatest contribution to the Republican cause would come from its 
greatest enemy. In a counterproductive effort to bolster support for his fellow Democrats, 
President Johnson’s almost single handedly ensured a sweeping victory for the 
Republicans in Congress through his political ineptitude.  Johnson’s propensity to engage 
in—and usually lose—heated debates with members of the crowd as he travelled was a 
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boon for the Republican Party.  Republicans made tremendous political gains during the 
election.  The balance of political power in Washington shifted in their favor.   
With this shift, the time of leniency toward the ex-Confederate states was about to 
come to an end.  In March 1867, following the 1866 electoral success of Radical 
Republicans, the First Reconstruction Act was passed.  This act effectively treated the 
Southern states as conquered territories, creating distinct military districts to be governed 
by Northern Republican sympathizers and forcing the South to accept Radical 
Reconstruction efforts through the implementation of martial law.  Although violence had 
been endemic in large swaths of the South before the 1867 bill—most notably the 
Memphis and New Orleans race riots that resulted in 85 deaths and 175 injuries—
sustained and coordinated acts of right wing terrorism would soon rage throughout at 
least nine Southern states. 
Despite the aggressive aims of Radical Reconstruction and the threat of martial 
law, “only 20,000 troops remained on duty in the South by the fall of 1867, and this 
number gradually fell to 6,000 by the fall of 1876.”158  Due in large part to the 
tremendous deficit of law enforcement capability, the South fell into complete 
lawlessness.  Hangings, beatings, murder, and arson became the flavor of the day in 
almost all ex-Confederate states and “vigilantism became more or less 
institutionalized.”159  At the forefront of this violence was an organization hell-bent on 
undermining Reconstruction efforts, reestablishing the complete subordination of the 
former slaves, and punishing white scalawags and carpetbaggers for “teaching niggers 
and making them like white men.”160  This was the world that welcomed the Ku Klux 
Klan.   
The birth of the Klan took place in the law offices of Judge Thomas Jones in 
Pulaski, Tennessee in May 1866.  The organization began simply and without great 
fanfare. The earliest Klan was nothing more than an entertaining outlet whose aim was to 
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alleviate “the tedium of small-town life.”161  It was begun by six returning Confederate 
soldiers who found Pulaski life an utter bore.  Three of the six were assigned the duty of 
crafting rules, positions, and ceremonies.  The remaining three formed a name committee.  
During their second meeting, the name Ku Klux Klan was chosen because, as one 
historian noted, it sounded like it “was the kind of name people liked to repeat, just to 
hear the sound of its sinister syllables.”162  A derivation of the Greek word kuklos—
meaning circle—the name was adopted in order to “attract attention without specifically 
asking for it.”163  In line with the ceremonial procedures of many American fraternities, 
the early Klansmen developed complex rituals, prescribed the wearing of strange 
uniforms, established organizational responsibilities for Klan members, and implemented 
a unique—often humorous—naming protocol for the group’s officers.  It is hard to find 
fault with the claims of its earliest members, which indicated that the Klan was “designed 
purely for amusement, and for some time after its founding it had no ulterior motive or 
effect.”164 
The Klan’s initially benign purpose soon evolved into far more violent and 
sinister goals.  Beginning in early 1867, several ex-Confederate generals, Democratic 
politicians, and renowned “vigilantes” filled the ranks and began to reorient the Klan’s 
founding rationale.  These changes in membership patterns led one of its original 
members to proclaim “it is to be lamented that the simple object of the original Ku-
Kluxes should be so perverted as to become political and pernicious in its 
demonstrations.”165   Soon, the tendency to play pranks amongst themselves gave way to 
playing practical jokes on others—in particular, former slaves.  Numerous stories exist of 
former slaves being approached by ghostly creatures at watering holes and witnessing 
these apparitions drink entire buckets of water, proclaiming they were famished from 
their journeys to and from hell.  According to the stories, the ex-slave would take to heels 
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in abject horror.  In reality, the buckets of water were being poured into a huge funnel 
and ran down a tube connected to a large water bag, where the liquid was collected and 
poured out after the “hell visit” had reached its conclusion.  These pranks were 
immensely enjoyed by members of the Klan, as they demonstrated the perceived 
gullibility and ignorance of the freedmen.  Eventually, however, these harmless pranks 
lost their appeal and “hell visits” took on an entirely different form.   
Pranks gave way to violence, and “before it ended, thousands of people—most of 
them innocent of any indictable offense—were subjected to beating, shooting, hanging, 
rape, or exile plus the loss of money, property, crops, and sometimes lives.”166  Attacks 
of extreme viciousness became commonplace.  In Louisiana, during November 1868, at 
least thirty Negro bodies floated down the Red River.167  In what is now considered to be 
a low estimate, a Congressional committee claimed 1,081 people had been killed within 
an eight month timeframe (April-November 1868) within Louisiana alone.168  In 1868 
Arkansas, over 200 murders were committed in a three month span.169  In July 1868, 
Arkansas witnessed the launch of a two month Klan campaign which killed twenty, eight 
of those in a single day.  In a later instance, Klansmen broke up an 1870 Republican 
political rally, killing four African Americans and wounding fifty-four.170   
To combat the wave of terrorism, numerous calls were made for the slaves to 
organize into militia units and defend themselves against Klan terrorism.  In the few 
instances where this occurred, the freedmen found themselves at a tremendous 
disadvantage.  Klansmen, usually ex-Confederate soldiers, had superior weapons and 
training in relation to any freedmen defense forces.  Numerous narratives detail 
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confrontations between Klansmen—usually numbering over fifty—and militia units (both 
black and white), describing the conversations Klansmen had with militia officers before 
conducting marches around the public square.171  According to these narratives, the Klan 
backed down militia units in the great majority of confrontations. 
One clear example of Klan opposition to black militias was the story of Major 
Avery and his South Carolina Klan.  Between November 1870 and September 1871, 
Major James Avery and over forty South Carolina Klansmen (with support from North 
Carolina Klansmen) went on a violent rampage, targeting black militia members 
throughout the area.  During this eleven month timeframe, Avery’s group was responsible 
for eleven murders, more than six hundred whippings, and the destruction of five black 
schools and churches.172  On March 6th 1871, Avery led his band of miscreants on a 
quest to destroy the black militia organization in the county.  He first started by abducting 
James Rainey from his home, beating him, and then hanging him from a nearby tree.  The 
Klansmen spent the rest of the night “beating and whipping black militiamen and their 
families.”173  When Avery had finished, the militia was in shambles, disbanded yet again, 
and the Klan once again enjoyed free reign.  Instead of being an effective force against 
Klan terrorism, black militias served as a lightning rod that drew Klan violence upon 
their members.  But those who chose not to arm themselves fared little better.        
Atrocities committed against African Americans during the time rival the most 
violent acts of contemporary terrorism.  In May 1868, a black Louisiana Republican was 
taken from his home and beheaded.174  In 1871, Mississippi freedman Jack Dupree was 
“beaten severely, then taken to a wood several miles away, beaten again, and then 
disemboweled.”175  In Alabama, a prominent black Republican was “taken from his 
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home…by the Ku Klux Klan, who murdered him and mutilated his body almost beyond 
recognition.”176  Bodies of African Americans hanging from trees or courthouse 
overhangs were not uncommon sights in Southern states.  In short order, the Klan’s aim 
to paralyze and subjugate the freedmen was a reality.  According to a Freedman’s Bureau 
agent in Tennessee, by 1868 Klans “have compelled a more complete system of 
surveillance over the freedmen scarcely equaled under the old slave regime…they are 
completely subjugated—afraid to say their souls are their own, afraid to express their 
sentiments, and afraid to exercise the elective franchise conferred upon them by the laws 
of the State.”177  The fear of the Klan throughout the African American community ran 
deep, deep enough to drastically alter voting patterns and political power structures 
throughout the South.  Despite freedmen hatred of the Klan, they were forced—either 
physically or psychologically—to comply with Klan demands.  Those who did not often 
met a traumatic, and frequently fatal, reckoning at the hands of the hooded menace.        
The Klan’s use of unconstrained violence was not limited to African Americans.  
White Republicans and Northern businessmen—known respectively as scalawags and 
carpetbaggers—were prominent objects of Klan terrorist acts.   In Texas, Captain George 
Smith, a former Union officer, had relocated from New York in order to expand his 
business and find fortune as a merchant.  In time, Smith became a prominent Republican 
politician elected to the Texas state constitutional convention.  To Klansmen, he was “a 
dangerous, unprincipled carpetbagger who lived almost entirely with Negroes on terms of 
perfect equality.”178  His political alliance with the freedmen made him a prime target for 
Texas Klansmen—a distinction that eventually cost Smith his life.  Following an 
altercation with the Klan at a political rally, in October 1868, Smith was arrested and 
taken to jail.  A mob of over seventy Klansmen descended upon the guarded cell, 
overpowered the soldiers assigned its defense, and emptied each of their weapons into 
Smith’s body.179   
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It can be argued that the relatively quick death afforded Smith was kind in 
comparison to the horrors that awaited other whites throughout the South, particularly 
Southerners who had turned their back on the Confederate cause.  As a means of 
punishment for housing three black men, a female South Carolina “scalawag” was taken 
from her home, stripped of her clothes, beaten, and subjugated to tar being poured into 
her vagina.180  In an 1871 South Carolina incident, William Champion was kidnapped 
from his home, stripped naked, and beaten.  Another den of Klansmen were 
simultaneously kidnapping a black husband and wife couple—both in their sixties—
down the road from Champion’s beating site.  The second Klan group marched the 
kidnapped freedmen down the road to meet Champion, where the black man was forced 
to take a switch and beat Champion.  When he failed to beat Champion to the Klan’s 
satisfaction, he was stripped and made to lay on the ground with his legs spread, where 
Champion was then forced to kiss his exposed anus.  The freedman’s wife was then 
stripped, and Champion was forced to perform oral sex on her.  “How’s that for nigger 
equality” was the parting taunt as the Klan disbanded for the night.181           
Local law enforcement officers who dared challenge the Klan’s authority fared no 
better.  In 1868, Arkansas Deputy Sheriff William Dollar was taken from his home, tied 
to an ex-slave by his neck, dragged about 300 yards, and then shot to death.  The 
Klansmen then “entwined the two bodies together in an embrace and left them in the 
road, where they remained an object of attraction to the curious for two days.”182  In 
1869, Sheriff O.R. Colgrove was ambushed and killed for arresting white men accused of 
terrorizing freedmen.183  In most instances, however—whether intimidated by or 
sympathetic to Klan terrorism—local police assisted the Klan in its efforts.   
As far as audacious showings of terrorist/law enforcement collusion go, the 
hijacking of the steamboat Hesper has few equals.  In 1868, Arkansas governor Powell 
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Clayton realized his state militia and law enforcement agents were undermanned and 
undergunned.  To rectify the situation, he sent an agent to New York to purchase four 
thousand rifles, ammunition, and necessary accessories to outfit a state militia to counter 
the Klan.  Word quickly got out about the shipment headed to Arkansas and panic spread 
about the potential of armed black militias.184  The Klan was able to perfectly monitor 
the position and movement of the shipment—most probably from the information passed 
along by those tasked to defend it.  As the steamboat Hesper departed Memphis enroute 
to Arkansas, it was shadowed by the tugboat Netty Jones.  After being overhauled by the 
tugboat, the Hesper ran aground in Arkansas, where whistles blew and “sixty or seventy 
armed and masked men sprang up and began shooting wildly.”185  By night’s end, the 
Klan had either destroyed or acquired the steamboat’s four thousand weapons and set the 
empty steamboat adrift downstream.      
Teachers employed by black schools became a special target of Klan terrorism.  
The luckiest ones suffered only verbal insults and veiled threats.  As one Northern 
teacher wrote, she became accustomed to “the polite salutation of ‘damned Yankee bitch 
of a nigger teacher,’ with the occasional admonition to take up my abode in the infernal 
regions.”186  Threats offering to send teachers to “the infernal region” were soon backed 
by action.  In Mississippi, a particularly disturbing event—though not particularly 
uncommon in the South—played itself out.  Two teachers, Daniel Price and Warren 
Tyler, alongside Republican activist William Dennis, sought to unite the black 
community to confront Klan terrorism, only to be jailed for their “making incendiary 
speeches.”  According to the sheriff, these speeches prescribed “a form of black 
terrorism” and were “a prelude to Negro insurrection.”187  During the preliminary hearing 
of the three, several armed white men entered the courtroom and, soon thereafter, shots 
rang out.  The presiding judge and two freedmen were killed immediately in the 
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courtroom, and Dennis was later taken from “protective custody” while his guard was—
by chance—missing.  Dennis was later discovered with his throat slit.   
The same night that Dennis was murdered, the mayor fled the city as a black 
church went up in flames.  Armed white bands “under the nominal control of the sheriff” 
scoured the city confiscating weapons and arresting leaders of the black community.  
Over the course of a few days, “other Negroes were shot down and mutilated.”188  By 
1871, of the eleven black schools stood up in Winston County, Mississippi, not one was 
left.  In neighboring Monroe County, twenty six were burned to the ground and A.P. 
Huggins, the superintendant of public schools, was mercilessly whipped by the Klan.189 
Klan opposition to black education was pervasive throughout the ex-Confederate states.  
Violence directed at teachers and black schools was noted in Alabama, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.  
Targeting of schools was so prevalent, in fact, that a historian with deep sympathies 
towards the Klan admitted “the worst work the Ku Klux Klan ever did was its opposition 
to negro schools.”190 
The Reconstruction-Era Klan is unquestionably one of the most violent examples 
of terrorist activity in American history.  Unfortunately—due to the fact that most of the 
attacks went unreported—the true scale of violence will never be fully determined.  It is 
said that by the mid-to-late 1870s “the North may have won the War, but the South had 
now won the peace.”191  The violence unleashed by the Klan undoubtedly played a 
significant role in that “victory.”  During the early 1870s, the national government was 
forced to suspend habeas corpus in areas throughout the South, and to send federal 
soldiers to enforce martial law in support of the 1871 Ku Klux Act signed by President 
Grant.  The threat of life under military rule, combined with a renewed spirit to hunt 
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down and prosecute Ku Klux members, led to the atomization of the Klan by 1872.  The 
damage, however, had already been done.  By 1875, the North had lost interest in 
maintaining large numbers of soldiers in the South to keep the peace.  Enforcement 
efforts fell apart, and social life in the post-war South reverted to antebellum conditions.  
Thus, the Klan can be said to have waged an effective domestic insurgency in the United 
States.  
Although several historical narratives exist regarding the 1860s Klan, to date there 
has been no attempt to test different theories of terrorism against these histories.  The 
following section aims to rectify this deficiency.  The section will undertake a systematic 
examination of structural, sponsorship, and organizational explanations of terrorism in an 
effort to determine whether or not the case fits the expectations of each approach 
respectively. To be clear, what is being evaluated in each section should not be 
interpreted as this author’s own argument about the causes of terrorist campaigns.  What 
is being determined is the presence or absence of variables commonly used in existing 
theories to predict and explain right wing terrorism.  Only after all four periods have been 
examined via this method will this dissertation offer its own argument, in keeping with 
the structured, focused approach. 
B. STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
To those seeking support for structural explanations of terrorism, the 
Reconstruction-era Klan affords plenty.  Economic devastation, the presence of an 
ideological opponent of the Klan, and the mass return of war veterans were hallmarks of 
the time.  While structural explanations are abundant, the importance of each of these 
variables differs depending upon the historical narratives and reports one chooses to 
review.  To historians sympathetic to the “Lost Cause” of the South, the post-Civil War 
south was painted as an apocalyptic nightmare.192  Many pre-1940 accounts of the South 
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portrayed a vast, burning wasteland where majestic and noble plantations once stood.  
Hard-earned fortunes were lost as the Northern armies razed the countryside.  
“Sherman’s sentinels”—brick chimneys that reached skyward on charred grounds where 
mansions once stood—dotted the Southern landscape.  These accounts highlighted the 
corruption and lawlessness imposed upon the South as carpetbaggers and scalawags were 
vaulted into positions of power.  According to these narratives, courageous Confederate 
vets were left jobless and poor while newly freed African Americans flooded the job 
market and—during their off time—sexually terrorized white women. 
This perspective was challenged during the second surge of the Klan in the 
1920s.193 It was the publication of W.E.B. Du Bois’ 1935 book Black Reconstruction in 
America that offered the first comprehensive view of Reconstruction from an African 
American perspective.”194  By this account, economic and physical devastation of the 
South was not nearly as pervasive as originally thought.  Devastation was undeniably 
present in the South, but only in widely dispersed areas.  Fortunes were indeed lost, but 
most were those that had been built upon the backs of slaves, and in many cases, the 
financial impacts upon this class were not as profound as many early histories asserted.  
In fact, those who felt the greatest impact from the Civil War were the farmers and 
single-family ranchers who would have been considered impoverished even before the 
war began.  Although the Civil War is routinely characterized as having been fought 
along a North-South divide, a huge social chasm existed within the Confederacy during 
the war that would be further exacerbated after it.  Referred to as “the Inner Civil War,” 
several dormant “societal fault lines” became exposed as the war progressed.195  For 
many, the Civil War was nothing more than “a rich man’s war and a poor man’s 
fight.”196  The armies of the South swelled with draftees from “the poorest class of non-
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slaveholders whose labor is indispensible to the daily support of their families.”197  Rich 
plantation owners and their families could avoid service by providing twenty slaves for 
every male they wished to exempt from military service.  For the poor, this was simply 
too high a price.  In the war’s aftermath, the entire South suffered, but, unable to acquire 
credit and increasingly taxed on land  that dwindled in value, the poorest paid the highest 
price.198   Undoubtedly, the “truth,” if one exists, about Reconstruction lies somewhere 
between the pro-Southern accounts and more recent pro-Northern accounts; most likely 
closer to the latter narratives.  With this in mind, it is now possible to explore the 
structural explanations for Klan terrorism.              
 The most common structural explanations for the emergence of terrorism deal 
with the repercussions of economic downturns.  The post-war Southern economy lends 
support to this view.  It is undeniable that the South went into an economic tailspin due to 
the tremendous burdens and aftershocks of war.   To fully understand the significance of 
the economic recession, it must first be understood that the South on the brink of Civil 
War was considered a very rich area.  In fact, “the levels of income per free person in the 
South were actually higher than those in the North…moreover, they were increasing at a 
more rapid pace.”199  This prosperity would come crashing down as war took its natural 
toll. 
The slash and burn tactics employed by Sherman and his army, combined with the 
tremendous economic efforts required to sustain war, left the South in economic 
turmoil.200  The Northern military strategy of blockade and attrition warfare wore down 
the Southern army and starved it of industrial and economic reinforcement.  By most 
estimates, the cost of physical destruction of the South was estimated to be in the billions 
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of dollars.201  Economic rebound would prove elusive, as the South was forced to 
reconfigure society in the face of emancipation. Confederate currency became even more 
worthless with Lee’s surrender.  Railroad systems were destroyed during the war (by 
some accounts, “two thirds of the South’s railroads were utterly destroyed or crippled 
into inaction”), and with them, so too was the hope for interstate trade and commerce.202   
For the South in general—and slave owners in particular—the most traumatic 
economic impact resulted directly from emancipation.  For the slave owner, the slave was 
a piece of property and represented a rather significant financial investment.  Many 
slaveholders in the South anticipated that the slaves would be freed, but also expected to 
be compensated for their government-induced losses.  Considering the precedent set by 
Great Britain’s 1833 compensated-emancipation plan, their expectations were 
justified.203  However, despite Lincoln’s initial attempts to enact a compensation plan, 
the efforts never became law, and slaveholders were forced to accept that they would lose 
their “slave property” outright.204  Needless to say, by the conclusion of the war, “the 
greatest single possession the Southerner lost was his property in Negroes.”205  The 
consolidated amount lost—depending on the source—ranged from $1 billion to $5 
billion.206  The amount is likely closer to the latter than to the former.   
In the wake of Appomattox, the national economy endured an almost three year 
recession which saw a GDP drop of nearly 25%.  Beginning in April 1865 and ending 
somewhere near November 1867, there were numerous painful economic repercussions 
as the now re-unified country began its transition away from a wartime means of 
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production toward a “peaceful” co-existence.207 The recovery would be short lived, as 
another eighteen month economic downturn took place between 1869 and 1870.  
Although it occurred after the time period in question, the dramatic six year economic 
depression which racked the United States economy from 1873-1879 demonstrates the 
instability of the post-war economic order.  In sum, although it is impossible to reach 
agreement about the level of destruction, there is unanimity about the fact that the 
economy of the South was crippled after the Civil War, unable to fully recover until the 
dawn of the new century.  The resultant economic quagmire plunged the national 
economy into deep recession at a time the Klan campaign began to take off.  Economic 
explanations for Klan campaign emergence find support therefore, during this period.      
 A second structural argument used to explain the emergence of right wing 
terrorism is the presence of a left wing antagonist.  For the Reconstruction-era Klan, this 
left wing antagonist took the form of the Union League.  According to Klansmen—and 
many Southerners—“it was composed of the disorderly element of the negro population 
and was led and controlled by white men of the basest and meanest type.”208 Union 
Leagues, or Lincoln’s Loyal Leagues as they were sometimes called, were established in 
the North as early as 1862, but were injected into the South between 1865 and 1867 to 
assist the newly freed slaves in understanding their new rights, to register them for 
voting, to set up educational systems, and to promote a sense of political solidarity within 
the freedman community.  While the Leagues sought to affiliate like-minded Union men 
and freedmen in support of a Reconstruction agenda, it was hardly the centrally directed 
conspiracy many anti-Reconstruction southerners imagined.  Still, for Southerners, the 
secret nighttime meetings of the Union Leagues smelled of a sinister plot.    
 Klansmen themselves supported the idea of the Klan as a force to thwart the goals 
of the Union Leagues.  According to a founding member of the Klan, “it was partly, I 
may say chiefly, to resist this aggressive and belligerent organization that the Ku Klux 
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transformed themselves into a protective organization.”209  In an even more 
conspiratorial explanation of terrorism, Klan violence was even blamed on the Union 
League itself.  For instance, Benjamin Hill explained to a Congressional committee that 
the murders of Republicans, scalawags, freedmen, and carpetbaggers were the work of 
Loyal Leagues looking to paint the Klan in a violent light in order to prompt a 
Republican-led military intervention.210  The Klan, in this conception, was a purely 
defensive organization performing an “immense service at this period of Southern 
history” that served to moderate the uncontrollable acts of the Union League.   
 It is undeniable that Southerners viewed Union Leagues with great suspicion, and 
many believed the Klan arose as a defense against them.  A more sincere look at the 
Union Leagues indicates that they were simply the physical embodiment of a multiple 
perceived threats (from scalawags, northern businessmen, teachers, carpetbaggers, etc), 
not necessarily the threat itself.  The argument—disingenuous as it may be—that the 
Union League was the cause of Klan terrorism is, sadly, alive and well even today.  
Again, for this period one can find support for the structural explanation that an 
ideologically opposite antagonist is necessary to trigger and sustain terrorism.         
 An influx of war veterans—the final variable to be explored—provides additional 
support to the structural approach.  At war’s end, a defeated Confederate army limped 
home to discover its world had changed.  Confederate veterans and Confederate widows 
were horrified to discover that all pensions had been withdrawn for their service.211  
Additionally, laws were passed that barred any Confederate veteran (or person known to 
sympathize with the Confederate cause) from employment in certain sectors.  According 
to one historian, over 174,000 soldiers were paroled from Northern prisoner of war 
camps, and an additional 60,000 were let out of prisons.212  Jobless, disenfranchised, and 
without pensions, Confederate soldiers played a central role in the organization and 
strategic trajectory of the Klan.  Soldiers brought with them all that is desired by a 
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terrorist organization—discipline, military skills, and understanding of operational 
security being but a few.  Consistent with the theory that returning war veterans are more 
prone to the nationalistic overtures of right wing organizations, high ranking confederate 
soldiers filled national and state leadership ranks, while junior officers filled out regional 
command levels.     
 The Klan also offered psychological support to those physically unable to carry 
on a physical fight, in return many offered active Klansmen motivation and inspiration to 
continue. Many of those who came back were in poor physical shape and would require 
state support for their medical issues.213  Disfigured, barred from several employment 
avenues, and without pensions, it should be no surprise that many of these soldiers 
enjoyed the prestige, camaraderie, and ideology that the Klan provided.  It was, in fact, 
six ex-Confederate soldiers who created the Klan and, in turn, populated its ranks with 
former soldiers.  These soldiers—with their own friendship networks forged during the 
war—reached out and further spread the Klan.  That the return of war veterans is 
undeniably present means that what we find in the 1860s is consistent with what the 
structural approach suggests.     
C. SPONSORSHIP EXPLANATIONS 
Sponsorship explanations emphasize the role of an external sponsor—either a 
state sponsor, a non-state sponsor, or an established political party—as a necessary 
precursor of terrorism.  To many modern scholars, it is apparent that “the Klan was a 
military force serving the interests of the Democratic Party.”214  It was no secret that the 
vast majority of Ku Klux Klan member were sympathetic to the Democratic Party and 
that “nearly all members regarded the Klan as a secret political party on behalf of the 
Democratic Party.”215  In Washington, the Klan was protected by Democratic lawmakers, 
many of whom publicly questioned the existence of the group in the face of 
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overwhelming evidence that detailed its organization, past actions, and future strategic 
aims.  Alabama governor Robert Lindsay even remarked “I do not think there ever was a 
political motive in any outrage committed on a colored man” when he was questioned 
about Klan terrorism in the state.216 
Although Democratic leaders attempted to distance themselves from Klan 
terrorism in public, their private interactions with the Klan highlighted close cooperation 
between the terrorist organization and the political party.  Beginning as early as 1867, 
Klansman began a violent “political campaign” to boost voter turnout in support of the 
Democratic leadership.  Republican ballots were confiscated at polling stations, African 
Americans were escorted to the voting booth and forced to vote Democrat; should they 
refuse, they were “simply muscled away from the polls” and often whipped for their 
insolence.217  Although heinous, the Klan’s efforts proved effective.  In the 1868 
Presidential election, Georgia witnessed huge swings in voter preference.  In Colombia 
County, where Republicans received 1,222 votes in previous elections, the number fell to 
1.  The trend repeated itself in other counties. Republican support in Oglethorpe fell from 
1,144 to 116; in Warren, from 1,124 to 188; and in twenty two other counties Republican 
support dropped from 3,000 to 87.218  Klan-supported Democrats soon began to rise to 
positions within both state and national offices.   
Direct support of the Klan from the Democratic party can hardly be disputed, as it 
was “impossible in many places to separate the violence engaged in by groups of 
Democrats from that of organized Klans.”219  It proved an efficient and effective 
relationship.  By 1870, Republicans had lost state control in North Carolina, Alabama, 
and Georgia.  The results in these states can be attributed directly to Klan violence.  In 
Georgia, “Klan violence had made it virtually impossible for Republicans to campaign or 
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vote.”220  The political success of the Democrats from 1868-1870 prompted one black 
Republican to remark “it seems we are drifting back under the leadership of the 
slaveholders…our former masters are fast taking the reins of government.”221 
Other strands of the sponsorship approach deal with either the tacit or active 
support of different appendages of the government, in this case the law enforcement arm.  
Again, the Reconstruction-era Klan supports this line of thought.  To put it bluntly, 
Southern law enforcement organizations were either completely supportive of Klan 
terrorism or woefully incapable of countering it.  Freedmen were not yet recognized in 
courts and were prohibited from testifying against any white citizen, so justice was a dead 
end street.  Instead, members of the black community relied upon law enforcement 
agencies to actively protect them and intercede before violence occurred.  They were left 
wanting.  As one paper reported, “were all the Ku Klux arrested and brought to trial, 
among them would be found sheriffs, magistrates, jurors, and legislators, and it may be 
clerks and judges.”222  From this perspective, law enforcement was not an issue; the 
problem was that white supremacy, not Constitutional law, was the social norm being 
enforced.  This was most blatant in Texas, where—dumbfounded by the levels of 
unrestrained violence—Union General Philip Sheridan declared that if he “owned both 
Texas and Hell, he would rent out Texas and move to Hell.”223  A July 1868 state report 
indicated 1,035 confirmed homicides had taken place since the end of the war, yet 
prosecutions had led to only one legal execution—an execution that was, ironically, of a 
 
 
                                                 
220 Elizabeth Studley Nathans, Losing the Peace; Georgia Republicans and Reconstruction, 1865-
1871 (Baton Rouge,: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 204. 
221 Foner, Reconstruction : America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, 444. 
222 Cincinnati Gazette, as quoted in: United States. Congress. Joint Select Committee on the 
Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States., Poland, and Scott, [Report of the Joint Select 
Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States, So Far as 
Regards the Execution of Laws, and the Safety of the Lives and Property of the Citizens of the United States 
and Testimony Taken. Part 2. Appendix, p 286. 
223 John C. Fredriksen, “Philip Henry Sheridan.” in Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A 
Political, Social, and Military History, eds. David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2000), 1762.  
 80
black man.224  The indirect support offered by law enforcement’s blind eye gave the Klan 
a safe haven throughout the South.  National forces sent to dry up these havens of support 
did little until 1871.  
When well-intentioned governors requested federal military assistance, they were 
appalled to learn that the military force would come under the jurisdiction of the local 
sheriff—often a Klansman himself.  Instead of patrolling the streets, federal forces were 
kept in barracks—a location to which freedmen fled whenever the Klan rode.  When the 
legal rules that kept federal military forces under the jurisdiction of local sheriffs failed, 
politicians were forced to establish state militias to put down the Klan.  This further 
exacerbated the problem.  Few white Southern men would join the militia, so politicians 
were left with no other option but to arm Northern men and African Americans.  The 
sight of armed black men patrolling the street infuriated the population, resulting in 
broader ideological support for Klan violence.  This, of course, resulted in an escalating 
cycle of protest and violence which compelled state leaders to disband the offending 
militia. 
 The significance of sponsorship and safe haven is further bolstered when one 
considers how Klan terrorism was undercut when safe havens were dissolved and active 
opposition took their place.  It could be argued that the series of Enforcement Acts 
beginning in the 1870s significantly curbed Klan terrorism.  The final act, known as the 
Ku Klux Act, made it a federal offense to impede black suffrage and afforded the 
President the option to suspend habeas corpus, use federal troops to arrest violators, and 
try those arrested in federal courts.225  The key to this legislation was that federal troops 
were no longer under the jurisdiction of local law enforcement and politicians.  Now 
unconstrained, these forces arrested hundreds of Klansmen, although few were actually 
ever prosecuted.  As sponsorship theories would suggest, the elimination of law 
enforcement support—both active and tacit—during the 1870s all but eradicated Klan 
terrorism.  
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According to sponsorship theories of terrorism, campaigns emerge when the 
supporting entity is blocked from power, and dissipate once that sponsor has achieved its 
goals. Once comfortable with its status, the sponsor will simply turn off its Frankenstein-
like creation and put it into hibernation until it is needed again sometime in the future.  
What happens to the Klan during this period supports this argument.  Klan activity was, 
indeed, curtailed in the wake of Democratic political success.  At the state level, when 
Democrats were excluded from political power (and during their struggles to return to 
prominence), Klan violence flared.  By the mid-1870s, most of the former Confederate 
states were back under Democratic control, and organized Klan violence had become far 
less significant than between 1867 and 1870.  Additionally, when law enforcement 
agencies either tacitly or actively supported the Klan, regardless of what party was in 
power, violence soared.  When they cracked down, the frequency of Klan terrorist 
violence plummeted.  Even in Republican locales, where law enforcement actively 
opposed the Klan, society often provided Klansmen a safe haven by making it impossible 
to prosecute or convict a Klansmen through the judicial system.226   Thus, both factors 
tested under the sponsorship approach remain viable explanations for the Reconstruction-
era Klan terrorist campaign.        
D. ORGANIZATIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
Thus far, both structural and sponsorship approaches are supported by study of 
the Reconstruction-era Klan, as each of the factors tested for are indeed present during 
this period.  Organizational explanations fare just as well.  As described previously, 
organizational approaches to explaining terrorism focus on the internal dynamics of the 
group.  Organizational design, leadership, recruitment strategies, and communication 
outlets of the terrorist group thus bear analyzing.   
The structure of the Klan between 1866 and 1867 speaks to the importance of 
organizational design in promoting a terrorist campaign.  As explained in the opening 
section of this chapter, the Klan began strictly as a social club for Pulaski gentlemen who 
sought an outlet for their boredom.  Neighboring towns were soon aware of the strange 
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group of hooded men, and the Pulaski Klan swelled with new recruits attracted by the 
organization’s mystique.  Although intended in jest, there is truth to the statement that “if 
Pulaski had had an Elk’s Club, the Klan would have never been born.”227  Although anti-
black violence would have likely still occurred without the Klan, it might not have been 
as organized or sustained in the absence of the Klan’s ability to mobilize support.  
However, once news of the Klan spread to the areas surrounding Pulaski, requests 
inundated the founding six seeking permission to open Klan franchises in surrounding 
Tennessee counties.  Broad and disorderly expansion of the Ku Klux soon followed.  The 
original founders had no formalized mechanism (or little desire) to control the activities 
of sister spin-offs, at least not initially. 
In April 1867, the leaders of the Pulaski den (local-level Klan grouping) decided 
they needed to rein in the surrounding dens.  Calls were sent out to each established Klan 
to meet in Nashville at the Maxwell House Hotel to discuss reorganization and control 
mechanisms.228  The stated aim of the meeting was “to reorganize the Klan on a plan 
corresponding to its size and present purposes…to secure unity of purpose and concert of 
action” and “to distribute the authority among prudent men at local centers and exact 
from them a close supervision of those under their charge.”229  Under the direction of 
Brigadier General George Gordon, a plan was adopted to establish a rigid organization of 
Tennessee Klans under state leadership while simultaneously creating plans for outward 
growth and eventual control under a national hierarchy.  Gordon borrowed heavily from 
the organizational regulations of earlier groups like The Order of the Star Spangled 
Banner and the Know-Nothing Party.230  At the Nashville meeting, officers were elected 
to fill state positions, but vacancies existed at both the national (Empire) level and the 
surrounding state (Realm) levels.  That the Democratic Party convened directly across the 
street at the same time is of no small coincidence, since many prominent Klan leaders 
would soon emerge as leading personalities within the Democratic Party as well.  The 
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vacancy of overall Klan command was rectified by the election of Nathan Bedford 
Forrest—of Fort Pillow infamy—to the post of Grand Wizard.     
Forrest immediately set to work spreading the Klan throughout the former 
Confederate states.  A Civil War hero throughout the South, Bedford had both the 
charisma and authority to command respect and to attract others to his cause.  As a 
railroad entrepreneur and insurance salesman, his work carried him throughout the South.  
As he travelled, Klan Dens sprang up in his footsteps.  Soon, the Grand Wizard had 
established an Empire to rule over and, to ease the burden of management, divided that 
empire into state-level Realms.  Each Realm was overseen by a Grand Dragon, who 
oversaw the Grand Titans of a Dominion (congressional district).  The Grand Titans, in 
turn, kept check on the Grand Giants who commanded their Provinces (counties).  Within 
each Province was a collection of Dens (local communities), commanded by a Grand 
Cyclops.  Each level of governance had appointed staffs, and at the bottom of this 
pyramid were the Ghouls—the foot soldiers who paid dues and carried out the orders of 
their superior officers.  Indeed, the early Klan was a well-established hierarchy created by 
professionals with vast knowledge of military-style command and control.231        
To fill the Dens, the Klan needed to have a recruitment pitch that resonated with a 
widely targeted audience.  Again, Forrest was adept at promotion, and he adopted a pitch 
both broad in scope and noble-sounding in cause so as to attract a wide range of men, 
even if the oath stretched all limits of the truth.  The 1868 Klan Prescript decreed the 
Klan “an institution of Chivalry, Humanity, Mercy, and Patriotism; embodying in its 
genius and its principles all that is chivalric in conduct, noble in sentiment, generous in 
manhood, and patriotic in purpose.”232  Its three purposes, as proclaimed from on high: 
(1) to protect the weak, the innocent, and the defenseless from the indignities, wrongs, 
and outrages of the lawless, the violent, and the brutal; (2) to protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States and to protect the States and the people thereof from all 
invasion from any source whatsoever; and (3) to aid and assist in the execution of all 
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constitutional laws and to protect the people from unlawful seizure.233  While there is no 
clear evidence to why individuals were attracted to the Klan, one may speculate that the 
pitch resonated well amongst Confederate vets, that the disguises worn by members 
provided anonymity to those seeking violent alternatives to the political system. 
The Klan also seized upon the prevalent fear that the newly freed slaves would 
prowl the cities and rape or sexually assault white women.  Any gesture from an African 
American towards a white woman was considered a sexual transgression which sparked 
outrage and violent reprisal. One Southern judge affirmed this sentiment, saying “I see a 
chicken cock drop his wings and take after a hen; my experience and observation assure 
me that his purpose is sexual intercourse, no other evidence is needed.”234  The Klan 
innately understood this societal fear and took up the cause to defend and protect white 
womanhood—a sentiment alive even today.         
Of course, in order to be successful, an organization needs a method by which to 
communicate and coordinate its actions.  For the Reconstruction-era Klan, mass 
communication occurred through Democratically-controlled newspapers.  Fantastic 
sounding notes, all intended for publication, would be passed to the editors of 
newspapers.  A message could conceivably read: “Make ready! Make ready! Make 
ready! The mighty hobgoblins of the Confederate dead assemble.  Mr. X will soon meet a 
painful fate at the Hideous Hour of Crimson…beware, beware, beware.”  To those 
unfamiliar with the Klan language, the warning appears to be little more than mystic 
babble.  To Klansmen, however, it meant a non-lethal attack would be launched on Mr. X 
at 7:00pm next Saturday night. Pre-assault meeting places and times were already 
established by Den regulations.  The editing staffs of these newspapers would plead 
ignorance, and assert that they were forced to print the message by the evil, ghostly 
apparitions who delivered it.  Thus, newspapers served as critical command and control 
tools through which to propagate and coordinate Klan terrorism.   
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Beyond simply coordinating attacks, newspapers also played a significant role in 
extending Klan reach.  Historians note that “the primary role in spreading the Ku Klux 
Klan was played, not by General Forrest and his cohorts, but by the Southern Democratic 
newspaper press.”235  Fabulous and mysterious stories of Klan activity went to print 
whenever the editor could find an opportunity, and support for the Klan was lent outright 
by many newspapers.  The Nashville Gazette, for example, once proudly published that 
“niggers are disappearing…with a rapidity that gives color to the cannibalistic threats of 
the Shrouded Brethren…run, nigger, run, or the Kuklux will catch you.”236  The Ku Klux 
Klan thus combined a strong organizational construct and strong recruitment strategy 
with an effective means of communication.  Internal cohesion and a sense of loyalty to 
the organization were the final needed elements to ensure complete organizational 
effectiveness—both factors to which Forrest attended.  
For any organization—be it terrorist or commercial—the maintenance of unit 
cohesion is an important part of sustaining operations.  Klan leadership understood this 
and placed tremendous emphasis on maintaining internal security, secrecy, and loyalty.  
Secret passwords and sayings were established to ensure operational security.  To compel 
a recruit to remain loyal to the Klan, the Ghoul would take an oath “to never reveal to 
anyone not a member of the Order of the ***, by any intimation, sign, symbol, word or 
act, or in any other manner whatever, any of the secrets, signs, grips, pass-words or 
mysteries of the Order.”237  Those who violated secrecy or acted outside the instructions 
of their officers were met “with a fearful and just penalty of the traitor, which is death, 
death, death” at the hands of his brethren.238  Members of the Klan were made to pay 
dues, participate in Klan ceremonies, and support the organization in any way possible.  
Threat of violent reprisal for refusal to do so ensured the Klan maintained rigid 
obedience.  Additionally, when Klansmen went on the attack, it was routine to pass 
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around the whipping stick to each member of the attacking party.  This ensured that if 
one person in the party went to law enforcement officials, he would have to implicate 
himself as well. 
Organizational explanations of the causes of terrorism seem vindicated by study 
of the Reconstruction era Klan.  Klan violence became rampant with the creation of an 
effective organizational structure headed by an effective leader.  Rules, regulations, and a 
strategic vision were put into place early in the Klan’s life.  This gave each Realm a 
common operating picture and an ability to act independently without direct control by 
the Grand Wizard himself.  When personally threatened with federal action, General 
Forrest publicly disbanded the Klan (privately, it is assumed he handed operational 
control to his Dragons).  By this time, however, the Klan’s violent trajectory had been set 
and the Klan was adequately prepared to operate as a cellular organization that could act 
in accord with what each local environment permitted.  By 1877, the end of Radical 
Reconstruction, the Klan would go into hibernation, only to be reawakened four decades 
later.     
E. CONCLUSIONS 
With regard to the applicability of each approach considered, the Reconstruction 
Era Klan campaign provides a support for each.  In fact, it is the “perfect storm” if we 
seek an environment in which every approach has its predictions supported.  Structural 
explanations of terrorism are defensible given the economic turmoil of the South, the 
presence of an ideological opposite in the form of the Union Leagues, and the mass return 
of war veterans.  Concomitantly, sponsorship approaches are well supported, as the Klan 
was widely considered to work in cahoots with the Democratic Party and had ample “safe 
havens” from which to operate.  Lastly, organizational explanations are reasonable as the 
Klan established a hierarchical organizational design under effective leadership, seized 
upon the concerns of society to boost recruitment, and implemented a tough method of 
internal control to ensure the compliance of its members. 
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Although the proponents of each approach can take a measure of satisfaction in 
empirical evidence in this period lending their arguments support, for purposes of this 
dissertation, the Reconstruction era Klan proves problematic.  To wee why, we must turn 
to another era of Klan terrorism.   
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CHAPTER IV. HISTORY WITH LIGHTNING—THE JAZZ 
ERA KLAN 
Law and order must prevail 
Cohabitation between whites and blacks must stop 
Bootleggers, pimps, hangers-on, get right or get out 
Wife-beaters, family-deserters, home-wreckers,  
We have no room for you 
Law violators, we are watching you.  Beware… 
We stand for old glory and 100% americanism 
We invite all 100% americans to join us. 
Here today, here tomorrow. Here forever. Watch us grow.239 
 
The Klan of the 1920s shared similarities with its Reconstruction-era predecessor, 
yet had considerable differences as well.  Among its continuities was the underlying core 
belief in white supremacy, though the Jazz era Klan hid it better.  African American 
migration northward following the Great War produced a wake of race riots in its wake.  
This was just the opportunity the Klan needed to break its Southern boundaries and 
propogate nationwide.  The 1920s Klan still promoted itself a defensive organization, but 
took aim against a broader array of potential targets than did its predecessor.  Both the 
Reconstruction and Jazz era Klans aimed for political influence but for wholly different 
reasons.  The Reconstruction Klan attempted to regain political power in the South in the 
name of the Democratic Party, while the Jazz Era Klan largely sought political support in 
order to promote organizational survival, generate wealth for its leaders, and provide the 
Klan an air of respectability.  Although the group relied on a campaign of terrorism to 
achieve its aims, Klan leaders attempted to steer the organization and adopt a more 
politically-minded strategy.  This strategy was based on gaining the national political 
power necessary to cover up some of the Klan’s more insidious acts in order to keep the 
group alive.  During this period of the Klan’s existence a true ideological opponent was 
largely absent.  Nor did the Klan receive active support from either an established 
national party or third party international sponsor, although it did enjoy safe haven 
throughout the country.  
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The chapter begins with a historical over view concentrating on the substantial 
terrorist campaign the Jazz era Klan waged for over five years.  Following this summary, 
the three approaches commonly used to explain terrorism campaigns will be tested 
against the case.  
Unlike the Reconstruction era Klan, whose primary aim was to undermine the 
efforts of Radical Reconstruction, the Jazz era Klan concentrated on group preservation 
and growth, which translated into personal income for Klan leaders.  To promote such 
growth, racist recruitment tactics and allusions to the Reconstruction era were toned 
down and replaced with socially-acceptable rhetoric.  In the public sphere, the Klan 
adopted a family-values tone, emphasizing American ideals and Protestant ethics.  
Privately, the Klan sold hate wherever the local environment permitted. The impact of 
this strategy proved significant.  During the 1920s, the Klan was able to politically steer 
several states, alter the outcome of numerous elections, and even gain the support of a 
President and Supreme Court justice.   
Although political role of the Jazz era Klan will be highlighted—as it was at the 
time—this political turn does not mean that the Klan suddenly abandoned its terrorist 
tactics.  Quite the contrary, as over five hundred acts of terrorism could be attributed to 
Klansmen during period under study.240  The list of atrocities includes acts of castration, 
acid brandings, burning men alive, floggings, hangings, shootings, arson, and the 
introduction of cross burnings to send the message that the Klan was present.  
Admittedly, this violence appears a strange counter to the 1923 Klan rally which drew 
over 200,000 to a picnic and family get-together in Indiana, an irony which highlights the 
unique nature of this period in the Klan’s history.241  To understand the paradox and the 
rise of the second wave Klan, it is necessary to revisit the years immediately following 
the failure of Radical Reconstruction.  
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A. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE  
With its objectives achieved in the South, the Klan went into a period of 
hibernation between the years 1877 and 1915.  During that time, due largely to the 
political climate the Klan helped establish by 1875, the South reverted back to its 
antebellum social roots.  Republican support for Southern Reconstruction abated as 
northerners became weary of the time and effort needed to create lasting change in the 
former Confederacy.  The Ku Klux Acts were largely overturned by 1883, and through 
numerous Supreme Court decisions (such as Slaughter-House (1873), Minor v. 
Happersett (1875), United States v. Reese (1876),United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 
Hall v. De Cuir (1877) and Texas Railroad v. Mississippi (1890)) the gains made by 
African Americans during Reconstruction were largely eroded.242     In 1886, Plessy v. 
Ferguson legalized racial segregation, in essence politically legitimizing a widespread 
American belief in the tenets of scientific racism.243 By 1890, virtually all African 
American social and political gains from Reconstruction had been undercut.  Those 
remaining would be further crushed by the enactment of Jim Crow laws, rules which 
systematically disenfranchised registered black voters and justified barring African-
Americans from most public venues.  By the turn of the century, bolstered as it was by 
“science,” white supremacy was still very much the ideological foundation for power 
structures in the South.244   
 It would be wrong, however, to paint the South as a pure racist society while 
describing the North as a haven of equality.  Although there was an overwhelming zeal to 
transform the South in the wake of the Civil War, Northern passion to drive societal 
change died out over time.  The Reconstruction enthusiasm would be replaced by a 
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feeling of apathy and a growing sentiment that maybe Southerners were right about the 
inequality of races and the proper social role of blacks.  Whereas hatred and fear of 
African Americans fueled violence in the South, Northerners found themselves 
confronting a different set of others.  Because the Klan has always possessed a keen 
knack for finding purchase among those beset by hatred and fear, it is worth exploring the 
sources of Northern anxiety.    
Rapid industrialization of the North after the Civil War sparked a large wave of 
European immigration.  Predominately Catholic, these transplants arrived in huge 
transport ships, eager to enjoy the opportunities America offered.  Soon, fears spread 
throughout the North that the Pope was systematically taking over the United States and 
that Americans would soon find themselves serving the interests of the Catholic 
Church.245  Short-lived groups like the American Protective Association and the 
Whitecaps emerged to try to restrict immigration, remove Catholic teachers from public 
schools, ban Catholics from public office, and require that immigrants learn English 
before gaining citizenship.246  Concomitantly, a large migration of African Americans 
northward during and after the war added further diversity, and further strain, to the 
Northern societal makeup.247  This mass migration and subsequent rise in societal 
anxiety, according to some accounts, served as an impetus for the Klan’s eventual 
northward progression.  
As society dealt with issues of migration, immigration, rapid industrialization, and 
an increased rate of urbanization, the academic realm was doing its part to portray Civil 
War history in an overwhelmingly pro-Southern light.  Led by William Dunning, a group 
of historians “systematically distorted the motives of radical Republicans, falsified the 
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behavior of Southern blacks, and glorified the Ku-Klux Klansmen as heroes.”248  Over 
time, Northerners and Southerners alike grew to accept the Dunning School narrative 
about Southern Reconstruction efforts.  The respectability of the myth of the “Lost 
Cause”  was once again re-elevated, lending academic credence to the notions of a once-
noble Southern aristocracy and the “horrors” of Reconstruction.249  This form of 
intellectual high cover indirectly aided the rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan in 1915. 
From a global perspective, the first two decades of the new century appeared to be 
ripe for right wing extremism.  Beginning in 1918, Austria was introduced to the 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, Hungary witnessed the birth of the Etelkoz Association, 
Mussolini introduced the Fascist Party programme at the Milan Conference, and 
Germany saw the Deutsche National Volks Partei form as the Treaty of Versailles was 
being signed and implemented.  Over the next five years (1919-1924), as overall Klan 
strength grew to the millions in the United States, Mussolini’s march on Rome signaled 
the official beginning of fascism in Italy, the National Socialist German Workers Party 
became a political contender under the leadership of Adolf Hitler and his paramilitary 
Sturm Abteilung (SA); even Japanese succumbed to the ideas of the Society for the 
Preservation of the National Essence.250   
United States domestic politics struck a tone of conservativism following World 
War I, despite President Wilson’s efforts to stand up and lead new international 
governance structures. Within American borders, an isolationist tone had been struck, 
urging an almost exclusive focus upon American domestic concerns.  This focus, in turn, 
sparked a wave of nationalistic sentiment.  The growing nativist sentiment owed a debt of 
gratitude to the Committee on Public Information, a government entity stood up by 
President Wilson to bolster American support for the war effort.  The CPI produced 
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millions of posters, newsletters, and pamphlets during the war, further stoking American 
nationalistic fervor.  The CPI’s “death to the Huns” message effectively created “a home-
front atmosphere conducive to political repression and abuse of civil liberties.”251  
President Wilson had effectively mobilized the domestic will to engage in and eventually 
win World War I, but the information operations campaign conducted during the war 
generated unanticipated, violent aftershocks.  “Popular hatred and sporadic acts of 
violence spread to socialists, pacifists, intellectuals, immigrants, and anyone else who 
failed to meet the test of so-called 100-percent Americanism.”252    
Similar to the Reconstruction era, 1920s society still maintained a strong belief in 
scientific racism and the hierarchy of race.253  Bolstered by the emerging scientific 
branch of eugenics, Americans still believed in the primacy of whites.  The 
dehumanization and demonization of blacks and “lesser races” played itself out in violent 
fashion throughout the country.  The Saint Louis race riot of 1917, triggered by a union 
strike, speaks to the blatant racism within America’s borders.  The bloody affair resulted 
in the death of forty blacks, and the torching of entire black communities.  One reporter 
witnessed the deeply personal violence firsthand, noting “to put the rope around the 
negro’s neck, one of the lynchers stuck his fingers inside his gaping scalp and lifted the 
negro’s head by it, literally bathing his hand in the man’s blood.”254  St. Louis could 
hardly be considered an isolated incident.  Over twenty five race riots were noted 
between April to October 1919.255  The following years would see little decline in racial 
violence.  Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1921 served as the site of one of the most bloody race riots 
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in American history; one in which the role of the Klan is still debated.256  As African 
Americans migrated northward after the war.    
Nationwide social turmoil was the flavor of the time, exemplified by the Red 
Scare of 1919.  That year was marked by a rash of union strikes as the American 
economy transitioned from a war footing back to normal operations and fears of an 
American Bolshevik Revolution spread.  The 1919 strike which shut down shipping in 
Seattle was soon eclipsed when the Boston police walked off their jobs in protest.  In 
places like Chicago, violence somehow turned yet again against African Americans—a 
scene reminiscent of the 1863 New York Draft Riot.257  The Roaring Twenties were an 
era in which Henry Ford’s anti-Semitic rants in The International Jew expressed widely-
held beliefs.258  This in mind, President Harding’s promise of a “return to normalcy,” was 
proven correct—at least in regards to the normal state of American racial affairs and 
beliefs.  The Ku Klux Klan would take advantage of these era-specific nuances to launch 
yet another campaign of terrorism.  
 Following a forty-year sleep, it is ironic to consider that what reawakened the 
Klan was not the sounds of discontent and social outrage, but the applause of millions.  
On January 8, 1915, a movie premiered that changed the motion picture industry forever.  
Costing over $110,000 to complete (an incredible sum at the time) D.W. Griffith’s epic 
picture grossed over $60 million.  The Birth of a Nation was indeed a major motion 
picture marvel, but as a NAACP official noted, “every resource of a magnificent new art” 
had been used “to picture Negroes in the worst possible light.”259  The picture began with 
stirring battle scenes of the Civil War using the most modern forms of filmmaking and 
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artistic direction.  Audiences were wrought with anticipation as the first act ended and the 
second opened with the assassination of President Lincoln.  According to the movie, once 
Lincoln was gone, Radical Republicans took power and unleashed an African American 
plague upon the South.  The movie depicts flashes of “helpless white virgins being 
whisked indoors by lusty black bucks.”260  A full orchestra accompanied these appalling 
visions, playing “hootchy-kootchy music with driving tomtom beats, suggesting to one 
listener the image of a black penis pushing into the vagina of a white virgin.”261   
Audiences were horrified by the images and quickly found themselves rooting for 
a band of law-abiding, hood-wearing heroes on horseback.  In multiple scenes, armies of 
Klansmen swooped in to save the sanctity of white womanhood from “crazed blacks.”262  
Through daring acts of martial bravery, the Klan was able to chase the evil blacks and 
Radical Republicans from town and reunite the North and South through a spirit of Aryan 
unity.  Fittingly, the movie closes with the army of Klansmen parading through the 
streets, while “southern families watch them joyfully, relieved that law and order are 
secure in the hands of those wondrous white knights.”263  In the final scene of the movie, 
Klansmen were painted as the sole source capable of reuniting the North and the South 
after the war—all “in defense of their Aryan birthright.”264   
 As one would expect, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) was instantly outraged and attempted to prevent further dissemination 
of the picture.  Griffith was a shrewd entrepreneur, however, and knew exactly how he 
could secure the support needed to get his picture in theaters nationwide.  A letter to an 
old friend ensured its widest distribution.   
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Following receipt of a letter from his old college friend, President Woodrow 
Wilson agreed to see the film in the East Room of the White House.  After its screening, 
the President shook hands with Griffith and exclaimed “it is like writing history with 
lighting, and my only regret is that it is all so terribly true.”265  Griffith also managed to 
get the endorsement from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Edward D. White.  A 
former Klansman himself, White was taken with the film, lent his imprimatur, and 
ensured that NAACP efforts to block it were for naught.  Soon, the film was being shown 
in theaters throughout the country, and was enough of a draw that theaters charged two 
dollars a head—a dramatic increase over the nickel that tickets usually cost.266  
Among the millions who viewed the film was an alcoholic ex-preacher by the 
name of William Joseph Simmons.  Known as “Doc” by some (although his self-
proclaimed attendance at medical school has never been proved) and called “Colonel” by 
others (a title bestowed as an honorary rank in the Woodmen of the World fraternal 
order), Simmons had a lifelong goal of re-establishing the Ku Klux Klan in its violent 
Reconstruction-era form.267  Strangely, he appeared to harbor no deeply racist feelings—
or at least he was no more racist than a typical white American male of the time.  Instead, 
he seemed to be driven by power more so than racial hate.  According to one source, “he 
cared little about whipping negroes or tarring and feathering wicked whites. But the 
thought of standing six feet tall or more, clad in a mysterious garb or riding a big horse at 
the head of a parade through Atlanta possessed and fascinated him.  His face took on a 
smile that has never faded away since.”268  
Simmons was known as a charismatic charmer, yet he was completely inept at 
organization, management, and mass recruitment.  His early efforts to reshape the Klan 
reflect these shortcomings.  Although his society should have been prime recruiting 
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grounds for the Klan, “five years of sporadic recruiting, cross burning, and torchlight 
parades had lured no more than 3,000 members by spring 1920.”269  The Klan was 
running on fumes, a fact reflected by Simmons admission that “there were times when I 
walked the streets with my shoes worn through because I had no money.”270  Terrorist 
acts could be attributed to the Klan between 1915-1920, but the violence was both 
sporadic and largely uncoordinated—hardly the systematic effort needed to be considered 
a campaign.  Indeed, by all accounts, the Klan was a marginal entity. 
 Simmons eventually realized his shortcomings and reached out to an organization 
that could help swell the Klan’s ranks and manage its daily operations.  In June 1920, 
acting on the advice of a rival, Simmons hired Edward Young Clarke and Elizabeth Tyler 
of the Southern Publicity Association to help spread the Klan throughout the nation.  
Results were immediate.  Clarke and Tyler, who were far from amateurs, recognized the 
potential wealth to be made from.  Earlier they had promoted such causes as the Anti-
Saloon League, the Armenian Relief Fund, the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial 
Association, the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, and the YMCA.271  The duo used this 
experience to develop a sizeable network of recruiters, who themselves tapped into 
fraternal organizations and churches capable of transmitting their recruitment pitch across 
America.   
 The deal was a lucrative one for Clarke and Tyler, as they earned eight dollars out 
of every ten dollar membership fee from new recruits.  Out of these eight dollars, some 
was allocated downwards to the local organization that brought in the new member.  This 
represented a financial windfall.  By summer 1921, the Klan had an estimated 850,000 
dues-paying members.272  Simmons stuffed his pockets with over $170,000 along with a 
 
                                                 
269 Newton, The Ku Klux Klan : History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of 
America's Most Notorious Secret Society, 14. 
270 Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest, 5. 
271  Dale, “Ku Klux Failure until ‘Imperial Wizard’ Surrounds Himself with Coterie of Experts on 
Finances.”  Ball State Archives: Digital Repository  
272 Newton, The Ku Klux Klan : History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of 
America's Most Notorious Secret Society, 15. 
 99
$25,000 payment for back pay.  One source reported that “tax auditors would later 
estimate that the initial gold rush brought $1.5 million pouring into Klan coffers, with no 
end in sight.”273   
Clarke and Tyler put over one thousand recruiters to work around the country, 
with instructions to adapt their message in a manner that resonated within whatever local 
community to which they were assigned.274  In the South, Kleagles (Klan recruiters) 
highlighted white supremacy and an anti-black recruitment pitch.  In the North, an anti-
immigrant and anti-Catholic tone was struck.  In dry communities, Klansman vowed to 
rid the town of bootleggers and alcoholics.  For conservative communities, the Klan 
vowed to uphold morality and punish those who violated community norms.  In this vein, 
the Klan, could present itself as cure for all evils, an organization embodying the ideals of 
100% Americanism. 
 An upsurge in violence naturally followed the tremendous influx of new 
Klansmen to the organization.    Texas and Oklahoma proved most receptive for Klan 
terrorism.  In Texas, between 1921 and 1922, Klan atrocities became commonplace.  
Floggings became anticipated public spectacles and, according to one source, “the Klan 
in Dallas was credited with flogging sixty-eight people during the bloody spring of 
1922.”275  The Dallas Klan later demonstrated its propensity for terrorism by kidnapping 
an African American bellhop, branding KKK on his forehead with acid, and then 
dumping him off in front of his workplace.276  Simmons’ eventual successor, Dr. Hiram 
Wesley Evans, was among those in this party.   
As a whole, the Texas Klan was credited with “over five hundred tar-and-feather 
parties and whipping bees, plus other threats, assaults, and homicides.”277  The most 
horrendous instance of Texas Klan violence occurred in 1922 when a young African 
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American doctor was kidnapped, beaten, and castrated for “consorting with white 
women.”278  Texas Klan violence would break free of its borders and affect neighboring 
states throughout the southwest.               
 The scene in Oklahoma was equally violent.  By 1920, Oklahoma (which had 
only been a state for only 13 years) was known for its rampant lawlessness.  It was here 
that the Klan would use terrorism in a particularly novel—but highly effective—manner.  
Kleagles in Oklahoma touted the Klan as a vigilante enforcement group; an organization 
that, according to the Klansmen, would clean up the streets of Oklahoma when and where 
government could not.  Thus, a strange relationship was developed between the Klan and 
local police forces.  Immediately, the Klan took to flogging and beating anyone who 
strayed beyond societal norms.  Scores of “bootleggers, gamblers, joyriders, corrupt 
lawyers and bail bondsmen, lenient judges, and men who lived off their own wives or 
fooled around with those of others” were summarily beaten and publicly shamed.279  
When asked to do something about Klan violence, an Oklahoma mayor remarked “you 
might condemn the method, but the results were entirely satisfactory to our city of twenty 
thousand.”280  A judge added, “I won’t defend it, of course, but from what I’ve seen I 
should say that the night-riders averaged nearer justice than the courts do.”281  In essence, 
the Oklahoma Klan became a pseudo-arm of the law. 
 Following a three day race riot in May 1921, the Klan took up official residence 
in Tulsa, proffering to maintain the racial status quo.282  In 1922, John Smitherman, an 
African American from Tulsa, was kidnapped, driven out of town, and handcuffed to a 
tree.  He was summarily whipped and, during the beatings, one of the hooded assailants 
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cut off his ear and tried to make him eat it.283  This, he was told, was for “registering 
Negroes to vote in the Democratic primaries and of being discourteous to a Tulsa white 
woman.”284  These acts were summarily cheered even by those who were educated.  The 
vice president of the University of Oklahoma, in fact, served as the Grand Dragon for the 
state.285  No wonder that, with the support of all segments of society, special Klan 
whipping squads appeared to render justice.           
 The “second wave” Klan differed from the “first wave” in that it broke its 
southern confines and was able to take root and flourish even in Northern states.  
Strangely, after monitoring and hearing reports of Klan violence in the South, 
Northerners would soon roll out the welcome mat for the Klan.   It began when Northern 
newspapers picked up on southern violence and published exposes about the Klan for 
each of the forty eight states.  On September 1921, newspapers—both Northern and 
Southern—concluded their Klan series by detailing 152 different acts of Klan 
terrorism.286  Many citizens were outraged and called for government intervention.  
Congress was forced to act, and immediately summoned Imperial Wizard Simmons to 
testify.  What happened next was completely unforeseen.  When Simmons took the stand, 
the charismatic speaker won over the nation with his stirring speeches and theatrical 
performances.  On the final day of questioning, Simmons closed by saying:   
I want to say to my persecutors and the persecutors of this organization, in 
all honesty and sincerity…that you do not know what you are doing.  You 
are ignorant of our principles as were those who were ignorant of the 
character and work of Christ.  I cannot better express myself than by 
saying to you who are persecutors of the Klan and myself, Father, forgive 
you, for you know not what you do…Mr. Chairman, I am done.287   
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As the last word left his mouth, Simmons “slipped from his chair to the floor in a state of 
unconsciousness.”288  The room exploded with roaring applause, and news outlets 
painted the Klan as true defenders of American morality and Christianity.  This position 
of prestige was further solidified by rumors of President Warren G. Harding’s swearing 
in ceremony in the White House’s Green Room (sparking a debate about whether or not 
he was a member which remains unresolved even today).289  Simmons would later sum 
the hearings up perfectly, “Congress gave us the best publicity we ever got…Congress 
made us.”290  
 The stage was set for yet another explosion in Klan growth, and by December 
1921, Klan numbers were well over a million, rapidly growing to a 1924 peak of over 
four million hood-donning members—a startling number considering the entire American 
population hovered around one hundred million.  Concomitantly—as it had done in 
1920—violence flared.  As 200 new klaverns were chartered throughout the country, the 
Klan’s growth was bound to trigger confrontation.  According to one historian, “Klan 
rallies sparked violence in Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.”291  Sadly, the wide propagation of the Klan was assisted 
and accelerated by various segments of the Protestant Church.   
 Following Simmons’ display in Congress, the Klan was widely regarded as if it 
was a true defender of American ideals and morality.  Although the Klan had heavily 
recruited ministers before the hearings, Klan leaders were surprised by the support shown 
by leaders of many fundamentalist Christian churches.  Simmons, a former preacher 
himself, jumped at the opportunity to tie the Klan to American Protestant churches.  The 
Kloran, the Ku Klux operating and ceremonies manual, was updated to reflect a closer tie 
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to fundamentalist Christianity.  In fact, the opening line of the newly-crafted Klansman 
Creed proclaimed “I believe in God and in the tenets of the Christian Religion and that a 
godless nation cannot prosper.”292 The office of Kludd (Klan chaplain) was stood up in 
each Klavern, with orders to remind members that “the living Christ is a Klansman’s 
criterion of character.”293   The efforts paid off.   
As one Protestant minister put it, “I joined the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 
because: I believed in Jesus Christ and His church; I believed in a militant Christianity; I 
believed in the Cross…if there isn’t enough in that to challenge a red-blooded virile 
minister to a sense of duty, he has lost his vision.”294  The connection resonated with the 
public as well.  When a woman was asked why she joined a local church, she responded 
“If you want to know why I am joining the church, I want to tell you.  It’s because I 
found Christ through the Ku Klux Klan.”295      
 With a growing organization and an excellent network with which to spread his 
message, Simmons quickly amassed both power and wealth.  However, in November 
1922, this power would be unexpectedly pulled from beneath him.  While Simmons was 
expecting another round of electoral support for his leadership in the Klan, former Texas 
Grand Titan Hiram Evans, and a small circle of co-conspirators launched a plan to 
“promote” Simmons out of power.296  Evans was able to convince a large percentage of 
voting members that Simmons needed to focus on the role of Klan Emperor—a pseudo-
advisory position for Klan affairs that positively placed Simmons above everyone else in 
the organization.  Evans completely understood that the real power was held by the 
Imperial Wizard and, through underhanded play, managed to maneuver himself to full 
command of the Klan through the November vote. Simmons was left scratching his head.  
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When Simmons returned to Klan headquarters in Atlanta, he found his office already 
occupied by Evans, with processes put in place to speed his departure.  Evans now ruled 
the Klan with every intent to turn physical and spiritual power into political power.                         
 Evans’ vision and strategic decision-making would soon help the Klan acquire 
considerable political power.  One positive result of this political expansion was that Klan 
terrorism declined significantly under Evans’ direction as all Klan efforts were focused 
on building political networks.297  According to one historian, “nationwide, Klan votes 
elected seventy five congressmen, sixteen U.S. senators, eleven governors, and countless 
other officials.”298  Newspapers throughout the country took notice of the Klan’s 
newfound political aims, noting that “the Ku Klux Klan has now passed out of the 
amusing stage and has entered the domain of practical politics to challenge our existing 
parties.”299  Indiana, under the leadership of Grand Dragon David Stephenson, would 
become the state most firmly controlled by Klan directives.  The story of the 1922–1925 
Indiana Klan speaks volumes about the Klan’s rise in political power and helps also 
explain the Klan’s abrupt downfall.  It is here the remainder of this narrative will focus.   
The Klan’s eventual sway over Indiana politics was tremendous.  Indiana was the 
one state in which each county harbored a Klavern and where the Governor and both 
Senators were beholden to the state’s Grand Dragon.  By 1923, over 300,000 people in 
Indiana were declared Klansmen, a number that represented ten percent of the state’s 
population.300  At the helm of it all was “The Old Man,” David Curtis Stephenson.  
Stephenson, a lifelong journeyman, had risen to Klan prominence for his outstanding 
record of recruitment throughout Indiana.  Stephenson was widely regarded as a master 
organizer and showman. He imported real-estate salesmen from Florida to serve as his 
pitchmen, hosted huge all-day barbeques, and transformed the Indiana Klan into a widely 
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admired organization.301  Stephenson also stood up a women’s auxiliary arm of the Klan, 
dubbed the Queens of the Golden Mask, which specialized in spreading derogatory 
rumors about any anti-Klan politician.  It was noted that rumors propagated by these 
women traveled throughout the state with unrivaled speed.302  Through an elaborate 
system of intelligence gathering and blackmail, Stephenson soon had incriminating 
information on almost every politician in the state, as well as an effective method by 
which to spread it.   
To prevent this information from being leaked through the female “Klan poison 
squads,” politicians ran to Stephenson for his endorsement and support.  Soon 
Stephenson was the puppet master of Indiana politics.  The 1924 elections spoke truth to 
this power, prompting one journalist to admit “I am convinced that it [the Indiana Klan] 
is—while it lasts—the most effective political organization the country has ever seen, not 
excepting Tammany.”303  Further East, at the same time, a parade was held in 
Stanton,Virginia to celebrate the fact that eighty percent of city public officers were 
Klansmen.304   
In an ordeal that would play itself out in lesser form throughout other states, 
Stephenson became power-hungry.  Following the 1924 elections, he began to take steps 
to divorce the Indiana Klan from the authority of the Imperial Wizard.  Hiram Evans was 
furious, but in the end could do little to check Stephenson’s immense power, although 
Stephenson’s boat was mysteriously destroyed by a bomb blast soon after the divorce.305 
The date that best signifies the beginning of the end of Klan power is March 15, 
1925.  It is the day on which “Old Man” Stephenson forced a twenty-eight year old white 
female, named Madge Oberholtzer, to take a train ride to Chicago.  Upon entering the 
train, Stephenson violently raped and assaulted Oberholtzer.  Her graphic depiction of the 
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event best tells the story.  “He chewed me all over my body, bit my neck and face, 
chewed my tongue, chewed my breasts until they bled, my back, my legs, my ankles, and 
mutilated me all over my body.”306  After passing out, Madge awoke to see Stephenson 
hovering over her with his revolver.  Oberholtzer asked him to shoot her, but Stephenson 
instead had his aides escort her to a local hotel to recover.  While there, Madge convinced 
her watchers that she needed to go to the store to buy some makeup.  While inside the 
store, she bought a box of mercuric chloride tablets and promptly poisoned herself when 
she returned to the hotel.  Two weeks later, after receiving no immediate medical 
attention from Stephenson, Madge Oberholtzer died.  Before her death, however, she 
gave the police a detailed account of Stephenson’s sexual perversities; a warrant was 
immediately drafted for his arrest.                       
 After his arrest, Stephenson was sure he would be pardoned by his friend, Indiana 
governor Ed Jackson.  A pardon never came, and Stephenson was found guilty of second-
degree murder.  Vowing to take everyone down with him, Stephenson handed over 
detailed accounts of others’ political complicity with Klan directives.  The details of both 
the sexual assault and Klan political affiliations were published nationwide.  Although 
Hiram Evans was glad to see his nemesis jailed, he was appalled by the reaction of his 
supporters.  Now robbed of their reputation as defenders of morality, Klan numbers 
plummeted.  Politicians divested themselves Ku Klux ties as quickly as possible.  Most 
importantly, national newspapers revealed the true nature of the Klan.  According to one 
historian, “the Texas floggings, the Elduayen affair in Inglewood, the Kern county 
tortures, the murder of Captain Coburn, Madge Oberholtzer’s death at the hands of D.C. 
Stephenson, the Georgia and Alabama lashers, and a dozen other stories stayed in the 
headlines for weeks.”307 
 While the Klan’s downfall began in 1925, by 1927 state Klans were separating 
from the now-reviled national organization in order to salvage what they could of their 
local apparatus.  Evans took them to court, but further sullied the reputation of the Klan 
as witnesses came forward to describe the levels of atrocities and incredible personal 
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greed exhibited by Ku Klux Klan leaders.  By 1928, the Klan’s political power had 
evaporated, and all that remained was a loose affiliation of local klaverns that bickered 
more than they cooperated.  The era of the second wave Klan had come to an end.           
B. STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
The rise of the Reconstruction-era Klan was fully consistent with structural 
explanations, since each factor tested was present during the period.  For the “second 
wave” Klan, one of the structural factors—the presence of a left wing opponent for the 
Klan to define itself in contradiction with—is absent.  As for the remaining structural 
factors used to explain right wing terrorism—a depressed economy, and the return of war 
veterans—are present, but are not sufficiently robust to explain the 1920 Klan terrorism 
campaign on their own.   
To begin with the supposition that a depressed economy results in terrorism 
campaigns, it is worth nothing that between the Civil War and WWI, the American real 
gross national product (GNP) more than doubled.308  Less well recognized, however, is 
the fact that there was a deep and painful economic recession which began in early 1920, 
lasting eighteen months into mid-1921.  Three different reports indicate a one year 
deflation rate of anywhere from 13% to 18%, a rate far above even the 11.5% drop 
experienced during the third year of the Great Depression.309  At the same time, GNP 
dropped between 2.6% and 6.3%, depending on one’s source.  This “forgotten” recession, 
ignored in most Klan accounts, lasted at least seventeen months, from January 1920 until 
July 1921.  Considering that the Ku Klux campaign took an upward swing around July of 
1920, one must acknowledge the possibility that economic downturn played a role in 
spurring the Klan’s campaign.  Economic conditions, however, fail to explain why the 
campaign persisted into the mid-1920s, when the American economy was witnessing 
tremendous growth. 
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Following the end of the “forgotten” recession in 1921, America witnessed some 
of the most remarkable economic growth in its history.  Thus, it becomes difficult to 
determine just how significant a role the economy played in the re-burgeoning of the 
Klan.  One scholar goes as far to argue that Klan violence was actually fueled by the 
wealth of certain locations.  According to Alexander. the Klan often thrived where there 
was great economic growth, since “wealth and population brought the usual social 
parasites” in the form of prostitutes, gambling establishments, and drinking 
establishments.310  Since the poor could hardly afford to pay for the services of 
“professional” women, and since the Klan proposed to fight such immorality, the Klan 
took root in as many wealthy as poverty-stricken locations.  The make-up of the Klan 
also throws into doubt the economy as an explanation for its terrorist campaign.  The 
Klan had as many bankers, businessmen, and doctors among its ranks as it did farmers.311  
Further casting doubt upon the economy as a key impetus is that the Klan of the times 
was described by many as largely middle class.312  Consequently, although the 
supporting evidence proves weak under deeper scrutiny, the economic explanation for 
terrorism will be coded as partially verified.   
One structural explanation which, at first glance, could be supported by this study 
is the argument that the presence of an ideological opponent spurs the rise of right wing 
terrorism campaigns.  Even this explanation, however, requires a bit of an intellectual 
stretch, as it is difficult to pinpoint an actual organization the Klan adopted as its enemy.  
Multiple perceived threats existed, yet none of them actually organized on anywhere near 
a similar scale to counter rising Klan activity.  What the Klan was able to do, however, 
was craft a narrative that the United States was under attack from a diverse array of anti-
American threats.  The 1920s, were known as the “Roarin’ 20s,” an age which began to 
push the norms of sexuality and witnessed the expanding roles of females as a social 
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force.  Males became increasingly alarmed as “young women in particular began to chisel 
away at the double standard of morality that had been typical of pre-1914 relations 
between the sexes.”313  The emergence of the flapper, in some ways, served as an 
indicator of a leftward shift in society, a shift that prompted a counter-shift in the form of 
the Ku Klux Klan and other conservative political organizations.  This said, leftward 
trends and perceived threats are different from actual organizations against which the 
Klan can mobilize and generate a symbiotic relationship with.    
Moving on to whether the Klan had an actual ideological opponent, an argument 
could be made that it did with the emergence of the NAACP during the “Red Scare” era.  
Naturally, based solely on race, the Klan despised an organization like the NAACP and 
went to great links to paint it a threat to society.  But it did so by stepping around issues 
of race.  The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 scared many Americans into fearing a similar 
Communist takeover in the United States.  Knowing this, the Klan made every effort to 
paint the NAACP red.  In one document, the Klan explained “we believe that the 
N.A.A.C.P. is a subversive organization, and is infiltrated with Communistic ideologies 
and should be abolished by legal means.”314  By tying one of its enemies—African 
Americans—to the enemy of the rest of society—Communists—the Klan effectively 
portrayed the NAACP as a left wing menace.  The NAACP countered that its members 
were not communists, to which the Klan retorted they should demonstrate their patriotism 
and join Klan efforts. However, there are no accounts of a major Klan counter-
mobilization against the NAACP; instead, Klansmen seemed to sidestep public 
confrontation.  
In a similar vein, the Klan in the North portrayed the Catholic group Knights of 
Columbus as an unparalleled danger to society.  In a masterful stroke of propaganda, the 
Klan released what it said was the secret initiation pledge of the Knights of Columbus.  
The pledge was fabricated by the Klan, but managed to catch the popular imagination of 
society nonetheless.  In its opening paragraph, the pledge has a Knight swearing “when 
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opportunity presents, [to] make and wage relentless war, secretly and openly, against all 
heretics, Protestants, and Masons, as I am directed to do [by “Mother Church”], to 
extirpate them from the face of the whole earth, and that I will spare neither age, sex, or 
condition, and that I will hung, burn, waste, flail, boil, flay, strangle and bury alive these 
infamous heretics; rip up the stomachs and wombs of their women and crush their infants 
heads against the wall in order to annihilate their execrable race.”315  This mouthful of a 
pledge goes on to reveal that the Pope has organized a militia and that Catholic girls are 
being used to infiltrate Protestant homes and report the “inner movements of the heretics” 
back to Rome.  In local areas, like South Bend, Indiana, Catholic organizations banded 
together to drive off local Klaverns, but since the Klan effectively diversified its targets 
around the country, downplaying racism for a populist recruitment campaign, no 
similarly organized group appeared to counter the Klan on a national scale.   
If one only reads Klan propaganda, then the argument that an ideological 
opponent led to terrorism seems plausible.  A deeper look, however, takes one in a 
different direction.  We find perception has overtaken reality.   Indiana became the state 
with the largest Klan presence, yet it is hard to find there a powerful ideological opponent 
for the Klan to rise against.  To create one, the Klan had to imagine it.  Indiana’s social 
structure in the 1920s caused one historian to ask “how could a Northern, landlocked 
state like Indiana—uninvaded by immigrants, unpolluted by Reds, undivided by racial 
strife, and with Catholics and Jews combined accounting for only a small minority—fall 
so completely into the hands of the ‘cluck-clucks’?”316  An unbiased examination of Klan 
strength and campaign intensity throughout the country reveals that Klan terrorism 
existed both in the presence and the absence of any true ideological antagonist.  In some 
cases, the Klan openly supported left wing organizations when it suited their 
organizational interests.  Always the opportunist, the Kansas Klan actually “championed 
the cause of labor” in a community that was predominately unionized.317  What mattered 
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was whether the Klan leadership in a given location could convince people they faced a 
menace, not that one actually existed.  The Klan never construed itself as being in 
opposition to any specific group, they simply pro-American, dedicated to preserving the 
nebulous concept of 100% Americanism.  Klan terrorism emerged in locations where 
there were and were not ideological opponents.   Relying upon populist rhetoric and 
exploiting the societal fears, the Klan of the 1920s was able to paint a picture of an 
existential threat to America, although none actually existed. This period of Klan 
violence underscores the fact that a threat does not have to be real to be perceived as one.    
Due to this fact the actual presence of an ideological opponent organized on a similar 
scale to the Klan, spurring the Klan to justify its existence in contradiction to it, will be 
coded as absent for this particular period. 
Finally, there is the issue of the return of war veterans.  The argument that they 
are critical to the emergence of a right wing terrorist campaign appears plausible as the 
American military began demobilization in the wake of World War I.  American 
redeployment home surged during early-to-mid 1919. Yet the Klan campaign did not 
truly kick off until July 1920.  In order to invoke war veterans, one must be able to 
account for the full year-long gap between the arrival of redeployed soldiers and the 
initiation of the campaign.  Dixon Wecter does so by arguing that it was not 
disillusionment with war or radicalization that led to the return of veterans being a 
problem, but the lack of jobs available to them.318   
Another way to explain Klan campaign emergence would be to say that returning 
vets, unable to get jobs or disillusioned by the outcome of the war, are automatically 
drawn to right wing rhetoric and this eventually leads to terrorism.  This argument loses 
support due to the fact that, unlike the Reconstruction era Klan, returning military 
officers failed to assume the majority of leadership positions, as those were generally 
filled by men with fraternal organization experience.  Although it is undoubtedly true that 
many returning veterans joined the Klan, their role and overall numbers suggest that mass 
redeployment from the war was not a primary causal factor in the rise of Klan terrorism. 
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Instead, if we seek an actual explanation of how returning war veterans may have sparked 
a Klan campaign, we must alter the normal theoretical explanations in a manner that 
views the veteran not as the fuel for a campaign, but as a trigger.   
The public fear of African American war veterans may have fueled the Klan’s 
resurgence.  As one historian notes, “White people, North and South, were uneasy about 
warnings that a ‘new Negro,’ filled with ambitions for social and economic equality, was 
coming home from the war.”319  In other words, during the 1920s, it was not the 
returning white veteran who caused the problems, but societal fears about the return of 
African American veterans that spurred violent resistance.  According to a 1918 military 
intelligence report, if African Americans returned home suffused with a sense 
egalitarianism learned from the French, then “an era of bloodshed will follow as 
compared with which the history of reconstruction will be a mild reading, indeed.”320   
As one historian noted, “the mere vision of an African American man in uniform, a 
symbol commanding respect, could arouse fire eaters to violence.”321   
In some regards, this was not a trivial concern.  After experiencing heightened 
levels of equality in Europe during the war, many African American veterans refused to 
return to their pre-war social status.  Many walked away from Southern society and went 
north.  One historian noted that seventy percent of Georgian farmers reported that at least 
some percentage of their African American farmhands left their jobs soon after they 
returned from the war.322  In any event, because it was white society’s response to black 
veterans that could be most directly linked to Klan terrorism in the 1920s, war veterans 
did matter during this period, and the factor will be coded as present. 
In sum, it is difficult to argue that the structural factors tested here were the 
leading causes of the 1920s Klan terrorist campaign.  Although an economic recession 
opened the decade, the Klan operated during a time of relative economic prosperity, 
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bringing together both the wealthy and the poor in the name of white supremacy.  The 
Klan also operated in areas largely untouched by any left wing threat.  Appealing to those 
who cherished good old home values and Protestant ideals, the Klan had no need to paint 
itself as a defensive organization.  Finally, the return of war veterans only works as an 
explanation if one distorts the argument in a manner that veers away from the original 
hypothesis.  Essentially then, structural explanations factors here carry only moderate 
explanatory value for understanding the Klan terrorist campaign during the 1920s.               
C. SPONSORSHIP EXPLANATIONS 
 Sponsorship explanations also appear to support but cannot fully account for the 
1920s Klan campaign.  Given that the Klan was deeply enmeshed with established 
political parties as well as in open collusion with numerous different branches of state-
controlled organizations, that it had the support of at least two American presidents, 
hundreds of congressmen, judges, and police officers, and numerous state-controlled 
media outlets, it is difficult to argue that the Klan was without friends.  The support 
provided by the state, however, was far from active support or direct control.   
 The fact that seventy five congressmen, sixteen senators, eleven governors, and a 
President had ties to the Ku Klux Klan suggests that the group was a direct recipient of 
state support.323  Worth noting is that of the sixteen Klan-associated senators, seven were 
democrats and nine were Republican.  Six of the eleven Klan governors were Republican, 
while the other five were Democrats.324  In a 1924 Indiana congressional election, seven 
of the ten democratic nominees were Klan sympathizers, while nine of the ten republican 
candidates expressed their support of the white hoods.325  With this in mind, it could 
more accurately be said that it was the political parties that benefitted from Klan support 
rather than the Klan benefitting from them.  The Klan, after all, was an organization 
capable of uniting and directing a large number of voters.  In each state, lists were 
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generated that directed all Klansmen about how to cast their votes.  Politicians from both 
parties were terrified of crossing the Klan, and even those who disagreed with Klan 
beliefs practiced “friendly neutrality” in hope the Klan would not blacklist them.326  The 
power of the Klan was so pervasive, it compelled one Birmingham attorney to proclaim 
“when I say powerful, they took over the state…you couldn’t be an officer, couldn’t win 
an election unless you were a member of the Klan.”327              
 The fact that the Klan could dictate elections and had candidates from both 
political parties begging for its support casts serious doubt on the Klan’s need for an 
active third party sponsor.  In fact, chronology suggests that politicians only became 
interested in collaborating with the Klan after it possessed a membership size over one 
million and the ability to deliver a unified block of votes.  Support from politicians or 
political parties had little to do with the 1920-1921 rise of the Klan.  By 1922 it was the 
Klan that was in position to trade its active support (in the form of votes delivered) for 
the tacit support of politicians (by ignoring calls to implement anti-mask laws or to 
publicly condemn the order).  Not a shred of evidence exists demonstrating active 
support—financial, operational, or logistical—from a political party.  Quite simply, the 
Klan played the role of the puppet master, often forcing politicians to bend to its will or 
face expulsion from office.  The explanation that predicts a terrorist organization needs 
active support, in the form of providing intelligence, finances, weapons, or operational 
guidance,  from a third party sponsor is therefore coded as absent during this period.  But 
before altogether dismissing sponsorship as a factor, it must be noted that the Klan did 
receive a certain, very important form of passive support. 
 The greatest support the Klan received was the tacit (although sometimes active) 
support of local law enforcement agencies and the safe havens that were derived from it.  
This effectively provided the Klan safe havens from which to operate, as police either 
turned a blind eye or lent a helping hand.  Between 1920 and 1929, according to one 
historian, “at least forty two blacks were lynched in circumstances suggesting police 
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collusion.”328  In Texas the Waco Board of Police Commissioners were Klansmen, and 
readily gave their brethren a free hand in carrying out violence throughout the city.329  In 
California, almost ten percent of all public officials in every major city were Klan 
members, and, in several instances, the Klan acted as a pseudo-legal arm of the law.330  
In a clear example of police/Klan collusion, between 1922 and 1923, over “three 
thousand prohibition cases were prosecuted in Indiana courts through the help of the 
Invisible Empire.”331  In return, Indiana law officers—many Klansmen themselves—
refused to prosecute terrorist acts committed by the Klan.      
 As the Klan flourished in areas where it received law enforcement support, so too 
did it wither where opposed by dedicated legal action.  In Texas—perhaps the most 
violent of all Klan states—Klan terrorism was curbed when the Texas Rangers were 
finally directed to round up known terrorists.  When Texas Governor Pat Neff, known as 
being “favorable” to Klan activity, departed for Washington on a business trip in 1923, 
the acting Governor unleashed the Rangers to arrest and begin prosecution of the hooded 
menace.332  The same trend played itself out elsewhere, prompting one observer to note 
that “not until the full fire department of federal and state law had been called out did the 
Invisible Empire cease to exist.”333  The presence of tacit support which gave the Klan a 
safe haven from which to operate, therefore, played a critical role and will be coded as 
supported in this case. 
 In summary, it is difficult to argue that the Klan was controlled or manipulated by 
either the state or an appendage of the state.  The “Sterling ideal”—that a terrorist 
organization needs active oversight—therefore fails as an explanation for Klan terrorism.  
If one considers lesser forms of support, however, the story changes dramatically.  Tacit 
support—simply looking the other way and not prosecuting crimes—is a form of support.  
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There is ample evidence that the Klan operated most effectively and violently in areas 
where it was permitted to do so by law enforcement agencies.  The presence of safe 
havens, therefore, helps account for where Klan terrorism occurred.       
D. ORGANIZATIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
Of the three approaches being tested, the organizational approach helps best 
explain the 1920s Klan campaign.   
The organizational design of the 1920s Klan was similar to that of its 
Reconstruction-era predecessor.  The 1920s Klan, according to the New York Herald, was 
“organized along military lines and the leader [was] surrounded by his chief of staff and 
staff officers.”334  The 1920s Klan was a hierarchical organization under the control of 
the Emperor.  Below the Emperor, the Klan was broken down functionally into an 
operations side—overseen by the Imperial Wizard—and a logistics side—overseen by the 
Imperial Kleagle.  A chief of staff—the Grand Goblin—synchronized efforts within the 
Headquarters, while a pool of lecturers and national representatives was on hand to 
provide “education” in any Province or Realm that the Wizard deemed needed extra 
intellectual indoctrination.335  The design of the organization also allowed for centralized 
control of the overall strategic direction of the Klan, but decentralized execution which 
enabled each local Klavern to decide upon actual operations in its locale.  The 
Propagation wing operated more in the form of a business model, adapting recruitment 
messages to the local environment and selling the Klan accordingly.   
Although the Klan’s organizational structure and its associated decision making 
processes afforded its leaders the ability to effectively guide the Klan’s strategic 
direction, this structure presented challenges as well.  As one historian notes, “the Klan’s 
autocratic structure was the greatest contributor to the growth of internal conflict” and the 
eventual downfall of the organization.336  Too much power and wealth were 
concentrating in the hands of a few, a dynamic which generated jealousy and a lust for 
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power among others.  Put simply, “the dictatorial character of the Klan hierarchy, based 
upon the principle that all power should originate at the Imperial Wizard and move 
downward from him, presented a ready-made opportunity for unscrupulous and power-
hungry leaders.”337  The structure also resulted in the Klan being publicly represented by 
only a select few.  As long as these few stayed beyond reproach, then the organization 
thrived.  When they did not, as in the case of Stephenson’s sexual assault or the 
revelations about greed on the parts of Clarke, Evans, and Simmons, the Klan crashed 
under its own weight.  The Klan’s organizational design, therefore, explains much about 
the timing, the scope, and the pervasiveness of Klan terrorism.     
So does the presence of strong leadership.  As mentioned previously, the architect 
of the 1915 Klan revival—Colonel William Simmons—was a charismatic man, but 
unskilled in either management or organization of a group. This was reflected in the fact 
that Klan membership between 1915 and 1920 was nominal, likely under ten thousand 
members by the close of the decade.  Following Simmon’s 1920 decision to hire 
propaganda and recruitment professionals the number of hooded members swelled by an 
over eighty five thousand additional members within a year’s time.338  As Simmons was 
primarily concerned with his own wealth and prestige, he offered little in the way of 
strategic guidance, so, although the Klan operated under an established hierarchy, it 
functioned autonomously throughout the country.  In several states—Texas, Oklahoma, 
and Arkansas, for example—the results were unconstrained violence.  In others, like 
Wisconsin, a more fraternal organization emerged.339  Without strictly defined strategic 
direction, the Klan remained hierarchical but operated according to what the region 
allowed, and adapting itself further to each locality in which it operated.  This, too, would 
be adjusted as Hiram Evans took over from Simmons.  
Upon assuming the role of Imperial Wizard, Evans turned the Klan into a political 
machine.  He immediately set out to curb unsanctioned Klan terrorism, at times berating 
Simmons’ motivations and early leadership.  In 1926, Evans ranted: 
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The Klan had remained weak, gaining barely 10,000 members in the first 
few years. Then the possibility of profit, both in cash and power, was seen, 
and soon resulted in a “selling plan” based partly on Southern affection for 
the old Klan, partly on social conditions in the South, but chiefly on the 
possibility of inflaming prejudices.  They began to sell hate at $10 a 
package. To us that know the Klan today, its influence, purpose, and 
future, the fact that it can have grown from such beginnings is nothing less 
than a miracle.340 
Evans was partially correct.  The growth of the Klan between 1920 and 1926 was indeed 
nothing less than a miracle, but it was a carefully engineered miracle that reflected the 
leader’s abilities at the time.  As demonstrated by the D.C. Stephenson ordeal in Indiana 
(and as described previously), discrediting the leadership would prove a tremendous 
causal factor in the downfall of a united Klan by 1927.   
 The third organizational factor to be examined in this section deals with the 
manner in which recruits were lured into the Klan.  Of all the factors to be considered, 
this one proves the most fascinating with regard to the versatility and adaptability of the 
Klan’s message.  From 1915 to 1920, the Klan’s recruitment pitch was one of fraternity 
and secrecy, flavored by a desire to emulate the Reconstruction era Klan.  This approach 
was largely ineffective and, in 1920, Clarke and Tyler changed tactics.  These 
professional Klan recruiters were given orders to sell the Klan however they could 
according to the particular environment they found themselves.  Klan leaders simply 
asked recruiters to stick to the broadly defined recruitment pitch of “Americanism.”  In 
the South, the Klan sold “Americanism” in racial and moral terms, in the North, 
“Americanism” revolved around anti-Communism and anti-immigration, and in all areas, 
“Americanism” meant an undying support to the Constitution—in whatever manner one 
chose to interpret it.  Following Simmons’ 1921 performance before Congress (which 
generated unanticipated support from Protestant churches), the recruitment pitch changed 
yet again.  A dedication to “old time religion” and Protestant values became the Klan’s 
selling point, and pastors were inducted into the Klan free of charge so long as they 
agreed to sell the Klan to their congregations.341 
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 The strange mix between “Americanism” and religion as a recruitment tool 
changed once again in 1924, when Hiram Evans dropped much of the over-the-top 
religious rhetoric and replaced it “with hyperpatriotism, militant nativism, and political 
activism.”342  Evan’s recruitment pitches, which emphasized the political nature of the 
Klan, directly impacted the level of terrorist violence while increasing the organization’s 
political clout.  By 1926, in a very unsuccessful campaign, the Klan emphasized 
“American pioneer-ism” and the supposed virtues of the Nordic race.343  This pitch 
resonated poorly among the American populace, and within a year, the Klan was largely 
an afterthought.  One conclusion to be drawn is that, the quality and appropriateness of 
the recruitment pitch clearly matter.   
 Key to disseminating an effective pitch is having the means to do so.  Again, this 
proved important for the 1920s Klan.  The film The Birth of a Nation proved ideal for 
bringing about the birth of Simmons’ Klan.  Without it, it is highly unlikely there would 
have been the “second wave” of Klan violence during the 1920s.  From the release of the 
film until the hiring of Clarke’s publicity organization, the Klan enjoyed no real form of 
mass communication beyond letters sent to prospective members or “notices” put on 
bulletin boards near screenings of the movie.  By the end of 1920, Clarke and Tyler had 
over 1,100 recruiters dispersed throughout the country serving the Klan’s newly formed 
“Propagation Department.” 
 The recruiters were directed to target fraternal organizations like the Masons or 
Woodmen of the World.  The size of the Klan increased dramatically through this way, 
but it was following Simmons’ October performance that “Klan membership increased 
another twenty percent by December 1921, with more than 200 new klaverns 
organized.”344  Congress and the national media inadvertently gave Simmons, Clarke, 
and Tyler access to a recruitment pool they would not have been able to access otherwise. 
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 The adoption of a fundamentalist Protestant tone in early 1921 opened yet another 
communication channel to spread the Klan’s message.  Seizing upon America’s shift to a 
more conservative form of Christianity, the Klan used Protestant churches to reach yet 
another untapped pool of recruits.  It was estimated that almost 40,000 ministers soon 
joined the Klan, and “many of them became the Exalted Cyclops of their local 
communities.”345  Tying into the pulpit gave the Klan access to an untold number of 
church-goers while simultaneously granting the Klan an aura of respectability.  Almost 
immediately, in light of the potential repercussions of this alliance, moderate Protestant 
churches began to speak out and chip away at the Klan’s self-created image.  As one 
church’s administrative committee railed: 
The recent rise of organizations whose members are masked; oathbound, 
and unknown, and whose activities have the effect of arousing religious 
prejudice and racial antipathies is fraught with grave consequences to the 
Church and society at large…any organization whose activities tend to set 
class against class or race against race is neither consistent with the ideals 
of the churches nor with true patriotism.346  
Once details of the Stephenson murder—an entirely un-Protestant affair—were 
publicized and the greedy financial aspects of the Klan became public knowledge, the 
church based communication-channel narrowed and the Klan began to shrink in both size 
and scope. 
 In summary, all three organizational explanations help explain the Klan’s 1920s 
Klan terrorist campaign.  The Klan’s organizational design made it easy to unify 
members and compel them to collective action in pursuit of a strategic endstate—whether 
that was financial gain under Simmons, or political power under Evans.  The quality of 
the Klan’s leadership determined the strategic direction the organization would take.  The 
recruitment pitch made a major difference in the size of the organization, while the 
communications channels used to spread the message increased its geographic reach.  
Each of the organizational factors tested points to the usefulness of the organizational 
approach to explain the Klan’s 1920 terrorism campaign.                 
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E. CONCLUSIONS 
Takeaways from this period of Klan terrorism are: while a contributing factor, the 
economic recession of 1920-1921 gave way to prosperity and the Klan did well in both 
rich and poor areas of the country, spurring many to see it as a middle-class phenomenon.  
There was no left wing antagonist to speak of, as the Klan artfully sidestepped major 
ideological opponents.  The return of war veterans seems at first glance to have been an 
important factor, since doughboys redeployed stateside after WWI, but it must be noted 
they returned almost a year before the campaign took off, making it difficult to attribute 
the campaign directly to the redeployment of the soldiers.  Additionally, unlike during the 
Reconstruction era, military veterans were largely absent from the top ranks of Klan 
leadership.  In short, what helped explain terrorism during the Reconstruction era—
namely structural factors—can not fully explain the 1920 Klan campaign. 
Arguments for terrorism that demand an outside sponsor fare about the same.  
While there is little evidence to suggest that the Klan was a pawn for either a political 
party or the state at large, Klan violence bloomed in safe havens established where police 
were either willing to help or willing to look the other way.  Consequently, sponsorship 
as an explanation helps us understand where Klan terrorism took root and for how long it 
survived in those locations.   
Most useful for helping us understand various aspects of Klan terrorism during 
this period are organizational explanations.  Leadership, organizational design, effective 
recruitment pitches, and communication channels all mattered.  This is considerably 
different from what helped explain Klan terrorism during the Reconstruction era. 
 122
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 123
CHAPTER V. WELCOME TO BOMBINGHAM—THE 
CIVIL-RIGHTS ERA KLAN 
I believe in violence, all the violence it takes whether to scare the Niggers out of the 
country or to have ‘em all six feet under.  In spite of what those numb-skull idiots on the 
Supreme Court say, they ain’t got no right to mix with you and don’t let ‘em!  If you have 
to fight and shed blood, theirs or yours, do it!  The Niggers started the war, and when 
you start a war, you expect some to die.  More will die, and you’d better be ready to see 
that they do.  I’m speaking for God, and you’d better listen.347 
 
Retaining a racist ideology at its core, the Klan of the 1950–1960s would prove 
different from its predecessors in many ways.  Whereas both the “first and second wave” 
Klans had operated under a tight hierarchical structure—referred to as a dictatorship by 
some348—the “third wave” Klan is said to have started off in the early 1950s as a 
collection of independent and often competing organizations, followed by some moderate 
but not entirely successful moves toward greater centralization.  While true, this depiction 
is misleading.  The atomization of the Klan following the Stephenson embarrassment 
resulted in a host of autonomous Klan groups which all claimed direct ties back to 
Pulaski and, by extension, felt they deserved the title of being the “true” Klan.  The Klan 
appeared to be headed for re-centralization during the late 1930s and early 1940s under 
Imperial Wizard Sam Green, but the strange brew of ideology which Green adopted, 
combined with his death in 1949, once again sent the Klan into organizational disarray.  
The majority of Klan violence during the early part of this period, 1955–1958, can be 
attributed to Eldon Edward’s U.S. Klans, which numbered over 20,000 members at its 
peak.  His death in 1960 led to the further consolidation of Klans under Robert Shelton 
and the United Klans of America.  Numerous other Klan-like organizations existed, but 
rarely caused an impact beyond the local level due to their relative small size (most had 
fewer than 75 members).  Only the White Knights of the KKK of the Sovereign Realm of 
Mississippi (WKKKKM) under Sam Bowers and (if the most generous estimates are 
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considered) James Venable’s National Association of Ku Klux Klan could claim over a 
thousand.  While there were forces pushing the Klan towards centralization, the Civil 
Rights era Klan could never achieve the high degree of centralization found in earlier 
periods.  While not completely hierarchical, the Klan of the 1950–1960s was not 
completely decentralized either.    
A second difference was the Klan’s choice of terrorist tactics.  The first and 
second wave Klans favored attacks that were up close and deeply personal—relying 
almost exclusively on lynchings, beatings, hangings, shootings, and burnings.  The third 
wave Klan, in contrast, often chose more long-range tactics. Beginning in the mid-1950s, 
Klansmen developed a keen affinity for explosives, as reflected by the large number of 
terrorist bombings attributed to them.  As an indicator of the violence, one account 
reported 142 bombings between January 1956 and May 1963.349   
Finally, the Klan of the 1950–1960s largely abandoned its “all-American” 
rhetoric and returned to a more racist recruitment pitch.  This was a message that fell on 
unreceptive ears since society had progressed intellectually since the opening decades of 
the twentieth century.  No longer did the Klan have an accurate understanding of widely-
held societal beliefs or concerns. Most likely this was due to the fact that the Klan had 
fallen into an ideological purgatory under Imperial Wizards Colescott and Green.  
Between the late 1920s and the 1950s, the Klan had no real recruitment pitch or stated 
aim; it was known to denounce fascism one week, and then participate in neo-Nazi rallies 
the next.  Even those who might be expected to support the Klan—populist Democratic 
governors “Kingfish” Huey Long and James Folsom for example—passed anti-mask 
laws in their states and publicly condemned the hooded menace.  After having his loyalty 
to America challenged by the Klan in the 1930s, the Kingfish asked reporters to “tell that 
tooth-puller that he is a goddam lying sonuvabitch” and then threatened to have the 
Imperial Wizard lynched if he saw him in Louisiana.350  With the national Democratic 
party now aligned against them, the Klan was left wondering who to politically support 
                                                 
349 Newton, The Ku Klux Klan : History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of 
America's Most Notorious Secret Society, 23. 
350 Chalmers, Hooded Americanism : The History of the Ku Klux Klan, 308. 
 125
and how to craft a message that could sustain the organization without political 
legitimization.  Lacking good options, it turned to blatant racism, and those attracted to 
the Klan’s racist call seemed already predisposed to engage in Klan terrorist activity.  For 
reasons to be explained, the aim of the Civil Rights era Klan came to be retention of 
white supremacy, and, in line with these ends, terrorist violence of the 1950–1960s was 
largely undertaken to prevent school desegregation or social assimilation of African 
Americans.  Due to the overwhelming emphasis on the opposition to desegregation (a 
predominately Southern issue), the Klan resigned itself largely to a Southern campaign.   
During this period, as during the previous period, organization mattered.  Of all 
the explanations given for the sustainment of terrorism, organizational factors have more 
explanatory power than structural or sponsorship factors.  To understand why requires an 
overview of the history. 
A. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
America emerged from World War II as the strongest nation in the world—
politically, militarily, and economically.  Its position of global dominance did not, 
however, equate to social harmony.  After Japan’s unconditional surrender in September 
1945, American society underwent dramatic social changes.  Many were of our own 
making.  During the war, the United States government implemented media—some 
would say propaganda—campaigns to bolster American support for the war effort and to 
paint European fascism as an existential threat.  With the war’s conclusion and with 
fascist threats eliminated, government-sponsored media performed a full one hundred and 
eighty degree shift away from their focus on right wing extremism to the now-existential 
threat from “Uncle Joe” and Communism.  In a relatively short time, the United States 
went from waging actual war against the radical right to waging an ideological war 
against the radical left.  American society thus experienced a dramatic societal “shift to 
the right” as the United States faced off against the Communist Soviet Union.351     
The resultant tone of fervent anti-Communism was further amplified by the fear 
of imminent nuclear Armageddon.  American policy makers largely adopted the “domino 
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theory” about Communist expansion, and stood ready to curb what, theoretically at least, 
appeared to be Stalin’s insatiable desire for global conquest.352  By 1950, the rabid Cold 
War anti-Communist sentiment was exemplified by the frenzied speeches and 
investigations of Senator Joseph McCarthy.   
McCarthyism’s half decade officially began on February 9th 1950 with a public 
speech in which the Senator revealed that he possessed a list of over two hundred 
Communists employed by the United States Department of State.    Elaborate conspiracy 
theories emerged to suggest that political enemies—from the President, to military 
officers, to Congressmen—were participating in a Communist plot to take over the 
country.  McCarthy concocted elaborate stories which accused numerous innocent 
Americans of being Red.  With his erstwhile anti-Communist colleague, FBI Director J. 
Edgar Hoover, McCarthy launched what amounted to a four and a half year witch hunt; 
his overreach eventually got him censured in December 1954.353  Yet, although 
McCarthy would fall from grace by mid-decade, Hoover would continue to carry on the 
hunt for Communist infiltrators until his death in 1972.   
At the same time, the nuclear race spiraled upward and American society 
increasingly militarized during the 1950s.354  The United States invested heavily in 
defense spending and weapons manufacturing.  Despite Eisenhower’s farewell plea to 
beware the influences of the “military-industrial complex,” the relationship grew stronger 
throughout the 1950s into the 1960s.355  During the 1950s, American society moved 
away from the liberal leanings of the FDR years, while for the first time accepting a 
sizeable standing army and defense budget during peacetime.  
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The role of women also underwent dramatic change, and although the era is most 
often associated with Leave it to Beaver–like portrayals of domestic life, the number of 
females in the workplace steadily rose.  By 1960, domestic life had changed so much that 
over thirty percent of married women worked outside the home.356  While mothers were 
at work, kids came of age in front of the television set, and television programs began to 
bring news of the world into American living rooms; over 90% of households had them 
by the close of the decade.357  Print media such as Playboy came into existence, a 
harbinger of a number of shifts in attitudes toward sexuality.358   
While pockets of racism existed (especially in the deep South), white supremacist 
beliefs were increasingly challenged.  Those who dared wield scientific justifications on 
behalf of racial inequality were often dismissed engaging in logical fallacies.359  No 
longer were intellectuals able to promote racist beliefs without generating significant 
counter arguments.  More significant were the demands made by African Americans as 
they returned from service abroad and sought more equal treatment at home.  This quest 
for civil rights would breathe life back into the Ku Klux Klan.   
The year 1929 and the two decades that followed were rough on the Klan.  The 
Great Depression wreaked havoc on Klan membership “leaving countless Klansmen 
either unemployed or desperately short of cash with which to pay their dues.”360  In June 
1939, an exhausted (but well compensated) Imperial Wizard Evans turned over the 
Klan’s reins to James Colescott, a far less eloquent or capable leader than either Evans or 
Simmons.  With this transition, even more Klans broke away from the national 
organization.  The Klan limped along until April of 1944, when the national headquarters 
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was dealt a fatal blow; the IRS presented Imperial Wizard Jimmy Colescott with a 
$685,355 bill for back taxes that had gone unpaid since the 1920s.  Without the numbers 
or political support to mount a defense, Colescott was forced to rethink the future of the 
Ku Klux Klan.  His first step was to dismantle the Klan as a united national organization.  
Although he broke the Klan’s structure apart, Colescott did not anticipate that this move 
would spell the end of Klan terrorism.  During the final national Klonvocation on 23 
April 1944, Colescott told his followers: 
This does not mean the Klan is dead.  We simply have released local 
chapters from all obligations, financial and otherwise, to the Imperial 
Headquarters.  I am still Imperial Wizard.  The other officials still retain 
their titles, although, of course, the functions of all of us are suspended.  
We have authority to meet and reincarnate at any time.361 
 Immediately, the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. transformed from a single 
organization into an unstructured, pseudo-cellular entity.   
Although splintered, Klan affiliates kept its name alive in their local and state 
Klaverns.  For instance, Georgia, led by Dr. Samuel Green, publicly announced its Klan 
presence by lighting a three hundred foot wooden cross atop Stone Mountain.  In the 
glow of this spectacle, Green proudly proclaimed, “We are revived…[the] Klan has never 
been dead and the Klan is never going to die.”362  Several state-level Klans—Alabama, 
and Tennessee in particular—followed the lead of the Association of Georgia Klans and 
reorganized on a smaller scale.  In Florida, at least three different Klan groups vied for 
state power, resulting in sporadic acts of intra-Klan violence reported throughout the 
decade.  During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Klan found refuge in the South, 
owing largely to the fact that racial attitudes had changed little since the downfall of the 
1860s Klan.  Racism still sufficiently resonated with enough Americans to sustain 
support for the Klan.  In fact, the racial situation in the South was so bad that it prompted 
two African Americans veterans to joke that, should Hitler be caught alive, they should 
“paint him black and sentence him to life in Mississippi.”363  Although the Klan carried 
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on its activities through small operational cells, the 1940s and early 1950s would be 
known as “the lean years” with regards to level of Klan terrorism.364  The atomized, 
cellular structure of the Klan was simply not up to the task of mobilizing or 
operationalizing any strategic vision.   
The basis for renewed solidarity between local Klans would not come until the 
17th of May, 1954—a day many Southerners dubbed “Black Monday.”365  It was on this 
date that the Supreme Court overturned the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson ruling and declared 
unconstitutional any state laws promoting racial segregation.  The historic Brown v. 
Board of Education ruling demanded integration of schools begin immediately.  Southern 
states, true to form, dug in their heels while Klan leaders sensed an upcoming opportunity 
to breathe life into the near-comatose organization.   
To combat the ruling, various Southern White Citizens Councils were organized 
to prevent African Americans from entering Southern white-only schools.366  These 
Councils insisted that desegregation broke the “natural order” put in place by God—a 
belief that showed white supremacist ideology still flourished among certain segments of 
society.367 A more laudable secondary objective, however, was to prevent another 
resurgence of Ku Klux violence.  One councilmen proclaimed, “we want the people 
assured that there is responsible leadership organized which will and can handle 
segregation problems…if that is recognized, there will be no need for any hot-headed 
bunch to start a Ku Klux Klan.”368  To their (dis)credit, the Councils developed many 
creative approaches for generating public concern over integration, swaying policy, and 
preventing the Klan’s resurgence.  In one instance, Council members handed out 
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pamphlets described “little white girls” contracting syphilis from shared drinking 
fountains.  As could be expected from such amateur propaganda, the Citizen’s Councils 
were soon brushed aside, labeled “white-collar Klans,” exposed for their general 
incompetence, and discredited for their outdated beliefs in white supremacy.369  The 
discrediting and downsizing of the Councils would result in a political vacuum for those 
seeking to maintain white supremacy.  
In May 1955, the Klan began its third wave of terrorism with the murder of 
Mississippi African American activist Reverend George Lee.  As the murder 
investigation began, the sheriff dug shotgun pellets out of the victim’s face, saying they 
were simply fillings from his teeth. This “finding” nullified evidence necessary to declare 
the death a murder.370  When pressed on the issue, the sheriff admitted that foul play may 
have been involved, but that it was likely “some jealous nigger” that killed Lee.371  
Making matters worse, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar 
Hoover, essentially turned his back on the violence, declaring the Klan “pretty much 
defunct” and not worthy of a follow-up federal investigation.372  Contrary to Hoover’s 
assessment, several Southern Klans embarked upon a period of sustained growth between 
1954 and 1958.  Led by a red-headed autoworker from Atlanta, the U.S. Klans, Knights 
of the Ku Klux Klan would draw 12,000-15,000 members and establish Klaverns in ten 
states by 1958.373   
Through his personal appeal, the fiery-talking, flame-haired Eldon Edwards 
successfully united several of the independent Georgia Klans under the title U.S. Klans.  
Although he could never claim the loyalty of all Klans, he served as a leading figure 
amongst most Klaverns and could steer the direction of other Klans through indirect 
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means.  According to many historians, Edwards talked tough but went to considerable 
lengths to control the violence associated with his group.  This was not to be the case for 
many competing Klans.   
In 1957, members of Asa Carter’s Klan in Atlanta kidnapped a black man near 
Birmingham and proceeded to castrate him with razor blades.  After passing the removed 
testicles around in a paper cup, the party proceeded to pour kerosene and turpentine over 
the victim’s bloody wounds.374  The brutality little concerned Carter; indeed he actively 
encouraged his followers to follow this violent example.  In order to spur his Klansmen to 
action, Carter threatened force himself.  Carter’s Original Ku Klux Klan of the 
Confederacy was renowned for its autocratic rule and willingness to step beyond the law 
to make its point.  Once, directly challenged over his style of leadership, Carter pulled a 
revolver and shot two of his doubting Klansmen.  There were no legal consequences.  
The charges over the shooting were immediately dropped and the sentences of the men 
responsible for the castration were commuted by Governor George Wallace.  Instead of 
incarceration, Carter would be offered a job, as a special assistant on Wallace’s staff.  
Such was life and law in Alabama. 
Heading into 1958, the Klan could be described as a fractured, competing set of 
organizations united only by a shared sense of racist hatred.  Emphasizing the level of 
disorganization, a Florida Grand Dragon described the Klan of the late 1950s as “a 
conglomeration of different organizations breaking up, going together, and not getting 
along.”375 In the absence of a unified chain of national command, Klan terrorism proved 
noticeably more violent in areas with strong local organizations.  Until 1958, Klan 
violence was determined largely by the levels of fanaticism demonstrated at the lowest 
levels by local Klavern leadership.  Quite simply, Klans led by outspoken leaders tended 
to be more active and violent in their operations.  In Montgomery, Alabama, for instance, 
the Klan committed ten bombings in a single year alone.376  J.B. Stoner, a man 
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considered extreme even by Klan standards (once referring to Adolf Hitler as “too 
moderate”),  managed to organize and incite violence wherever he went; acts of terrorism 
followed him through Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, and Tennessee.377  Between 
1958 and 1960, Klan terrorism and overall size would abate.  
The Civil Rights movement of the 1960s would inspire yet more determined, 
more violent, and more organized resistance from the Klan.  The 1960 election of a 
Catholic President—a New England liberal to boot—swelled Klan numbers. Soon after 
the election, Klan size doubled from 10,000 to over 20,000 members.378  
Organizationally speaking, however, things still looked bleak for unification.  
Complicating efforts to centralize was the loss of Eldon Edwards, who died unexpectedly 
of heart failure in August of 1960.   
Edward’s widow deemed his deputy, “Wild Bill” Robert Davidson, unacceptable 
as a successor, a rejection which meant the Imperial Wizard position went unfilled.  A 
bitter struggle for control of Edward’s organization soon followed.  Eventually, lifelong 
Klansman (sometimes tire salesman) Robert Marvin Shelton prevailed.  
Shelton, known as a man of action within Klan ranks, soon wowed Klansmen 
throughout the South.  His prestige attracted throngs of followers, and, through his 
personal charisma, he soon merged Edward’s U.S. Klans, his own Alabama Knights, 
several South Carolina Klaverns, and numerous other splinter groups into a unified front 
known as the United Klans of America (UKA).  From his headquarters in Alabama, 
Shelton assembled a cadre of effective leaders to oversee Klan operations within their 
respective Realms.  For the first time in decades, the Klan demonstrated renewed 
potential for coordinated efforts.   
Alabama became the stage for the showdown with Martin Luther King’s Civil 
Rights movement, and the battle began in earnest in May 1961, when two teams of 
“freedom riders” set out on buses to test whether desegregation laws were being enforced 
in the South.  The teams immediately found out that they were not.  As the buses pulled 
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closer to Birmingham, bands of Shelton’s Klansmen were put on notice to prepare a 
proper greeting.  Shelton handpicked sixty men to lead the effort.  As the busses pulled 
closer to town, police began to disappear.  After numerous meetings with local law 
enforcement agencies, Shelton secured fifteen minutes “free from interference of police” 
in which the vigilantes could “beat them, bomb them, murder or kill them.”379  In fact, 
the Birmingham police commissioner and Shelton had already discussed plans about how 
they anticipated the ambush might play out.  The commissioner asked the Klansmen to 
beat the freedom riders so it “looked like a bulldog got hold of them,” then strip them of 
their clothing so the police could pick up the riders for indecent exposure.380   
As the freedom riders approached Birmingham, they met and were pulled over by 
a mob of Klansmen about sixty miles east of their intended destination.  After slashing 
the tires of the first bus, Klansmen firebombed it while riders huddled for their lives 
inside.  As the second bus arrived at the Anniston ambush point, a group of Klansmen 
rushed aboard and began beating the riders with pipes, bats, and chains.  One rider was 
beaten so badly that he suffered permanent brain damage.  This occurred under the gaze 
of both local and federal law enforcement officers.  In fact, as the Klansmen left the bus, 
a policeman boarded and told the riders, “don’t worry about no lawsuits…I ain’t seen a 
thing.”381 The bus then limped onward to Birmingham, where a second round of beatings 
awaited the riders.382  Arriving at the Birmingham Trailways bus station, the riders were 
yet again assaulted by fist, bat, car jack, and bottle.  The day after the assaults, 
Birmingham police detective Tom Cook called one of the lead Klansmen and thanked 
him for “a goddamn good job down there.”383  
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A week later, a repeat performance played out in Montgomery.  When federal 
agents asked the local police to have personnel on hand to prevent violence, the police 
commissioner smugly responded, “we have no intention of standing guard for a bunch of 
troublemakers coming into our city.”384  Again, when the bus pulled into Montgomery, 
Klansmen boarded it and began their assault.  After more than an hour of beatings, the 
police stepped in to disperse the 1,000-man mob.  Medical assistance was called for, but 
“every white ambulance in town reported their ambulances had broken down.”385  The 
only arrests made were of two whites, cited for disorderly conduct and “shielding riot 
victims from their attackers.”386  
The civil rights movement would again enter Klan territory in 1962, when an 
African American military veteran named James Meredith was admitted to the University 
of Mississippi.  President Kennedy did not care to see more acts of terrorism carried out 
on national TV.  Kennedy put pressure on Mississippi government officials and offered 
federal assistance should it be required.  The Mississippi officials told the President they 
had everything under control.   
As the government coordinated efforts to protect Meredith, Imperial Wizard 
Shelton planned mayhem, calling together his lieutenants to tell them that a black man 
walking through the doors of Ole’ Miss should trigger “the bloodiest rioting ever seen in 
the United States.”387  To mobilize his troops, Shelton relied upon telephone and wireless 
radios, and sent his call for support out to all corners of the United Klan’s empire—
which, according to Congressional reports, spread through seventeen states.388  In return,  
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the Klan promised its support, going so far as to telegraph the Mississippi governor and 
inform him that Klansmen were “on a stand-by alert waiting for your call to protect the 
state sovereignty of Mississippi.”389 
Shelton himself attempted to be on-site for Meredith’s first day at Ole’ Miss, but 
his aircraft was refused landing clearance and was forced to return to Alabama.  
Regardless, even without their leader, throngs of Klansmen descended on Oxford in 
anticipation of Meredith’s arrival.  Eyewitness accounts paint a disturbing picture of the 
scene.  According to one witness, speakers blared the song “Cajun Ku Klux Klan,” a ditty 
warning: 
You niggers listen now, I’m gonna tell you how  
To keep from being tortured while the Klan is on the prowl. 
Stay at home at night, lock your doors up tight. 
Don’t go outside or you’ll find them crosses burning bright.390 
 
Needless to say, the stage was set for yet another bloody standoff.  And bloody it was.   
 As Meredith walked onto campus, a riot broke out.  Rocks and Molotov cocktails 
were tossed between intermittent gunfire while a haze of tear gas overtook all those 
watching the melee.  Two people were killed in the riot, while 166 U.S. Marshalls, 48 
soldiers, and 300 on-lookers were treated for injuries.391  As was expected, police did 
little to stop the violence.  Robert Kennedy remarked to his brother that “approximately 
150 of the police were observed sitting in their automobiles within half a mile of the 
rioting and shooting.”392  The President was understandably furious at the Mississippi 
police and their inability (or more accurately, refusal) to either enforce the law or 
maintain control.  To demonstrate his personal resolve, Kennedy sent 3,000 armed 
                                                 
389 Wade, The Fiery Cross : The Ku Klux Klan in America, 317. 
390 Newton, The Ku Klux Klan : History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of 
America's Most Notorious Secret Society, 301. 
391 Nadine Cohodas, “James Meredith and the Integration of Ole Miss,” The Journal of Blacks in 
Higher Education, no. 16 (Summer 1997): 122. 
392 Newton, The Ku Klux Klan : History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of 
America's Most Notorious Secret Society. 
 136
National Guardsmen into Oxford to oversee Meredith’s next admission attempt.  
Unsurprisingly—given this show of force—Meredith’s second attempt was successful.393 
 Resistance would continue throughout 1962, but under a somewhat different 
guise.  Under Shelton’s direction, the UKA and other Klans began to emulate Martin 
Luther King’s approach and push a non-violent strategy of resistance.  Members of the 
National Knights were told to refrain from violence and that “our weapons are the 
boycott and the ballot.”394  Amidst a cross burning ceremony, Georgia Grand Dragon 
Calvin Craig hammered this strategy home, telling Klansmen, “Let’s be 
nonviolent…we’ve got to start fighting just like the niggers.”395  Soon, robed and hooded 
Klansmen could be seen conducting their own sit-ins in protest of integrated restaurants 
and public facilities.  Shelton attempted to downplay the Klan’s racist rhetoric once he 
recognized he was losing ground and was constrained solely to the South given his 
previous approach.   He thus played up the threat of “Black Communism.”  However, this 
was too far a stretch and Shelton garnered little additional support from his racist 
followers when he proclaimed that “many well-meaning nigras know their own people 
are being used by the Communists.”396  One man listening to Shelton’s new pitch 
expressed a widely-held Klan sentiment and protested “I didn’t come out here to hear him 
talk about this communist stuff…why doesn’t he talk about the niggers?”397  Clearly, the 
pitch didn’t resonate, and, by 1963, a return to a racist ideology proved the strategy of 
choice. 
 The Klan’s racism would receive national attention during the highly publicized 
investigation into the bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in September 1963.  
The attack, which resulted in the death of four young African American girls, was carried 
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out by four members of the UKA, well-known for its violent tendencies.  As the nation 
watched in horror, Klansmen spoke out, revealing the true nature of their ideology. When 
questioned over whether or not the Klan was sorry about killing children, a Klan leader 
from Florida responded: 
They weren’t children. Children are little people, little human beings, and 
that means white people….there’s little dogs and cats and apes and 
baboons and skunks and there’s also little niggers.  But they ain’t children.  
They’re just little niggers…it wasn’t no shame they was killed. Why?  
Because when I go out and kill rattlesnakes, I don’t make no difference 
between little rattlesnakes and big rattlesnakes, because I know it is in the 
nature of all rattlesnakes to be my enemies and to poison me if they 
can…if there’s four less niggers tonight, then I say ‘Good for whoever 
planted the bomb!  We’re all better off.’398  
As the speaker closed his hateful sermon, Klansmen spotted a couple of African 
American “spies” hanging out in the nearby woods.  The crowd exploded in fury, 
swarmed the onlookers, and began to beat them.  As the police finally arrived—tipped off 
by an onlooker disgusted by the spectacle—the crowd was getting ready to pour gasoline 
over the four men and light them on fire.  One Klansmen excitedly asked, “Did you ever 
smell a nigger burn?  It’s a mighty sweet smell.”399 Again, the only “justice” served after 
this incident was a single conviction: that of a black victim charged with assaulting 
various Klan members participating in the ceremony.  Violence continued to flare in 
Florida, while nightly newscasts brought the situation into living rooms around the 
country.     
 By late 1963, despite its best efforts to shroud its ideology in acceptable anti-
Communist terms, the Klan had been exposed for what it was, a racist organization 
willing to advocate terrorism to achieve its ultimate aim of white supremacy.  Through 
increased media coverage of the violence, the nation began to understand the importance 
and timeliness of President Kennedy’s civil rights initiatives.  These initiatives would, 
tragically, gain even greater levels of support in the wake of his November 1963 
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assassination.  The death of Kennedy—although celebrated by Klansmen—would 
ultimately seal the fate of the “third-wave” Klan. 
 Four days after the assassination, evoking the memory of JFK, Lyndon Johnson 
appeared before Congress to urge the immediate passage of the Civil Rights bill.  Despite 
the fact that Kennedy’s initial attempt to get the bill passed was soundly rejected earlier 
that year, the image of Kennedy’s murder combined with media portrayal of the freedom 
rides and race riots in Florida were fresh in the public’s mind.400  Americans nationwide 
rallied in support and provided the political groundswell needed to carry the bill forward.  
The bill effectively gave federal organizations enforcement powers, immediately 
threatening local safe havens in which the Klan enjoyed immunity.  Following passage of 
the bill, President Johnson unleashed a reluctant J. Edgar Hoover and his FBI on the Klan 
in an all-out war against the Klan.    
 Although Hoover preferred to focus on anti-Communist efforts and—in line with 
Klan ideology—saw the Civil Rights movement as a Communist ploy, he nevertheless 
set out to dismantle the terrorist organization.  His zeal was triggered when Robert 
Kennedy, in what appears now to be a personal challenge to Hoover, sent a special 
Justice Department team to Mississippi following the 1964 murders of three civil rights 
volunteers.  Hoover, desperate to prove the worth of his organization and not get shown 
up by the Justice Department team, swarmed Mississippi with FBI agents and turned the 
focus of his Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) squarely upon the Klan.  In 
an internal memorandum, this initiative was described as a “hard hitting closely 
supervised coordinated counterintelligence program to expose, disrupt, and otherwise 
neutralize the Ku Klux Klan and specified other hate groups.”401  The program, though 
questionable on a legal and moral basis, proved remarkably effective, virtually destroying 
Shelton’s UKA within three years. 
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 The agent Hoover assigned to head up the White Hate COINTELPRO initiative 
was William C. Sullivan, a man who harbored “disturbing memories of the anti-Catholic 
Klan of his childhood.”402  Sullivan used his experiences as a veteran of successful 
COINTELPRO initiatives against the domestic Communist Party: “the decision was 
made to incorporate all counterintelligence operations into one program directed against 
the Communist Party…I simply redirected the use of those techniques toward 
investigating the Klan.”403  Sullivan crafted and oversaw a ruthless campaign of 
psychological warfare, deep penetration, and persistent operational disruption against the 
Klan. 
 Between 1964 and 1971, as one scholar notes, “virtually the entire arsenal of 
techniques was brought to bear against white hate organizations with a level of success 
that can only be described as extraordinary.”404  The FBI kicked off the program by 
sending postcards to Klansmen that indicated the secret membership rosters of the Klan 
had been exposed and that “someone knows who you are.”405  These postcards stirred up 
internal dissent and suspicion. Soon Klansmen were at each other’s throats trying to 
figure the source of the leak.  Capitalizing on the fissures created by its psychological 
operations, the FBI created a fictional rival organization, called the National Committee 
for Domestic Tranquility (NCDT), which promoted an ideology which paralleled the 
Klan’s but mocked the Klan for its inability to either promote political change or 
maintain secrecy.  Letters sent by the leader of the NCDT—an equally fictional character 
by the name of Harmon Blennerhasset—personally attacked Imperial Wizard Shelton and 
openly questioned his form of governance.  In one newsletter, Blennerhasset railed that 
Shelton “has reduced the Klan to a totalitarian organization which serves the interests of 
the communists…I have never met a klansman who did not love his country, but I have 
met Shelton’s men who are strictly professional money men and organizers…it is they 
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whom you must divorce yourselves from.”406  Shelton, understandably furious over the 
personal attacks, filed a mail fraud complaint against the NCDT and sent the complaint 
(quite ironically) to the FBI.  Needless to say, the complaint was never followed up.  
 Although the initial wave of counter-Klan programs was aimed at producing 
psychological effects, subsequent COINTELPRO measures would step over the legal line 
and aim to operationally cripple the Klan.407  In order to do this, the FBI relied heavily on 
paid informants within Klan ranks.  One of the most underhanded tactics involved paying 
Klansmen to seduce and sleep with the wives of other Klansmen.  According to one 
informant who testified before the Senate, “my instructions were to sleep with as many 
wives as I could.”408  In this task, it was noted the informant “performed his duty like a 
little soldier.”409  Concomitantly, the FBI began mailing letters to the wives of Klan 
claiming to have firsthand knowledge of adulterous affairs involving their husbands.  As 
expected, a great deal of family turmoil resulted from such campaigns.  Greater legal 
problems arose, however, when COINTELPRO programs began to provoke acts of Klan 
violence in order to ambush and then arrest those involved.  For instance, the FBI hired 
two agitators to talk a Klansman into bombing a residence.  Upon the Klansman’s arrival, 
he was greeted by FBI agents waiting in ambush, pinned down in a hail of gunfire, and 
then taken in and convicted of attempted murder.  At one point, Shelton became so 
enraged by the number of infiltrators he threatened “to weed informants out of the Klan 
through, of all things, the use of polygraph tests and sodium pentothal.”410  
 Although some COINTELPRO techniques were undeniably questionable, the 
results of the campaign were staggering.  Within a year of initiating the program, the FBI 
estimated “about 15% of the entire Klan was comprised of informants” and that “about 
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half were elected to leadership positions.”411  At one point, the Klan was so heavily 
infiltrated that “Hoover briefly considered installing an informant at the top of the Klan, 
and thus making Klan policy.”412   
 Although the White Hate COINTELPRO initiative lasted until 1971, the Klan was 
all but finished by 1968.  Its campaign of terrorism was rendered ineffective, as schools 
across the South continued to march towards desegregation.  Hoover, in his letter to the 
Attorney General, touted his success, stating “we have found that by the removal of top 
Klan officers and provoking scandal in the state Klan organizations, the Klan in a 
particular area can be rendered ineffective.”413  Imperial Wizard Shelton himself 
admitted “the FBI’s counterintelligence program hit us in membership and weakened us 
for about ten years.”414   The Klan campaign, for a third time, thus came to an end.  
Hoover and his anti-Klan task force had done its job with brutal efficiency.  The fractured 
and defeated Klan would again atomize and go to ground.                         
B. STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
The use of structural approaches to explain Ku Klux terrorist campaigns of the 
1950s and 1960s proves problematic.  Of the three structural factors tested, only one—the 
presence of a left wing opponent—was present in this period.  As will be shown, the 
other two—a depressed economy and the return of disgruntled war veterans—are absent 
and, therefore, largely unhelpful in understanding Klan terrorism.   
Following the Second World War, the United States was in a prime position to 
reap the financial windfalls that came with Allied victory.  Separated by two oceans from 
the war’s devastation, the United States became the primary supplier of material for 
Allied war efforts.  Large-scale American industries arose to feed the insatiable material 
demand.  American automotive, aviation, electronics, and housing industries grew by 
leaps and bounds.  In fact, the war was so beneficial—financially speaking, at least—that 
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many economists feared its termination would plunge America back into the Great 
Depression.  This was not to be the case.  Instead, the United States found itself poised to 
benefit from the establishment of a global capitalist system largely of its own design.  
Under this system, the United States economy would enjoy the largest sustained period of 
economic growth in its history.  In fact, the timeframe between 1945 and 1970 is now 
referred to as the “golden years” of the American economy.415   
As one economic historian notes, “it became clear to all the world that the United 
States economy after mid-century was capable of producing enough to provide every 
man, woman, and child with a minimum comfort level of living.”416  Compared to the 
fifteen to twenty percent unemployment rates of the 1930s and 1940s, the four percent 
unemployment rate of the 1950s was a dramatic improvement.  United States real GNP 
rose at an average of three percent over the decade—a moderate yet respectable rate.417  
Although there was a slight recession beginning around April 1953, Eisenhower’s 
economic advisors responded swiftly and arrested the economy’s downward trend within 
five months; the downturn was completely resolved within ten.418  A second economic 
downturn occurred in April 1960, but like the 1953 downturn, was not severe enough to 
warrant labeling it a significant recession.  Another 10-month affair, GDP growth failed 
to drop below 2% at any time during the decline, and, for this reason, neither will be 
coded as a significant economic disruption.419    
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The second factor to be explored deals with the presence of an ideological 
opponent to the Klan.  Here—perhaps more so than in any other period under review in 
this dissertation—a viable explanation occurs.  The 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
essentially ushered in “the Second Reconstruction Era” for the South.  However, in 
contrast to Reconstruction in the 1860s, African Americans and associated civil rights 
supporters were better prepared and organized to ensure enforcement of desegregation 
laws and equality initiatives.  In the figure of Martin Luther King and his Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Klan had a tangible enemy against which 
to mobilize.  
As at least one historian points out, under King, “a new generation of blacks was 
becoming more demonstrative in demanding civil rights.”420  Their attitude directly 
challenged the core goals of Ku Klux Klan’s leadership, and, arguably, forced the Klan to 
respond.  As one would expect from a theory that advocates right wing terrorism rises in 
response to the presence of a left wing opponent, Klan activity peaked in areas where 
SCLC organizations were most energetic.  In Alabama, for instance, the Klan honed in on 
the SCLC and “ringed in” the major hubs of Civil Rights activity.  David Chalmers notes 
“if a rough four sided figure were to be drawn to include Tuscaloosa, Birmingham, 
Anniston, and Montgomery, the major area of Klan activity would have been 
enclosed.”421  Similar to the Reconstruction-era Klan’s violence against the Union 
League, the 1950–1960s Klan primarily targeted King’s SCLC.   
The Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) 
mobilized against the Klan along with the SCLC, spurring the Klan to counter mobilize 
and direct terrorism at members and headquarters of those organizations.  In fact, it was 
the murder of COFO workers Michael Schwerner, James Cheney, and Andrew Goodman 
by members of Mississippi’s White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan that brought FBI 
pressure down on the Klan and, inadvertently, actually assisted the Civil Rights 
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movement.422   The Klan’s mobilization against the SCLC, CORE, COFO, and SNCC 
indicates an ideological opponent was present and, thus will be coded that way. 
As for the return of war veterans, July 27, 1953 marked the Korean War 
armistice, almost a year prior to the spike in Klan violence.  After a brief respite in Klan 
violence between 1958 and 1960, the Klan reinvigorated its campaign of terrorism in 
early 1961.  Even if one wanted to try and find an association between Klan violence and 
the return of Vietnam War veterans, this would be undercut by the simple fact that the 
Gulf of Tonkin incident—which spurred massive American involvement in Vietnam—
did not until August 1964, and direct large scale ground combat did not begin until 
1965.423  By the time many of the first deployed Vietnam combat veterans were returned 
home, the Klan was already in decline thanks to the FBI’s COINTELPRO initiatives.  
Thus, it proves extremely difficult to support any explanation of Klan violence during the 
1950s and 1960s as a result of returning soldiers. 
C. SPONSORSHIP EXPLANATIONS 
Those seeking to explain 1950–1960s Klan terrorism using sponsorship 
arguments will be left wanting.  It would be a difficult, perhaps impossible, task to argue 
that the Klan was controlled by the state or that it enjoyed active financial, operational, or 
material backing during this period.  Due in large part to its negative branding during the 
late 1920s, national political parties went out of their way to dissociate themselves from 
the Klan.  However, if one broadens the definition of support to include support from 
local appendages of the state, a different story emerges.  Again, the presence of a safe 
haven—derived through either active or tacit police support—provided the Klan with the 
operational latitude to carry out its terrorist operations.   
  In contrast to the two previous waves, the “third wave” Klan received very little 
public support from either political party.  In fact association with the Ku Klux Klan was 
generally viewed as political suicide.  Often, political rivals tried to associate the name of 
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their opponents with the Klan in the hopes of discrediting them.  Nonetheless, it must be 
noted that Klansmen endorsed Eisenhower in 1952, the first instance of a Republican 
presidential candidate receiving Klan support.424  Eisenhower was initially known to 
oppose Civil Rights legislation, yet his administration oversaw some of the most dramatic 
civil rights advancements, overseeing Brown v. Board of Education, passing the 1957 
Civil Rights Act, and sending members of the 101st Airborne to enforce desegregation in 
Little Rock.425  Klansmen were furious when Ike let them down, and vowed to turn away 
from the Republican Party by 1960. 
While the Klan may have initially considered throwing support behind a 
Democratic nominee in 1960, the slate of presidential candidates made them reconsider. 
Opposing the young, energetic figure of Democrat John F. Kennedy was the politically-
savvy Republican candidate, Richard Milhous Nixon.  Kennedy, a Catholic liberal who 
strongly supported the aims of the Civil Rights movement, naturally became Klan enemy 
number one.  Although there is no evidence to suggest support was solicited, Nixon 
became the recipient of an endorsement from Florida Grand Dragon William Griffin.  
During a nationally-televised debate on October 13, 1960, Kennedy was asked what he 
thought of the notion that “all bigots will vote for Nixon.”  Kennedy offered the 
following response, which some consider a “sly dig”: 
Well, Mr. Griffin, I believe, who is the head of the Klan, who lives in 
Tampa, Florida, indicated in a statement, I think, two or three weeks ago, 
that he was not going to vote for me, and that he was going to vote for Mr. 
Nixon.  I do not suggest in any way—nor have I ever—that that indicates 
that Mr. Nixon has the slightest sympathy in regard to the Ku Klux 
Klan.426 
Following the comment, Nixon went on to reiterate that he had no ties or sympathies to 
the Klan, to which Griffin himself responded “I don’t give a damn what Nixon said, I’m 
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voting for him.”427  After the 68,000,000 votes had been counted, Kennedy walked away 
with the Presidency with less than a 120,000 vote margin.  Many felt that “the KKK 
endorsement [of Nixon] may have been a crucial factor in swinging black votes to 
Kennedy that year.”428      
 During the 1950s and 1960s, the Klan was resoundingly rejected by any and all 
national political parties.  The fact that it was considered political suicide to be associated 
with the Klan demonstrates just how far the Klan had fallen from its 1920 peak of 
political power.  The argument that an active third part sponsor is necessary for an 
organization to wage a terrorist campaign is refuted by this example.  Lesser forms of 
support, however, do correlate with outbreaks of sustained terrorism. 
 The Klan consistently thrived and prospered in areas where it enjoyed legal 
exemption.  In fact, one scholar notes that the 1950s/1960s Klan “successfully turned to 
violence only where popular and police sentiment granted them a high degree of local 
immunity.”429  One need only to look at where the Klan built legal and judicial safe 
havens to see where the highest rates of terrorism occurred.  Sadly, examples of police 
complicity are plentiful.  The lies in collating them in a presentable way. 
Perhaps the best place to start is Alabama during the mid-1950s.  It was during 
this time that Sheriff Eugene “Bull” Connor oversaw Birmingham’s police and fire 
departments as the Commissioner of Public Safety.  A staunch white supremacist, Connor 
was responsible for allowing Birmingham to become nationally known as Bombingham.  
Between 1948 and 1963, Connor overlooked more than forty suspected Klan 
bombings.430  When pressed on the issue, “Connor invariably blamed blacks for bombing 
their own homes and churches.”431   
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So intermeshed was the Birmingham police with the Klan that “the Negroes of 
Birmingham claimed it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between the Klansmen and 
the deputies.”432  The most audacious example of this collusion is what happened to the 
Birmingham freedom riders during the summer of 1961.  An FBI informant explained 
how Connor, a small group of his top police detectives, and the top Klan officials in 
Alabama closely coordinated the assault on the freedom riders.  As the buses approached 
Birmingham, the police actually provided the waiting Klansmen an update on the buses’ 
whereabouts and passenger manifests.  Following the beatings, Detective W.W. Self 
approached the leader of the Klan assault and thanked him and his team for “a job well 
done.”433  A week after the assaults, a policeman was asked why the Commissioner 
didn’t send reinforcements to quell them.  His reply?  “The men he would send out 
probably would join the mob.”434      
The link between Klan terrorism and law enforcement safe havens can be found 
in areas beyond Alabama.  In Mississippi, the deaths of three civil rights workers were 
tied directly to the Sheriff and his deputy.  After the FBI was forced to investigate, it 
named “twenty-one Klansmen responsible for the murder, including Sheriff Lawrence 
Rainey and Deputy Cecil Price.”435  FBI reports indicate the three Civil Rights activists 
were pulled over by Deputy Price and put into a local jail.  While there, plans were made 
to hand over the three to a Klan lynch mob at nightfall.  The three were duly released, but 
as they were on their way out of town, they were again pulled over by Price, surrounded 
by Klansmen, and fatally shot. 
So pervasive was the Klan/police interaction that Robert Kennedy wrote in a 
memo to President Johnson that “the spread of Klan terror had the actual sanction of local 
law enforcement agencies in many parts of the South.”436  James Venable, the Imperial 
Wizard of the National Knights of the KKK (and Chairman of the National Association 
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of Ku Klux Klans), agreed, adding “you’ll never be able to convict a white man that 
killed a nigger what encroaches on the white race of the south.”437   It was only after 
Johnson launched his 1964 “war” against the Klan that these pockets of support 
evaporated.  As FBI agents penetrated the Klan, harassed its members, and began federal 
prosecutions (since local prosecutions rarely held up), the Klan went into disarray and its 
headlong eclipse.  By 1968, under the persistent pressure of the FBI’s COINTELPRO 
initiatives, the Klan was atomized.  
D. ORGANIZATIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
Once again, of the three broad theoretical approaches tested, the organizational 
approach to understanding Klan terrorism proves most substantial.  We see fluctuations 
in Klan violence and size directly associated with the Klan’s organizational design, its 
leadership, and its recruitment pitches.   
We can delineate two distinct phases of organization for the “third wave” Klan.  
During the first phase, which began with the Brown v. Board of Education ruling in 1954, 
the Klan is best labeled a “divisible invisible empire.”438  Complete atomization of the 
Klan down to the local level resulted in at least twenty seven different Klan factions.  So 
confusing was the number of Klans that the Grand Dragon of Florida once remarked “the 
old countersigns and passwords don’t work because all Klansmen are strangers to each 
other.”439  Further complicating organizational efforts was the emergence of the White 
Citizen’s Councils, intended to peacefully resist desegregation efforts and prevent 
another outbreak of Klan terrorism.   
As the Citizen’s Councils began organizing, one member accurately predicted that 
the Councils may be “watchdogs of segregation in the Deep South, but when the going 
gets tough and they need bulldogs with an instinct for the jugular, the Klan would be 
                                                 
437 Activities., The Present-Day Ku Klux Klan Movement; Report, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 
86. 
438 Wade, The Fiery Cross : The Ku Klux Klan in America, 276. 
439 Ibid., 302. 
 149
there to step in.”440  And so it did.  The Councils began to lose members to the Klan at an 
ever-increasing rate following multiple failures to thwart the Civil Rights movement in 
the South.  The WCC’s failed efforts to prevent desegregation had the unintended effect 
of uniting various Klans into a more solidified, hierarchical entity.  This would result in 
the Klan’s second phase of organization. 
As Klan numbers rose, many of the splinter Klans began to merge and form larger 
bodies. The most obvious example was the formation of the U.S. Klans under Eldon 
Edwards.  By 1958, Edwards had drawn Klaverns from ten states under his control, with 
a reported membership of over 15,000.  By 1960—in the face of a Catholic presidential 
nominee—that number had almost doubled.  On March 26, 1960 Edwards put together a 
well coordinated cross-burning demonstration of Klan unity that spanned the South.  Said 
an official from the Anti-Defamation League, “the wave of cross burnings indicates a 
coordinated effort to unify all the Klans.”441  Until his death in 1960, Edwards had 
assembled the most powerful Klan since the 1920s.  Although he never reached the 
degree of unity exhibited by either the first or second wave Klans, he nonetheless brought 
the Klan into the national spotlight and prepared the way for even further unification 
under his successor, Bobby Shelton. 
During a July 1961 meeting, Shelton successfully unified Edward’s U.S. Klans 
with the Alabama Knights, the Georgia Invisible Empire, Knights of the KKK, and 
various other splinter groups.  By 1966, the UKA could be found in nineteen different 
states.442  Although rival Klans still existed, Shelton’s UKA was widely known as the 
most dangerous and powerful of the group.  At least nine autonomous Klans quickly 
discovered the value in establishing centralized control and eventually agreed to organize 
under James Venable’s National Association of Ku Klux Klans.443  Although Venable’s 
group functioned more like the United Nations (several independent actors having a vote) 
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than the United Klan (an autocracy), the NAKKK further solidified the Klan, thus 
creating a more united, but still three-pronged, racist front.  Forming the third “bloc” of 
associated Klans was Samuel Bowers and his ultra-violent White Knights of the Ku Klux 
Klan in the Sovereign Realm of Mississippi (WKKKKM).  Most previously autonomous 
Klans fell under one of these during the 1950s.  
As the various local Klans were subsumed by larger organizations, their terrorism 
became more coordinated, better controlled, and used in a more strategic manner.  Under 
unified command, the UKA was able to set up training seminars, “led by a former Navy 
Frogman, who showed them how to rig dynamite, select the proper fuse, and attend the 
various details of bombmaking.”444 The Klan’s organizational power was visibly 
demonstrated by the overwhelming response to Shelton and Bowers’ call to resist 
desegregation efforts at Ole’ Miss.  Operationally, a tight hierarchy produced improved 
campaign results.  Under the autocratic Bowers, the WKKKKM was responsible for 
bombing sixty three homes, forty-four churches, two synagogues, ten civil rights 
headquarters, nine stores, and twenty-five other public locations between 1964 and 
1966.445  It is doubtful such violence would have been possible without a centralized 
leadership structure in place. 
Leadership, the second of the three variables considered important by proponents 
of the organizational approach to terrorism, also helps make the case of Klan terrorism 
during this period.  As the story of the “third wave” Klan opens in 1954, the White 
Citizens Councils laid claim to the communities’ likeliest potential leaders.  Whereas the 
Councils were made up of “businessmen, planters, bankers, and lawyers,” the 
membership rosters of the Klan were dominated by “mechanics, farmers, and 
storekeepers.”446  Adding insult to injury, “sociologists began remarking on the fact that 
the Klan had become a collection of uneducated misfits.”447  In fact, it was noted that 
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various Klan leaders of the time “are sadly lacking in the essential qualities of 
leadership… measured by the most elementary standards of leadership ability, the leaders 
of today’s [1955-60] Klan organizations are a mediocre lot.”448  This leadership 
imbalance would begin to change as Citizens Councils proved ineffective in their efforts 
and people turned elsewhere to combat segregation efforts.  People began to look for 
leaders who promised action.  Enter Eldon Edwards.                          
Described as a man possessed of “a certain force of personality and an almost 
benign expression on his nicely mustached face,” Edwards quickly assembled the largest 
and most powerful Klan of the 1950s.449  Edwards “tried to keep his Klansmen satisfied 
with strong talk and minimal night riding.”450  His leadership and tone resulted in a Klan 
which was (comparatively) less violent than its competitors.  Klan leader Asa Carter, on 
the other hand, urged a level of violence that his hooded followers gladly lived up to.  
Carter specifically attracted violent personalities into his organization, breaking ranks 
with other Klan leaders by insisting that “the mountain people—the real redneck—is our 
strength.”451  Along with the castration of Edward Aaron, described earlier, Carter’s Klan 
was also responsible for the assault of Nat “King” Cole at a Birmingham Auditorium, 
and, later, assaulted Autherine Lucy as she attempted to enroll at the University of 
Alabama.   
Robert Shelton, the youngest Imperial Wizard ever elected, was a mix between 
Edwards and Carter.  On one hand, like Carter, he held very militant views about what 
needed to be done and was not afraid to express or put them into action.  Initially, 
Edwards dismissed Shelton due to the violence undertaken by his Alabama Klan.452   But 
like Edwards, Shelton was both a charismatic figure and competent manager.  He knew 
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when it was appropriate to ramp up terrorist activity, and when it was best to scale it 
down in order to support other strategies.  In short, Shelton was charismatic enough to 
attract members, yet savvy enough to know how to translate the size of the Klan into acts 
of terrorism.  Proof of this is that when Shelton was discredited by the FBI, the Klan 
suffered.  Following a successful prosecution by the FBI in 1969, Shelton was sent to jail 
for one year.  In that one-year span, Klan numbers dropped from 8,500 to less than 
5,225.453  This points to the critical role of leadership in promoting Klan activity and 
campaign sustainment, and will be so coded.              
As for recruitment techniques, unlike the 1920s Klan which enjoyed the 
assistance of Protestant churches and many sympathetic newspapers, the 1950–1960s 
Klan enjoyed no such assistance. Lacking professionals with expertise in nationwide 
recruitment techniques, the Klan inadvertently constrained itself to the South, primarily 
by drawing on images of the Reconstruction era KKK.  At many rallies, the theme “the 
Ku Klux Klan saved the South before, and it can save it this time” dominated rhetoric.454  
But this pitch only appealed in areas of the former Confederacy, prompting law 
enforcement organizations to conclude that, due to the recruitment strategies used, “the 
Klan is virtually nonexistent and ineffective outside the South.”455           
Additionally, the Klan was “shunned by educated people, by members of the 
professions, and by business leaders.”456  In contrast to 1920, when churches assisted the 
Klan’s growth, churches in the 1950s and 1960s largely turned their backs on the hooded 
organization.  Lacking mass dissemination methods, religious support, or resources to 
generate their own propaganda, the Klan was forced to “recruit its members in two ways: 
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by secret, personal contact and by public appeal, mostly at rallies.”457  The results were 
lackluster, and overall Klan size stalled in early 1961.  Unable to keep pace with the 
recruitment and strength of the Civil Rights movement, the Klan was forced to 
experiment with a variety of different (ultimately unsuccessful) techniques. 
 In the summer of 1963, Klan leaders recognized their predicament and called a 
secret meeting in Atlanta to discuss the situation.  At this meeting, Klansmen agreed that 
“until Klan membership could be increased, and until it could enlist the aid of large 
segments of officialdom, it would be best to deemphasize hostility to the Jewish race and 
to Catholics and the foreign born.”458  Unable to raise the needed numbers through racist 
rants, Klansmen keyed on the Red threat and attempted to tie Jews, African Americans, 
and even the mentally handicapped together as agents of Communism.  This, of course, 
did not play well to the established base of Klansmen, and leaders soon discovered “anti-
Semitism and opposition to fluorinated water and mental health as Communist inspired 
can only carry one so far in the South.”459  Unable to recruit, the Klan began to accept 
almost any applicant who showed interest.  Unfortunately for Klaverns throughout the 
South, many of these new recruits worked for the FBI.    
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The terrorist campaign of the 1960s Klan, like the campaign of the 1920s, cannot 
really be explained by structural factors.  The 1950s and 1960s were times of relative 
economic prosperity, thus defying the argument that campaigns emerge in depressed 
economies.  The existence of a left wing opponent, in the form of the Civil Rights 
movement, did produce multiple organizations the Klan could mobilize against and 
directly target.  However, given the mismatch between the timing of Klan violence and 
the end of the Korean conflict and the initiation of the Vietnam War, there is little to 
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support the idea that an influx of veterans caused Klan campaigns.  Overall, structural 
arguments prove only marginally effective in explaining 1950-1960 Klan terrorism. 
Sponsorship explanations fare better, especially when one considers support from 
local levels and the presence of safe havens.  In contrast to earlier periods, during the 
1950s and 1960s, both national political parties openly shunned the Klan and there is no 
evidence to suggest that the federal government provided the Klan with either 
information or material.  An entirely different story emerges when we consider the 
support of local law enforcement organizations.  Wherever police either turned a blind 
eye or offered a willing hand, coordinated Klan terrorism surged.  Wherever it was 
actively opposed, the Klan was either destroyed or forced to decentralize in order to 
survive.            
As we saw during the previous two periods, the Klan’s organizational abilities 
mattered significantly.  Differences in organizational design—from being completely 
atomized to mobilized under a charismatic leader—help explain how violent the Klan 
could or could not afford to be.  The scale of Klan terrorism correlates with the leadership 
styles of different Klan Imperial Wizards and Grand Dragons.  The greater a leader’s 
proclivity toward violence (combined with how openly he expressed those sentiments) 
the more this influenced the amount of terrorism from that group.   
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CHAPTER VI. ENEMY OF THE STATE—
MARGINALIZATION OF THE KLAN AND RISE OF THE 
CHRISTIAN PATRIOTS 
“Let the record show that Morris Dees is an Anti-Christ Jew!”460 
Grand Dragon Louis Beam’s flustered response during a 1981 prosecution of the Klan 
 
 The Ku Klux Klan of the 1970s and 1980s failed to wage a significant terrorist 
campaign, in spite of social and political conditions that seemed to favor one.  Instead, 
the era saw the seeds planted for the later rise of “lone wolf” terrorism and adoption of 
the “leaderless resistance” concept of organization.  As such, the study of the 1970–1980s 
Klan is considered a negative case, and selected for its ability to help confirm or deny 
results found in the earlier periods from a different perspective. 
 Although this period begins less than a decade after the close of the last, a world 
of change had occurred within the Klan.  Terrorist groups such as The Order, Posse 
Comitatus, Aryan Nations, and the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord emerged on 
the ever-expanding radical right.  Once the most prominent organization on the radical 
right, by the mid-1970s the Ku Klux Klan was considered full of uneducated racists 
parroting an incoherent ideology.  The Klan had, in short, become the dregs of modern 
society.  Although the threat of right wing terrorism was prevalent throughout the 1980s, 
the Klan continued to play only a minor part in the story.  This chapter seeks to 
understand why the Klan was operationally marginalized during a time when it should 
have experienced resurgence.  
A. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
During the 1970s, global and domestic developments created anxieties in 
American society that should have provided fertile ground for a new campaign of right-
wing terrorism.  At the start of the decade, the anti-war movement was still in full swing, 
but not for long.  The 1968 Tet Offensive triggered a large-scale drawdown of forces 
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from Vietnam.  Although President Richard Nixon declared a “peace with honor,”461 
what Americans saw on TV told a different story. The United States and its South 
Vietnam ally were defeated by North Vietnam, with the war ending in a chaotic final 
scene on the roof of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. Following this withdrawal from 
Vietnam, popular fears arose that the United States was losing the Cold War and its 
standing in world affairs.462  Right wing organizations had a difficult time 
comprehending how Richard Nixon, who had once preached the virtues of anti-
communism, could be seen shaking hands with Mao Tse-Tung.463  Following Nixon’s 
resignation, President Ford’s continuation of the strategy of détente led conservatives to 
accuse him of appeasing the Soviets, resulting in a strong primary challenge by Ronald 
Reagan in the 1976 presidential election, and Jimmy Carter’s ultimate triumph.464  
The 1970s also ushered in a growing unease over social issues.  The 1973 
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade legalized abortion and instantly triggered a 
conservative backlash.  Republicans rejected the decision, and soon “abortion opponents 
in some instances became increasingly militant and violent.”465  Conservative lifestyles 
were attacked through a wholesale shift in societal norms, a trend which began almost a 
decade earlier.  The first perceived assault on traditional values was the adoption of “no-
fault” divorce clauses and the resultant spike in divorce rates that followed.  As divorce 
became more routine, the “percentage of Americans in their forties who were married 
dropped from 84 percent in 1972 to 67 percent a decade later.”466  The gay rights 
movement of the 1970s, represented by over seven hundred gay and lesbian organizations 
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around the country, generated significant conservative counter-mobilization.  Other 
leftward trends that dominated the 1970s landscape included environmentalism, and 
feminism.  The liberal agenda was vehemently opposed by far right conservative groups 
such as the John Birch Society 
From the race relations standpoint, the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s began 
to achieve its intended effects in the early 1970s.  A 1970 Harris survey indicated that 
nearly two-thirds of African Americans felt “things were getting better” when asked for 
their opinion on race relations.467  Signifying how far society had come with respect to 
school desegregation, over two thirds of all black college students were attending mixed-
race colleges as the 1970s began; this marked a dramatic increase from the early 1960s 
when over two thirds were attending exclusively black colleges.  By 1976, only 8% of 
Americans felt that it was acceptable to prohibit blacks from living in established white 
communities.468  
Meanwhile, the threat of a superpower nuclear exchange still loomed large and 
the near meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979 did little to allay Americans’ nuclear 
concerns.  The 1979 seizure of the Iranian embassy only underscored how inept the 
government appeared and a general distrust of government began to mount.  One might 
think these broad societal trends would have proven at least as favorable to the Klan as 
did those in previous periods. However, the 1970–1980s Klan appeared unable to rally.   
 As discussed in the previous chapter, destruction of the Klan’s infrastructure was 
well underway.  In April 1965, Congress appropriated $50,000 for an investigation of the 
Ku Klux Klan.  Recalling how Congress had inadvertently helped the 1920s Klan grow in 
stature, several Congressmen cringed at the thought of giving the Klan another such 
opportunity through Congressional hearings.  Their worries proved unjustified.  Whereas 
William Simmons shone in 1921, the Klan leaders of the 1960s floundered.  
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 Terrified at the prospect of being grilled before Congress, the Grand Dragons of 
Alabama and Delaware immediately resigned their positions.469  There was further 
embarrassment when Imperial Wizard Shelton took the stand.  For years, Shelton had 
praised the work of the House’s rabidly anti-Communist Committee on Un-American 
Activities.  Shelton lambasted all who pleaded the Fifth Amendment before the 
Committee, asserting that those who did so were undoubtedly Communists.470  When 
Shelton, an avowed anti-Communist, was asked his first question, he not only pleaded the 
Fifth, but the First, Fourth, and—ironically—the Fourteenth Amendments.  In a mocking 
newspaper report, it was noted that “for a Kluxer to take the fifth like any ordinary 
Commie is poetry; for him to take the fourteenth is epic.”471   
 Congress’ inquiry decimated popular support for the Klan.  One after another 
Klansman came forward to expose the Klan’s illicit financial activities, the greed of its 
leadership, and, frequently, they then offered their resignations to avoid further 
questioning.  A furious Shelton was cited with contempt and summarily sentenced to a 
year in prison.  The Klan was made the laughing stock of society, and there was a general 
free-for-all over leadership positions in the wake of Shelton’s incarceration.  By late 
1970, a Gallup Poll revealed absolutely no positive support for the Klan, indicating that 
Americans rated Klansmen worse than the Viet Cong.472  Congress had achieved its 
objective; the Klan had been exposed and branded.  The Klan was comatose, 
operationally stagnant, and strategically lost for years to come.  Between 1967 and 1973, 
according to one source, “the Klan lost immense prestige, its image as an outlaw 
organization was doubly reinforced, and a generational change took place within the 
organization.”473   
 In 1974, the Klan experienced the brief possibility of revival, as a young, 
educated, and handsome man emerged to try to return the Klan a degree of respectability.  
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David Duke, the new twenty-four-year-old Imperial Wizard was described as “the 
smoothest talking salesman since Indiana’s ambitious Grand Dragon of the 1920’s.” 
Duke won over many of the Klan’s harshest critics, as he aimed to turn the image of a 
Klansman as an uneducated redneck on its head.474  Duke traveled the country, accepted 
television appearances, spoke before college crowds, and even agreed to a Playboy 
magazine interview.  Upon assuming command, he opened the Klan’s ranks to women 
and Catholics, both firsts.475  Duke also focused on recruiting the middle-class, educated 
Americans.  He changed his title from the awkward-sounding Imperial Wizard to 
National Director, and sought ways to modernize Klan operations.  Most importantly, he 
appointed capable lieutenants to head up operations in various states.  In California, for 
instance, Duke appointed Tom Metzger.  In Alabama, he appointed Don Black.  Louis 
Beam headed the Texas Klans, while Bill Wilkinson oversaw Klans throughout 
Louisiana.   
 Duke also recognized the importance of avoiding overtly racist rhetoric in public 
discourse.  Duke tried to dress the Klan in the garb of 1920s “Americanism” and 
promoted the idea that the Klan was not “anti-black, just pro-white.” Yet, his Lieutenants 
made the pitch difficult.  Metzger, for example, made it a habit to carry his Colt .45 while 
dressed in black fatigues, and Beam proudly proclaimed “I’ve got news for you nigger, 
I’m going to be hunting you…I’ve got a Bible in one hand and a .38 in the other and I 
know what to do.”476  
 Frustrated by Duke’s grandstanding, Louisiana’s Grand Dragon Bill Wilkinson 
decided that he would take the Klan down a more familiar route.  “We tried the moderate 
approach in trying to halt the extravagant gains by blacks, but it failed…Now we are 
resorting to other methods,” Wilkinson added “you don’t fight wars with words and 
books; you fight them with bullets and bombs.”477  In 1975, Wilkinson split with Duke 
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and created his own, violent, version of the Klan, naming it the Invisible Empire, Knights 
of the Ku Klux Klan (IEKKKK).  With a recruitment pitch of unrestrained warfare 
against non-whites, Wilkinson pulled in the lower classes of white society.  Additionally, 
Wilkinson targeted members of the U.S. military, a tactic that paid off when black and 
white Marines fought at Camp Pendleton and when crosses were lit aboard the aircraft 
carrier America.478  Wilkinson also stood up a paramilitary training course for teenagers, 
a program that increased membership among youngsters seeking action.479  Within the 
Klan(s), then, competition flourished, and by December 1978 there were three main 
strands of “Klandom:” Duke’s media-savvy moderate strand, Shelton’s nervous, security-
conscious strand, and Wilkinson’s ultra-violent strand.    
 Despite Duke’s call for political action and moderation, Klans seeking to emulate 
Wilkinson’s violent IEKKKK grew in numbers and appeared primed to initiate a fourth 
wave of Ku Klux terrorism.  Even more troubling were alliances made with non-Klan 
organizations.  In 1979, the North Carolina Knights of the KKK—a group that had 
defected from Shelton’s moderate UKA—merged with the Neo-Nazi National Socialist 
Party to form the United Racist Front.  In opposition to a planned Communist Workers 
Party “Death to the Klan” parade in Greensboro, NC, nine beat-up sedans sporting 
confederate flag plates pulled alongside the parade route.  As Communist Party marchers 
began hitting the cars with signs and sticks, the Klansmen and Neo-Nazis—cigarettes 
dangling from their lips—calmly stepped from their cars, popped the trunks, and pulled 
out an assortment of weapons.  As the crowd began to draw back, gunfire erupted.  The 
incident—caught on tape—resulted in the death of five Communist Party marchers and 
injuries to nine others.480  Eager to latch onto the subsequent national publicity, 
Wilkinson publicly declared “we are the ones being attacked…and primarily by 
Communists in this country.”481  An all-White, all Christian North Carolina jury agreed.  
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Despite video footage depicting the cold-blooded murder, all involved Klansmen and 
Neo-Nazis were acquitted.  Said one juror of the Communist dead, “we are better off 
without them,” while another added, “the only thing the Klan is guilty of is poor 
shooting.”482        
 Using a faltering economy and the national embarrassment of America’s hostage 
situation in Iran as a foundation, Wilkinson launched yet another full-court recruitment 
effort.  Seeing the writing on the wall, David Duke—in private correspondence—told 
Wilkinson he was leaving the Klan and would sell his membership roster to the IEKKKK 
for $35,000.  Wilkinson, who had secretly recorded the conversation, then published the 
transcript, depicting Duke as a greedy sell-out, more worried about his wallet than the 
white supremacist cause.  Discredited, Duke now set off to establish the National 
Association for the Advancement of White People, a political program doomed to fail. 
 In the wake of all this, despite the efforts by Don Black and Louis Beam, 
membership in the KKKK dwindled while the membership of Wilkinson’s Klan swelled.    
The gloating wizard gleefully proclaimed “I wiped him [Duke] out, now I’ve got ninety 
five percent of the Klansmen in the country.”483  Though his financial resources were 
limited, Wilkinson now had a manpower base of around 9,000 with which to launch 
another surge of terrorism.  In order to train this growing mass, Wilkinson created Camp 
My Lai in Alabama where Klansmen received paramilitary weapons and explosives 
training.  While their parents were away, “Ku Klux Kids” summer camps were offered to 
teach youngsters the basics of weapons handling and Klan ideology.  By early 1980, 
news of these training camps and increased Klan activity caught the ear of a southern 
lawyer named Morris Dees, and in response, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) 
launched a Klanwatch program by year’s end.   
 Ironically, what first broke the Klan’s momentum were media reports that 
Wilkinson himself had been an active FBI informant since the early 1970s.  As members 
of Wilkinson’s IEKKK walked away in disgust, betrayed by the Wizard who had been 
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urging them to violence all along, a new form of counter terror effort further crippled 
Klans throughout the nation.  In March 1981, at the request of several terrorized 
Vietnamese shrimpers, Morris Dees and the SPLC took the KKKK’s Grand Dragon, 
Louis Beam, and his Texas Klan to court. 
 Asked by local white fisherman in the Galveston area to intervene on their behalf 
to help drive away Vietnamese competition, Louis Beam brought his Texas Klan to the 
Gulf area.  The Galveston Vietnamese community was soon victimized by constant Klan 
harassment and intimidation, receiving night letters warning them of violence while 
crosses burned in their front yards.  When local law enforcement failed to follow up on 
complaints, the Vietnamese elders reached out to the SPLC in a last ditch effort to stop 
harassment by the Klan.  Dees agreed to assist, and immediately filed suit against Beam 
and his Texas Klan. 
 Before the case went to court, Beam and his Klansmen ratcheted up their levels of 
intimidation in an effort to scare the Vietnamese away from their legal strategy.  Crosses 
were burned in the fisherman’s yards, boats were set afire, and threatening calls were 
made to local marina workers who supported the Vietnamese fishermen.  Business cards 
were left outside of any business with ties to the Vietnamese fishermen that chillingly 
announced “YOU HAVE BEEN PAID A SOCIAL VISIT BY THE KNIGHTS OF THE 
KU KLUX KLAN—DON’T MAKE THE NEXT VISIT A BUSINESS CALL.”484  This 
strategy of overt intimidation nearly worked.  Under pressure, the Vietnamese elders 
called Dees and told him they had decided not to prosecute.  Undaunted, Dees met with 
the shrimpers and convinced them it was in their best interests to push forward with legal 
action.  With the compliance of the Vietnamese community, Dees took Beam to court 
over a Texas state law which forbids paramilitary training within its borders.  When 
asked about the Klan and its purpose, Beam denied running a paramilitary unit and 
continued to assert the Klan was simply a patriotic organization.  Unfortunately for 
Beam, after Dees presented video evidence and a clip in which Beam himself instructed  
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students how to effectively kill enemies in an ambush, the judge ordered the Texas Klan 
disbanded.  A furious Beam shut down his Klan, renounced his Klan membership, and 
moved to Idaho.485            
 With this precedent, the SPLC turned its sights on the remnants of Wilkinson’s 
Klan with the intent of shutting down the My Lai training camp.  Realizing he did not 
have the funds to defend himself in court, Wilkinson closed the camp of his own accord.  
This was not sufficient for the SPLC.  Lawyers began filing injunctions against 
Wilkinson’s organization, triggering a costly legal battle for the Klan.  In private 
correspondence to his followers, Wilkinson “begged for funds, saying that the Klanwatch 
suit was costing the Empire between $5,000 and $10,000 per month.”486  Rather than 
support their disgraced Imperial Wizard, many Klansmen walked away or agreed to 
provide information to Klanwatch lawyers.  Wilkinson’s Klan tried one last desperate act 
of terror, firebombing the offices of the SPLC in 1983.  Though the bombing caused 
significant damage, no court documents were lost, and the SPLC received an influx of 
donations which allowed it to construct a new, fireproof, bombproof building from which 
to operate.   
 In May 1984, a grand jury handed down nine indictments to Klan leaders for 
obstruction of justice.  Alongside the SPLC, the Anti-Klan Network (later renamed the 
Center for Democratic Renewal) and the Anti-Defamation League kept constant 
surveillance and unremitting legal pressure on Klaverns scattered across the country.  
Legal defeats would prove to be the theme during the 1980s.  In 1987, the SPLC won a 
$7,000,000 case against Robert Shelton’s United Klans of America, bankrupting it, and 
forcing the UKA to disband; the headquarters of the UKA was given to the mother of an 
African-American victim of Klan terrorism.  Needless to say, Shelton was livid when he 
realized that the physical hub of the most powerful Klan was now owned by an elderly 
black woman.  In 1988, the SPLC shut down what was left of the IEKKKK with a 
$1,000,000 verdict against Wilkinson’s former Klan.    
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 The constant pressure of watchdog groups combined with effective law 
enforcement penetration decimated the Klans’ leadership ranks, tempered its violence, 
and forced alliances to dissolve.  The trend of Klan unification begun in 1979 reversed 
course, and, by the mid-1980s, Klan reach and violence was limited to sporadic, 
uncoordinated acts of local terrorism.  Adding insult to injury, the Klan became the 
laughingstock of right wing extremist organizations.  As Bill Stanton—a plank owner of 
the Klanwatch program—points out, “perhaps the most telling commentary of the Ku 
Klux Klan’s status as the last decade of the twentieth century began to unfold was that 
other, more radical white supremacists had begun to ridicule it openly.”487  The branding 
of the Klan would not end racist violence.  In fact, an unforeseen consequence of 
effective watchdog pressure was the slow morphing of the Klan name and structure into 
organizations that would come to be associated with the Christian Patriot movement.        
 As the Klan took its legal beatings, mass defections depleted the group.  After 
walking away, most Klansmen retained their racist beliefs and sought alternative outlets 
in order to express them.  If these outlets were unavailable, many created their own.  
Take, for instance, Don Black, who had served as David Duke’s Grand Dragon in 
Alabama.  Following the 1980 public disgrace of Duke, Black assumed the vacant 
Imperial Wizard position.  Instead of focusing on the Klan’s organization and strategy, 
Black enlisted the help of nine others and set off for Dominica in a doomed attempt to 
invade and conquer the small Caribbean island.  Black received three years of prison time 
for his attempt.  Following his release, he set up the ultra-popular White Nationalist 
website Stormfront.org.488  Today, this website is known for helping to expand the base 
of white nationalism, in effect turning white nationalism into white internationalism.   
 Louis Beam was another former Klan leader who took his racist beliefs into other 
venues.  After his courtroom disaster, Beam closed shop on his Texas Klan, headed north 
to Idaho, and met with Reverend Richard Butler to discuss plans for the expansion of an 
organization known as Aryan Nations.  As the “ambassador at large” for Aryan Nations, 
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Beam recruited throughout the country.  Beam also created one of the first virtual 
collaboration sites on the militant right wing by standing up of the Aryan Nations Liberty 
Net.  After breaking with Aryan Nations in the late 1980s, Beam maintained a strong web 
presence, calling on all Patriots to adopt a strategy of leaderless resistance and 
spontaneously take up arms against the American government.  Beam maintains a 
website even today that continues to inspire those on the radical right.   
 Tom Metzger, another of David Duke’s Grand Dragons, officially cut ties with 
the Klan in 1982 under considerable legal pressure.  Following an abortive run for the 
U.S. Senate, Metzger returned to his California home, fell in with the burgeoning Neo-
Nazi crowd, and built the foundations for an organization called WAR—an acronym 
standing for White Aryan Resistance.  True to Neo-Nazi form, Metzger promised to put 
“blood on the streets like you’ve never seen” and “advocate more violence than both 
world wars put together.”489   Still “one of the most notorious white supremacists in the 
United States,” Metzger would become a cult hero for Americans on the extremist 
right.490 Even Hollywood took note, as Metzger’s ultra-violent tones and leadership style 
served as the inspiration for the neo-Nazi leader portrayed by Stacy Keach in the movie 
American History X.   
  The mass defections from the Klan were not limited to its leaders.  Like rats from 
a sinking ship, rank and file members deserted Klaverns in droves, often joining other 
extremist groups possessing parallel ideologies.  In fact, a notable feature of right wing 
terrorism in the 1980s and early 1990s was the preponderance of ex-Klansmen involved 
in terrorist activity.  In 1983, for instance, Robert Jay Mathews formed an ultra-violent 
organization known as Brüder Schweigen (The Silent Brotherhood), known soon 
thereafter as The Order.  Seven Klansmen formed the core of this group, and, over the 
course of a year, The Order went on a bombing, counterfeiting, murder, and arson spree 
that would net the group over $4,000,000.  Before they were brought to justice (or killed 
in Mathews’ case), The Order helped support right wing extremism nationwide, making 
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significant donations to Klan associates Louis Beam ($100K), Robert Miles ($15K), 
Frazier Glenn Miller ($200K), and Tom Metzger ($260K-$300K).491 
 Frazier Glenn Miller, a former Army Special Forces soldier, defected from the 
Klan and stood up the White Patriot Party in the early 1980s.  In 1984 he lost a bid for 
Governor of North Carolina; two years later, he would experience defeat in his Senate 
run as well.  His political activity barely masked his paramilitary activities.  Altering his 
rhetoric from racist to anti-Semitic anti-government militia speak, Miller purchased 
weapons and relied on a few active-duty military friends to train his Patriot militia.492  
Brought to court a second time for threatening to bomb Morris Dees and declaring war on 
the ZOG, Miller turned state’s evidence, returned the money from The Order’s bank 
heists, and received a five year jail sentence.        
 As Klansmen walked away from their respective Klaverns in the early and mid-
1980s, William Potter Gale’s Posse Comitatus drew Klansmen into its ranks with a 
flexible anti-Semitic, Christian Identity-based ideology.493   A former Klansman himself, 
Gale would build the base of what would become the Christian Patriot movement—a 
movement which spawned Oklahoma City bomber (and former Klansman) Timothy 
McVeigh.494 The Posse seized upon the huge farm crisis plaguing the country during the 
1980s, drawing farmers into a belief system that preached violence against what it 
purported to be a Jewish-controlled government.  “Scattered Posse units attracted 
klansmen, neo-Nazis, Identity cultists, tax-dodgers, and disaffected farmers” and merged 
them underneath the Posse’s broad ideological tent.495  The popularity of the Posse 
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during the 1980s reflected a growing trend: the willingness of Klansmen to shed or 
downplay Klan affiliations and adopt the identity of “Christian Patriots.” 
 By 1985, the Ku Klux Klan was struggling to survive.  Staggering losses in 
courtrooms throughout the country decimated the organization and served as a deterrent 
to any Klan chapter attempting to engage in illicit activities.  From a peak of 11,000 
members in 1981, the Klan could claim fewer than 5,000 by the close of the decade.  The 
Klan would claim fewer than 1,500 members by the mid-1990s.496  Fearful of judicial 
repercussions, Klan leaders toned down their violent rhetoric, urged peaceful and legal 
resistance, and did everything possible to distance themselves from their more violence-
prone followers.   Now viewed as “plodding, cowardly, even foolish” by the end of the 
1980s, the Ku Klux Klan “came to be viewed as outdated and out of touch, all talk and no 
action.”497  Unfortunately, as noted by watchdog organizations, “if the Klan’s numbers 
were dropping, its terrorist philosophy was still influencing the [racist right wing] 
extremist movement.”498  Paramilitary groups, neo-Nazi skinheads, and small, 
compartmentalized terrorist organizations benefitted from the Klan’s rhetorical turn from 
violence and these “Patriot” groups began to collect former Klansmen with an appetite 
for violence.     
 The rise of the Christian Patriots can, in many ways, be attributed to the demise of 
the Ku Klux Klan.  Unable to keep its members satisfied, the Klan was drained of its 
strength, size, and overall power.  With its recruitment efforts severely constrained by 
watchdog groups, the Klan lost many of its most willing future terrorists to groups 
espousing anti-government rhetoric.  This includes the individual considered America’s 
most notorious domestic terrorist; Timothy McVeigh was a Klansmen between 1990-
1991 while on active duty in the United States Army.499  Unhappy with Klan ideology 
and organization, McVeigh walked away and began his associations with multiple anti-
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government Patriot organizations.  These associations eventually led to the April 19, 
1995 death of 168 people in Oklahoma City.   
 Discredited by its past and unable to escape the constant pressure applied by 
watchdog groups, the Ku Klux Klan was pushed into the background of the radical right 
movement during the 1980s.  As of the writing of this dissertation, the Klan has been 
unable to escape the branding that has been applied to it.  Although it once claimed men 
of stature, the Klan is now viewed as an organization of uneducated buffoons. It remains 
a marginalized entity in modern society.  Unfortunately, as previous history indicates, the 
Ku Klux Klan is unlikely to vanish altogether and, even today, cross lightings occur at 
which Klansmen still rally and chant “behold, the fiery cross still brilliant, all the troubled 
history failed to quench its hallowed flame.”500   
B. STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
To analyze the Klan during this period, what must be kept in mind is that the 
1980s Ku Klux Klan represents an organization (or organizations) that failed to launch a 
successful campaign.  Therefore, as factors are analyzed, we must remember we are 
seeking to explain a negative case.  Analysis must therefore be approached from a 
different angle.  Of importance here are instances where theory would anticipate a surge 
in Klan terrorism, but where none materialized. 
As in the previous three periods, the first structural factor to be considered is the 
state of the American economy.  If the period between 1945 and 1970 could be called 
America’s economic golden years, the following decade represents its antithesis.  Still 
enmeshed in the Vietnam War during the early 1970s, the American economy suffered 
massive rates of inflation while unemployment crept up around eight percent—a 
phenomenon dubbed the great stagflation.  Between November 1973 and March 1975, 
the United States economy suffered what some called “the most serious [recession] since 
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1937.”501  Lasting seventeen months, the recession pushed GDP down by 3% to 5%, an 
economic calamity generally attributed to the 1973 oil crisis.502 
The 1973 OPEC oil embargo pushed energy costs higher while the American 
economy sagged further still under the weight of Vietnam War expenditures.  Recovery 
began in mid-1975, but, by 1979, national economic growth was again stagnant, 
unemployment was rising, and inflation was through the roof.  The 1980 election of 
Ronald Reagan, considered by some a punishment vote against Carter and the 
Democratic Party, did little to immediately rectify the economic situation.503  For almost 
two years after assuming the presidency, Reagan’s economic policy was met with yet 
another deep economic recession.504  This sixteen month recession, from July 1981 to 
November 1982, pushed GDP growth rates down close to, but not over, 3%.  Only by 
1982, did the economy begin a steady recovery, propelling Reagan to a landslide second-
term election.   
If the structural argument that economic recessions result in right wing surges 
held true, we should expect to see the activities or membership of the Ku Klux Klan grow 
as early as 1971 and especially in 1973 and 1980.  But this did not occur.  As Christopher 
Hewitt indicates, Klan violence peaked around 1964 and then tapered off to almost 
nothing by the mid-1970s.505  A membership surge occurred around 1974, but the timing 
suggests it was primarily in response to the efforts of the charming new Imperial Wizard 
David Duke, and his whirlwind media campaign.  The economic argument also would 
anticipate a large surge of Klan violence during or immediately following the deep 1981-
1982 economic recession.  Again, a Klan campaign did not occur. The downfall of David 
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Duke in 1981 combined with the prosecution of Louis Beam stunted any Klan growth in 
the first year of the decade.  The 1982 revelation of Wilkinson’s background as an FBI 
informant activity as the final nail in the coffin, all but destroying any chance of Klan 
revival.  Because predicted surges in Klan terrorism throughout the 1970s and especially 
during the early 1980s failed to materialize, the economy as a source of structural 
problems leading to terrorist campaigns has to be judged weak to non-existent in this 
case.   
Positing that an ideological opponent is necessary factor to sustain a Klan 
campaign also fails in this instance, as there were numerous enemies from which the 
Klan could have chosen to mobilize.  This particular explanation loses credibility due to 
the fact that when a credible ideological opponent did appear to directly challenge the 
Klan, instead of enlarging and unifying, it was atomized, beaten, and bankrupted.  
Although the Klan tried to counter the SPLC, the SPLC beat it repeatedly in the courts.  
Nor was the SPLC alone.   A loose affiliation of human rights organizations coalesced 
into the Anti-Klan Network.  Beginning around 1979, the Anti-Klan Network travelled to 
active and potentially active Klan hot spots to expose the truth about the Klan’s ideology 
and to provide communities the tools with which to counter Klan recruitment. Many of 
the Anti-Klan Network’s leaders were rightfully described as possessing polar-opposite 
ideologies of the Klan, but the Klan never responded, much less develop a sustainable 
symbiotic relationship.  Nonetheless, since there were multiple national ideological 
opponents to align against during the 1970–1980s, the presence of an ideological 
opponent will be coded as present.   
Finally, for those advocating the return of war veterans as a factor in terrorist 
campaigns, the aftermath of Vietnam should have resulted in a burst of Klan terrorism.  
The fact there was a tremendous lull in Klan terrorism during this period calls this as a 
critical factor into doubt.  Following the 1968 Tet Offensive, the United States adopted a 
“Vietnamization” policy which gradually handed off all responsibility to the South 
Vietnamese military.  American soldiers began the redeployment process soon 
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thereafter.506   In 1972, a pressured Nixon ordered the immediate drawdown of 70,000 
troops from Vietnam, and the 1973 Paris Peace Accords officially ended American 
involvement in the conflict.  The timing of the redeployment of war veteran along with 
the rise of the very charismatic David Duke, should have led to a sustained campaign of 
terrorism; if there were ever to be an example of “disillusioned” war veterans returning 
from an unpopular overseas conflict, it would be here.  That this redeployment failed to 
initiate or sustain a campaign speaks to its limited usefulness as a factor in predicting or 
explaining right wing terrorism, at least in this case.   
C. SPONSORSHIP EXPLANATIONS 
The Ku Klux Klan of the 1970–1980s, like the KKK of the 1950–1960s, enjoyed 
political support from neither the Republican nor the Democratic Party.  Save perhaps 
Strom Thurmond and Robert Byrd—both of whom backed away from their open support 
of racist organizations—no politician could afford to admit association with the Ku Klux 
Klan.  Although Imperial Wizard Wilkinson threw his support behind Reagan’s 1980 
Presidential campaign—once stating “the Republican platform reads as if it were written 
by a Klansman”—Reagan quickly condemned the endorsement and even tried to 
associate Jimmy Carter with the hooded order.507    In his opening campaign speech, 
Reagan mocked the Carter campaign, proclaiming to the audience that, while he (Reagan) 
was in All-American Detroit,  Carter was “opening his campaign down in that city that 
gave birth to and is the parent body of the Ku Klux Klan.”508  Embarrassed, Reagan later 
apologized to the mayor of Tuscambia, Alabama when it was pointed out that Tuscambia 
was neither the birthplace nor the parent body of the Klan. 
The Klan remained a political embarrassment for any political party associated 
with it.  Any benefits a politician might gain from offering support or legitimacy to the 
Klan were far outweighed by the negative repercussions should that relationship become 
public knowledge.  Other than a few instances when FBI agents appeared to be apathetic, 
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there were no instances when the federal government offered rhetorical or material 
support.  Without support from a state one could conclude that the Klan was unable to 
initiate a campaign of terrorism.  This would be keeping in line with Claire Sterling’s 
argument about third party support.  The theory suggests that where there is no active 
support for the Klan, we should not expect to see a campaign.  During this period, theory 
aligns with reality. 
However, as was also true in every other period studied, the Klan was able to 
engage in terrorist acts wherever local law enforcement and judges allowed it the space in 
which to operate with impunity.  While police and legal collaboration were not nearly as 
prevalent as they had been in previous years there were a few incidents. 
One such example was in northern Alabama, where up until the late 1960s signs 
still greeted travelers with: “NIGGER DON’T LET THE SUN SET ON YOUR HEAD 
IN CULLMAN COUNTY ALABAMA.”509  Although these were removed by the 1970s, 
the sentiment behind them was still very much alive.  Alabama governor George Wallace 
was most responsible for providing the Klan such safe havens from which to operate.  His 
famous “segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” speech—written 
by Klansman Asa Carter, who borrowed generously from the Klan motto for it—left no 
doubt about where Wallace stood with regard to race relations.  As if his image needed 
further burnishing, in 1975 Wallace went so far as to officially name David Duke a 
colonel in the state militia.  In Decatur, when Imperial Wizard Bill Wilkinson proclaimed 
that the Klan was now “providing vigilante law for Decatur,” no one—least of all the 
police chief—refuted the statement.510  The Klan would eventually lose this safe haven—
as well as havens in Mississippi and Texas—once watchdog groups brought national 
attention to the problem.  However, wherever police turned a blind eye, Klan terrorism 
flourished.     
For the most part, law enforcement did turn against the Klan.  As former SPLC 
paralegal Bill Stanton pointed out:  
                                                 
509 Stanton, Klanwatch : Bringing the Ku Klux Klan to Justice, 42. 
510 Ibid., 52. 
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By the late 1970s sympathy for the Klan seemed to be on the wane among 
white Southern lawmen, and it was rare to hear of a law enforcement 
officer who actually belonged to the Klan or some other organized white 
supremacist group.  Stricter hiring standards and improved pay had 
resulted in the attraction of higher caliber recruits to Southern police 
forces…Furthermore, the integration of many police agencies made it 
more difficult for the KKK to operate inside them as it once had.511  
More professional police forces began more effective enforcement efforts against white 
supremacist groups, thereby eliminating their safe havens.512  Once a non government 
entity (the SPLC) proved willing to actively target the Klan and publicly humiliate law 
enforcement agencies who refused to carry out the law, many local police stations found 
themselves shamed into maintaining national laws.  The same could be said of judges, as 
by the late 1970s, “the full weight of the Justice Department, which had too often been 
invisible during the civil rights years, now helped keep the Klan and its associates on the 
run.”513   
 Adding to the Klan’s problems was the 1980 standup of the SPLC’s Klanwatch 
program.  Through this program, the nonprofit organization systematically disassembled 
the Klan throughout the south.  In 1981, the SPLC shut down Louis Beam and the Texas 
Klan; in 1984, the Alabama Klan was dismantled; 1985 saw the downfall of the North 
Carolina chapter; and Robert Shelton’s UKA was brought down in 1987.  After targeting 
the larger Klans, the SPLC cleaned up by attacking the IEKKKK in 1988, and then 
shifted its efforts to other racist groups such as Tom Metzger’s WAR (sued in 1990).  
 Arguable, more than during any other period, the Klan of the 1970–1980s was 
under constant pressure and forced to operate under the threat of unrelenting legal 
pressure.  Safe havens, where and when they existed briefly enabled Klan terrorism.  But 
whenever identified, these havens were quickly challenged by watchdog organizations as 
well as anti-Klan protest groups.  Whenever directly challenged, Klan terrorism retreated.  
                                                 
511 Ibid., 26. 
512 In a personal interview, Joe Roy of the SPLC stressed the importance of educating and 
professionalizing all branches of law enforcement.  
513 Stephen Scheinberg, “Right Wing Extremism in the United States,” in The Extreme Right: 
Freedom and Security at Risk, ed. Aurel Braun and Stephen Scheinberg (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1997), 59. 
 174
Therefore, the presence or absence of safe havens did play a significant role in helping to 
explain the sporadic nature of Klan activity during the 1970s and 1980s.     
D. ORGANIZATIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
When it comes to explaining the lack of terrorist activity by the Klan during the 
late 1970s and 1980s, one has to consider the inability to merge autonomous units in a 
single unified front combined with a complete misunderstanding of which recruitment 
strategies could best attract new members to be major factors.   
It is difficult to analyze the organizational design of the 1970–1980s Klan simply 
because the term “organization” so ineffectually captures what the Klan was.  Any actual 
hierarchy was quickly undercut through defections and internal dissent.  The 1974 rise of 
David Duke and subsequent unification under him was as close as the Klan came to 
achieving hierarchical organization.  But rather quickly, beginning with Bill Wilkinson’s 
defection in 1975, Duke’s organization fell into disarray.  Three major strands of 
Klandom emerged, one led by Duke, one led by Wilkinson, and the last led by Shelton.  
Smaller satellite organizations revolved around each one of these three strands.   
By 1979, the three Klans fought amongst themselves more often than they fought 
with anyone or anything else.  Shelton, still leader of the UKA, resented Duke and 
suspected him of leaking a story to a gay tabloid that accused the UKA Wizard of 
changing his sexual orientation while behind bars.514  Wilkinson, in turn, lambasted Duke 
for being all talk and no action.  Duke publicly taunted Wilkinson as a violent half-wit, 
once commenting that his former lieutenant was “practically an illiterate who has never 
read anything.”515  Rank and file Klansmen were left scratching their heads looking for a 
point of unity. 
In the early 1980s, the Klan’s organizational problems only intensified. A 
publicly humiliated Duke lost control of his Klan, while his successor was immediately 
jailed for his hare-brained Dominica coup attempt.  Other Klan leaders—like Tom 
                                                 
514 Wade, The Fiery Cross : The Ku Klux Klan in America, 370. 
515 Newton, The Ku Klux Klan : History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of 
America's Most Notorious Secret Society, 26. 
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Metzger—walked away from the Klan to form their own organizations.  The highly 
disorganized, yet highly militant neo-Nazi movement pulled still others away from the 
Klan and into its ideological tent.  The remnants of the Klan were further dismantled 
through court proceedings, and leaders were soon made aware of the financial costs 
associated with running a recognizably hierarchical organization.  Local Klans quickly 
renounced their memberships in any parent organization; subsequently, the Klan—as an 
entity—atomized and dwindled.  Unlike during previous periods, “the white supremacist 
movement had expanded in so many directions that it no longer made sense to talk about 
the Ku Klux alone.”516      
Leadership issues help to explain why the Klan proved unable to generate a 
campaign. The 1970–1980s, were rife with internal squabbling, while the leader who 
emerged strongest was actually an FBI informant.  While David Duke possessed the  
charisma and tools needed to re-popularize the Klan, he fell victim to his own cult of 
personality as he went on public speaking tours around the United States.  Willing to 
tamp down the Klan’s racist rhetoric publicly, he was known to rant in private meetings 
that “there’s times I’ve felt like picking up a gun and shooting a nigger…we’re going to 
do everything to protect our race.”517  Eventually, Duke became more interested in a 
political career than in leading the Klan, and, due to pressures from Bill Wilkinson, 
turned over control in order to found the National Association for the Advancement of 
White People.  It was Wilkinson, a former submariner aboard the USS Simon Bolivar, 
who took over Klan leadership in 1980, but was immediately exposed as an informant for 
the FBI and bankrupted by the SPLC shortly thereafter.  Robert Shelton, leader of the 
third strand of Klandom, kept his head down and largely stayed quiet after being 
investigated by the FBI in the 1960s, an experience which landed him time behind bars.  
Although, Shelton maintained control over as many as 5,000 Klansmen in 1983, by 1987 
he had been destroyed by SPLC lawsuits.   
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Regarding effective recruitment pitches, the Klan simply bet on the wrong horse.   
In an attempt to outdo rival Klan groups, leaders failed to look beyond their Klan rivals to 
see their racist recruitment pitch no longer resonated.  Other white supremacist 
organizations realized the Klan’s mistake and altered their rhetoric to play on a growing 
anti-government sentiment throughout the United States.  As Morris Dees himself points 
out, “[the Klan’s] strident racist and anti-Semitic rhetoric kept Beam and the others at the 
fringe of the debate.”518  Groups that were more successful at the time—often led by 
former Klansmen—focused their anti-government pitch on excessive taxation and fears 
of a government crackdown on personal weapons.  It is as if the Klan pinned its hopes on 
the appeal of The Clansman while other groups invoked The Turner Diaries.   
Further complicating the Klan’s recruitment efforts were the limited means at its 
disposal for disseminating its propaganda.  Unlike during previous eras, “the religious 
right wanted nothing to do with the Klan and steadfastly denied it the support 
fundamentalists had lent it in the 1920s.”519  Although the “Moral Majority”—a highly 
religious and influential band of preachers and politicians—began to attain political 
power by the late 1970s, this movement turned against the Klan and openly attacked the 
organization for immorally manipulating the Christian faith.  The Klan, financially 
strapped and with no media support, was relegated to sending news through cheap 
publications and via limited distribution channels.       
E. CONCLUSIONS 
As during the previous periods studied, structural factors carry the least amount of 
explanatory value for understanding or explaining Klan violence during the 1970–1980s.  
Although the United States experienced significant economic troubles, the Klan was only 
able to make minor strides through sporadic, unsustainable acts of terrorism.  The 
existence of left wing opponents only spiked Klan terrorism when these opponents chose 
to attack the Klan directly –”Death to the Klan” marches being a prime example.  When 
left wing opponents avoided direct confrontation with the Klan, and chose to work either 
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through the courts or by educating communities instead, the Klan shrank.  Finally, the 
period did not see a Klan campaign on spite of the significant drawdown from the 
Vietnam War and the resultant influx of veterans, should have spurred a Klan campaign.   
Arguments about sponsorship approach do a better, although not perfect, job of 
helping to explain the absence of a sustained Klan campaign during the 1970–1980s.  
What I call the “Sterling Ideal”—the argument that terrorist organizations rely on active 
support from third party actors—can’t be validated or invalidated by the Klan’s relative 
impotence during this period since a negative can’t prove a negative.  Worth noting is 
that there were few, if any, safe havens in which the Klan could operate; watchdog 
organizations and a professionalized police force saw to that.  As would be expected in 
the absence of such sanctuaries, the Klan was unable to sustain an actual terrorist 
campaign.   
Finally, arguments about the significance of organizational factors provide the 
greatest insight into the causes of the Klan’s failures during the period.  First, the Klan’s 
fractured, competing, and decentralized organizational structure prevented it from 
developing any coherent strategy, much less stringing together acts of terrorism toward 
some strategic end.  The leadership squabbles between Duke, Wilkinson, and Shelton 
made the Klan a laughingstock on the revolutionary right, a condition further exacerbated 
when Wilkinson’s affiliations with the FBI became public knowledge.  Finally, the Klan 
of the 1970–1980s lacked the ability to craft a recruitment message which resonated with 
the dominant social concerns of the day.   
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CHAPTER VII. RESULTS—A COMPARISON OF KU KLUX 
TERRORISM 
As analysis in the preceding four chapters suggests, no single approach 
adequately explains campaigns of Klan terrorism.  In this dissertation, four different 
periods of Klan violence have been examined in order to compare the three main 
approaches commonly used to explain terrorist campaigns: structural, sponsorship, and 
organizational.  The aim has been to use three waves of Klan terrorism (which this 
dissertation also recognizes as campaigns) to determine whether explanations for right 
wing terrorism commonly used in terrorism studies adequately predict or explain the 
emergence of sustained terrorism in a North American case. Eight different factors have 
been considered; economic recessions, the mass return of veterans, the presence of an 
ideological opponent, the presence of a third party sponsor, the presence of safe havens, 
and the structure, leadership, and recruitment techniques of an organization.  Many of the 
factors tested were present in a few but not all periods.  The factors were also tested 
against a negative case (the 1970/80s).  Using Mills Method of Agreement and 
Difference, these variations should raise a red flag and hint at factor necessity as we try to 
improve our logical understanding of the phenomenon.  The presence and/or absence of 
these factors across cases indicate one of two possibilities. First, by comparing the 
positive cases using Mill’s Method of Agreement, we can assess which factors are 
necessary and which are not.  If absent in one or more positive cases, a factor can be 
dismissed as spurious and unnecessary.  If present in each positive case, a factor should 
be recognized as a potentially necessary one. Second, using Mill’s Method of Difference, 
we compare the negative case (the “non-campaign” focused on a time period in which the 
Klan could only muster sporadic acts of terrorism, despite conditions that, theoretically, 
should have supported a sustained campaign) with the positive cases. This second 
comparison permits us to search for sufficient factors.  If present in the negative case, a 
factor or combination of factors is not sufficient to cause the outcome.  If present in only 
positive cases, a factor or combination of factors is sufficient to cause the outcome. 
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This chapter concludes that—broadly speaking—the organizational approach 
fares best in explaining Klan campaigns, followed by the sponsorship approach, and, 
finally, the structural approach.  This thesis asserts that although some theoretical 
approaches are better than others, none are adequate for either academic or policy 
purposes when used in isolation.  This is hardly front page news, as gadflies have been 
arguing as much for years.  None of them, however, have offered a better tool in 
response.  Given the fact no single approach proves adequate, the only solution is to 
sacrifice parsimony and elegance for explanatory value.  This said, we must begin to look 
for points of synthesis.  Through cross-study comparative analysis, it became apparent 
that an interplay between two of the approaches existed, suggesting an explanation yet to 
be fully explored in the realm of terrorism studies.   
The argument presented here is that terrorist campaigns result from the 
relationship between the organizational fit of a terrorist group to the presence or absence 
of a safe haven combined with the organization’s ability to frame a recruitment message 
which hides its underlying ideology yet ties into a preexisting dominant societal 
narrative.  The proper “fit” relies on the decision making skills of the group’s leaders.  
The concept of organizational “fit” builds on contingency theory, which grants primacy 
to a terrorist organization adapting its structure depending on the presence or absence of 
safe haven.  The remainder of this chapter offers supporting analysis. 
A. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
For purposes of clarification, each approach to terrorism tested offers, in essence, 
a “family” of variables.  Within these broadly-defined “families” reside factors 
commonly used to support the line of thought advanced by the approach.  For each period 
studied, both the approaches and the factors were tested to determine their presence or 
absence.  Following these tests, it is appropriate to first analyze the results broadly—at 
the “family” level—and then delve deeper into individual factors.  Table 1 summarizes 







recessions, ideological enemies, 
return of veterans) 
Sponsorship 
Approach 
(active support from third 


























Strongly Supported Strongly Supported 
Table 2.   Findings from Broad Analysis 
Comparing the periods, two of the explanatory approaches revealed consistent 
moderate to strong explanatory value (moderate defined as at least half the variables 
tested were present).  The strongest of these, the organizational approach, was robustly 
supported in each time period studied.  In fact, there are several instances when we 
observed concomitant variation between campaign intensity and changes in terrorist 
organizational structure. The sponsorship approach proved robust in two of the four 
periods, and was moderately supported by the remaining two.  Finally, the structural 
approach, which proved weakest, received strong support in only one campaign, 
moderate support in two, and weak support in the final instance.  Of the three factors 
tested under the structural approach, the return of war veterans as a “root” cause of Klan 
terrorism appears the closest to achieving necessity, but was undercut by the results of the 
final two periods.  The other variables—economic collapse and presence of an 
ideological enemy—were easier to dismiss.  Broad analysis—simply viewing each 
approach as a whole—could not eliminate any factors outright, but did serve to highlight 
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Table 3.   Findings of Systematic Review 
1.  Structural Factors Systematically Reviewed 
Looking first at the argument that economic recessions are a necessary factor in 
the emergence of Klan campaigns, we find only two instances when the explanation can 
be supported; during the 1860s and during the 1920s.  As Chapter III indicates, the 
Reconstruction Era was a time of economic devastation for the South.  For the duration of 
the Klan campaign (1867–1871), the South suffered economic hardship, a hardship that 
preceded the Klan campaign.  The utility of economic collapse as a predictor of terrorist 
campaigns also finds support in the 1920s.  Although the 1920s was a time of economic 
prosperity, between January 1920 and June 1921, the United States fell into a deep 
economic recession.  Unemployment climbed from 5.2% in 1919 to 11.7% in 1921, a 
crisis some attribute to the massive influx of veterans rejoining civil society.520  The 
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Klan, awakened in 1915, underwent dramatic growth in the summer of 1920, but the 
chronology suggests this growth is more likely attributed to the June 1920 hiring of a 
propaganda business.  Nonetheless, an economic recession was present during the time 
examined and has to be coded in that way.  The 1950s and 1960s were, quite simply, 
times of economic prosperity.  As such, citing economic recession fails to predict or 
explain the campaign of Klan violence during this period.  A decade of stagflation under 
the Carter administration in the 1970s should have led to a terrorist campaign.  Yet, a 
Klan campaign failed to emerge.  Through cross-study comparisons, significant economic 
recessions—present in only two of four studies—is deemed not necessary for the 
emergence of a Klan campaign.   
Seeking to bolster the findings from inter-case analysis, economic factors can be 
subjected to intra-case analysis. For instance, following the Civil War, the North was 
undeniably more prosperous than the South.  However, if we look at actual poverty 
levels, for many Northerners, the emerging post war society proved financially 
disastrous.  Historian Eric Foner highlights this economic disparity, stating “the 
unprecedented fortunes accumulated by the nation’s captains of commerce and industry 
helped create one of the highest levels of income inequality in all American history.”521  
In essence, poverty ravaged sections of the North, but was hidden by the overwhelming 
fortunes accumulated by businessmen when national average incomes were reported.  
However, the global economic recession from 1873-1879 did fail to produce a right wing 
campaign of significance in the North, despite the presence of abject poverty and slums 
in many major cities.  According to economic explanations for terrorism, the Ku Klux 
Klan should have found fertile recruiting ground among Northern slums.  History shows 
they did not; nor did any other right wing terrorist group.  In fact, the opposite occurred, 
as unions mobilized the poor to champion left wing causes. In sum, although poverty was 
rampant, campaigns of right wing terrorism were not.  
The final nail in the coffin for the significance of the economy as a factor is the 
fact that the Klan went on life support following the Great Depression of the 1930s.  
Economic explanations would predict a surge of coordinated Klan violence, but Klan 
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campaigns failed to materialize.  In fact, since 1866, there have been at least 30 instances 
of economic recessions (of varying magnitudes) in the United States, at least one per 
decade, and none of these generated a sustained Klan campaign.522  The relative 
inactivity of the Klan in the wake of the multiple economic crises calls the significance of 
economic recession as a catalyst into question.  Without a more detailed understanding of 
the social and psychological effects of economic crisis within varying specific 
environmental contexts, economic crisis as a determinative factor proves too imprecise.  
For these reasons, using economic crises, broadly defined, as a predictor to Klan 
terrorism campaigns is judged unnecessary.    
The second factor, the presence of an ideological opposite (in this case a left wing 
opponent) also fares poorly as the studies are compared.  Proponents of this explanation 
can point to the presence of the Union Leagues during Reconstruction and Martin Luther 
King’s SCLC during the Civil Rights Era.  The 1920s Klan advertised itself as anti-
Communist, pro-Prohibition, and pro-American at a time when there was no real 
Communist, anti-Prohibition, or anti-American organization worth mentioning.  
Although the NAACP took issue with the Klan’s racism, by this time the Klan had buried 
its racist ideology under a pitch of 100% Americanism, thus sidestepping a direct 
confrontation, and going so far as to publicly label the NAACP communist rather than 
opposing it on racial grounds.  Finally, the 1970–1980s Klan confronted an ideological 
opposite in the form of the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law 
Center.  Instead of developing a symbiotic campaign of opposition523, the Klan allowed 
itself to be destroyed through prosecution and lawsuits.  In other words, for the Klan of 
the 1970–1980s an ideological opposite spelled defeat rather than a springboard toward 
 
embarking upon a sustainable campaign of terrorism.  Failing in two of the four cases, the 
presence of a left wing opponent is also deemed an unnecessary factor for the emergence 
of Klan campaigns.  
                                                 
522 Victor Zarnowitz, Business Cycles : Theory, History, Indicators, and Forecasting, A National 
Bureau of Economic Research Monograph (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
523 The logic behind “symbiotic relationships” leading to campaigns of terrorism is discussed in 
Chapter II. 
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The presence of left wing opponents as an indicator of right wing campaigns also 
falls short when we conduct expanded analysis through intra-case study.  The 
Reconstruction Era once again provides such an opportunity.  If one sought had out “left 
wing organizations” to take up arms against, the North was home to most of them.  
Radical Republicanism was conceived in the North, and was a political ideology formed 
by a group of men who criticized even the fairly liberal ideas of President Lincoln for 
being too conservative.  Unions—a left wing concept—were also prominent throughout 
the post-war North. Again, campaigns of terrorism designed to oppose them were largely 
absent as the job of handling union riots fell to law enforcement and military personnel—
groups that, admittedly, took to the task with zeal.  The fact that the North was dominated 
by left wing activism and no right wing terrorist campaign developed to counter it to 
tends to undercut the idea that symbiotic relationships of terrorist activity are built from 
ideologically opposing enemies. 
With regards to an ideological opponent, what seems far more important than an 
actual organization that the Klan painted itself in contradiction with was the Klan’s 
ability to create an ideological opponent where one may not have existed.  The clearest 
example of this in the case of the Klan is the continual reliance upon fears of “white 
womanhood” being taken by lustful African Americans.  The fear—an unfounded one—
lives on today, as witnessed in the White Nationalist “14 Word” rally cry “because the 
beauty of the White Aryan woman must not perish from the earth.”524  Protection of 
white womanhood’s sanctity is a powerful theme that has existed since the creation of the 
Klan in 1866.  The Klan’s ability to paint Jews as an existential threat has existed since 
the 1920s, a powerful too carried on today through the belief that a Zionist Occupational 
Government is taking over the United States.  The fact that evidence of a mass rape of 
white women at the hands of black men or shred of proof that Jewish conspiracy actually 
 
 
                                                 
524 David Lane, “Open Letter to a Dead Race,”(2005), 
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exist is of minor concern.  What matters is the ability to paint both as ideological 
opponents, thus crafting a perceived threat out of the darkest corners of society’s 
collective minds.  
The final structural factor tested was the mass return of war veterans.  Beginning 
with the Reconstruction era study, it is difficult to argue that the return of veterans did not 
play a role in the resulting Klan campaign.  Klan ranks were built according to a military 
hierarchy and top leadership positions were filled by skilled Confederate generals.  Here, 
the ties between the Klan and military vets are too strong to dismiss.  During the 1920s 
the return of veterans was also a factor in Klan campaigns since soldiers were returning 
in droves with battlefield experiences from World War I.  A surge of doughboys had 
returned stateside by the end of 1919 and the subsequent massive demobilization dropped 
the overall military strength from wartime highs of around 4,000,000 to fewer than 
150,000.525  Although many military members joined the Klan upon their return, Klan 
leadership ranks were filled primarily by non-WWI veterans.  Because we must 
acknowledge the fact that a surge of vets did occur, we must code the factor as present.  
In contrast, 1950–1960s campaign was undertaken without a great influx of veterans.  
Further calling into question veterans as a critical factor is the fact that American soldiers 
were returning from the Vietnam War during the early 1970s, yet no Klan campaign 
erupted as a result.  Indeed, the war appears to have a greater impact on the rise of leftist 
terrorism during and after the veteran’s return.526  Providing explanatory support on even 
a generous interpretation in only two of the four studies, the presence of war veterans is 
declared unnecessary.   
Labeling the return of veterans to be an unnecessary factor gains additional 
support through intra-study analysis of the Reconstruction era Klan.  We must remember 
that the North also suddenly experienced a return of veterans.  Subsequently, the North 
experienced a surge of left wing activism, as labor unions began fighting for workers’ 
rights, standardized wages, shorter work days, and an expansion of educational 
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opportunities.527  Instead of joining terrorist organizations which urged collective 
violence, Northern vets joined organizations preaching collective politics.  Whereas the 
South leaned right after the war, the North leaned left.  It is no coincidence that while 
Klan violence plagued the South, the North experienced “the rise of liberalism.”528 
Again, this is not painting the North as a violence-free utopia.  When liberal collective 
politics failed, a string of left wing violence plagued the North.  Groups like the Molly 
Maguires, the Knights of Labor, and multiple anarchist organizations staged violent 
union strikes and bombings in the name of egalitarianism.  This underscores how 
inaccurate it is to argue that an influx of veterans translates into right wing terrorism. 
Again, although the return of veterans is dismissed as a necessary factor, the Ku 
Klux Klan has benefitted from the skills brought to it from military members—a point 
most poignantly made through the study of the Reconstruction era Klan.  During the 
1920s, sailors were photographed debarking from an aircraft carrier and putting on their 
Klan robes for a mass photo.529  During the 1980s, former Special Forces soldier Glenn 
Miller trained his North Carolina Klan right outside the gates of Fort Bragg, prompting 
gate guards to call in the training as a routine military exercise.530  Although the mass 
return of veterans does not equate directly to the initiation of a right wing terrorist 
campaign, when an organization is able to attract soldiers, the likelihood of a campaign is 
definitely enhanced by the skills a trained soldier brings to a militant organization.  Given 
the correct set of circumstances, welcoming trained military veterans into an organization 
can be a significant enhancer of terrorism.    
In conclusion, systematic review suggests the structural factors tested in this 
thesis are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain or predict campaigns of Klan 
terrorism.  Essentially, the use of structural explanations to predict and explain right wing 
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terrorism has to be considered a hit-or-miss affair.  This dissertation supports Dipak 
Gupta’s argument that “there can be wide ranging social, political, economic, and even 
religious grievances in the society, but, following the predictions of Olson’s Paradox531, 
these will not necessarily lead to violence.”  Instead, “violence takes place when a leader 
gives voice to the frustration by formulating a well-defined social construction of 
collective identity.”532    This dissertation thereby adds to a growing literature which 
argues structural explanations provide a comparatively weaker overall explanation of 
what enables, triggers, or sustains terrorist campaigns.533  Reliance on structural 
factors—especially economic ones—may prove useful on occasion, but the deeper one 
digs in analysis the more holes one finds.  Due to its overall inability to explain Klan 
campaigns, the structural approach, and the factors tested within it, are thus to be 
dismissed as neither necessary nor sufficient explanations. 
This is not to say that structural factors have no importance in the emergence of 
Klan campaigns, it just means they just do not provide as much of a “push” as many 
would have us believe.  Structural factors provide a terrorist organization an array of 
potential issues to build perceived threats and conspiracies from.  Some form of structural 
strain is present during every era of American existence.  Structural factors are important, 
therefore, only when a terrorist organization can make them important.  Alexis de 
Tocqueville once proclaimed that “the evils which were endured with patience so long as 
they were inevitable seem intolerable as soon as hope can be entertained about escaping 
from them.”534  What a successful terrorist organization (like the Klan) must be able to 
do is turn a “tolerable evil” into an intolerable existential threat in order to mobilize 
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support against it.  The more structural strains present for a terrorist organization to 
choose from, the greater the likelihood they will get it correct, and the greater the leeway 
the organization has in adopting a broad recruitment pitch that can encompass many of 
the issues at once (even if they are in contradiction to one another.)  A longitudinal study 
of the Klan suggests that far more important than structural factors is the organization’s 
ability to realize them and to ensure it addresses the concern in a way that has mass 
appeal.  Though structural factors may prove neither necessary nor sufficient, they can 
definitely aid a terrorist group by expanding the list of grievances and societal fears that 
the group can base a recruitment strategy from.       
2. Sponsorship Factors Systematically Reviewed 
The first of the tests conducted on the sponsorship approach was to determine 
whether a third party sponsor—in the form of a political party or foreign third party 
sponsor—was necessary to initiate and sustain a campaign of Klan terrorism.  Of all tests 
conducted, this particular explanation fared the worst.  In only one case—that of the 
Reconstruction Era—did the Klan expressly serve the interests of a political party to the 
point it could be considered a militant wing.  During the 1920s, it appears roles were 
reversed, to a degree that the Klan wielded so much power that politicians began to serve 
its interests.  During the 1950–1960s, politicians largely rejected association with the 
Klan, offered no support, and actively campaigned to fight its activities and ideology.  In 
the 1970–1980s the Klan did not have active support from a party or third party sponsor 
and, according to the predictions of the theory, did not initiate a campaign.  Scoring 
support in only two of the four studies, we could say the need for a third party sponsor 
was proved unnecessary for the emergence or sustainment of a Klan terrorist campaign. 
Although active support from a third party is deemed unnecessary, similar to 
many of the structural factors, the interactions between the Klan and political parties 
dramatically enhanced any campaign of terrorism where a relationship was forged.  
During the Reconstruction era, the tight relationship formed between the Democratic 
Party and Klan Imperial officers (who represented the party in numerous conventions and 
committees) helped strategically focus Klan violence to achieve political effects.  
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Considering that the Democratic Party had regained power in the South by the early 
1870s (and sooner), the relationship seemed to be beneficial to both.  During the 1920s, 
after the Klan possessed the size to influence votes, the relationships built with politicians 
prevented anti-mask laws from being implemented, provided a degree of legitimacy to 
the Klan, allowing it to spread and sustain operations throughout the country.  These 
associations were absent during the final two periods studied, partly because the Klan no 
longer possessed the strength to impact electoral outcomes, and partly because of the 
sullied reputation of the organization.  Far from being the active support tested for in this 
dissertation, a co-dependency between the Klan and national parties was noted as an 
enhancing factor of the campaigns.    
The second of the variables in the sponsorship approach—the presence of 
geographical, legal, or judicial safe havens—yields the first necessary factor of our 
comparisons.  The presence of a safe haven was noted during the first three periods 
examined.  In the 1970–1980s when the Klan was unable to trigger a campaign, it was 
constantly under pressure and lacked both active and tacit support.  The intensity of 
campaigns also dovetailed with the presence or absence of sanctuaries.  The number and 
overall geographic size of safe havens directly impacted both the geographic spread of 
Klaverns and the duration of their terrorist campaigns.  The more significant the safe 
haven provided, the more powerful and more sustained Klan campaigns became.  In three 
of the periods, the Klan actively increased the scale of its available safe havens by 
recruiting law enforcement personnel into its ranks.  During the 1920s, the Klan was able 
to court Supreme Court justices and, according to more than a few narratives, even won 
the sympathy of the President of the United States (if not his actual membership).  The 
presence of a safe haven can thus be considered a proximate factor upon which a terrorist 
campaign depends. 
In summary, the argument that a terrorist organization requires the active support 
of some third party actor proves neither necessary nor sufficient.  However, tacit forms of 
support, such as law enforcement turning a blind did lead to safe havens from which the 
Klan was able to operate.  Present in each of the campaigns studied and absent in the 
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outlier case, the presence of safe havens is determined to be necessary.  However, based 
on a close-up analysis of the cases, this factor was not individually sufficient. 
3. Organizational Factors Systematically Reviewed 
The first of the organizational factors tested, organizational structure, revealed a 
great deal about the emergence and sustainability of Klan campaigns.  The Klan was both 
unified and hierarchical when waging its most powerful campaigns.  Although debates 
rage over the span of operational control Forrest, Simmons, and Evans actually 
possessed, the degree to which Klans were able to coordinate across Realms (cross-state 
operations) reflects a higher degree of operational control than usually afforded them.535  
In what I consider to be a moderately strong campaign—the 1950–1960s—the Klan was 
initially fractured, but began to unify under Shelton and the UKA.  This was concomitant 
with an increase in campaign activity.  During the 1970–1980s, a completely atomized 
and internally fractured Klan could not generate a campaign of any significance.  Rather 
than offering visions for the beginning of some grand new campaign, Louis Beam 
advocated that the Klan operate on the basis of Leaderless Resistance in the early 1980s.  
Fighting for survival in the face of an aggressive opponent, Beam realized a cellular 
organization was far more resistant to law enforcement efforts than a hierarchical 
organization would be.  In each period studied, the presence of a hierarchical 
organization proved a necessary factor.                      
The second organizational factor considered also has to be considered necessary.  
The charisma and managerial effectiveness—i.e., leadership—of Klan leaders had a 
profound impact upon the overall effectiveness of the organization during each period 
studied.  In two instances, the failure of leadership led to the downfall of the Klan; in 
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another it prevented a campaign from emerging.  In the instances of downfall, the 
Imperial Wizard failed to recognize that support from law enforcement and local judges 
had dried up.  Motivated by power and greed, leaders in both the 1920s and 1950–1960s 
failed to decentralize in order to survive.  During the 1970s, an overall absence of 
leadership prevented any possibility of campaign emergence.  When a charismatic 
candidate did emerge in the form of David Duke, he was publicly trashed by opposing 
Klan leaders. 
Klan leaders who were motivated by ideology—Forrest for example—proved 
more successful than those motivated by wealth or power.  Unfortunately for the Klan, 
more of its leaders largely were attracted by the latter.  A leader’s ability to recognize his 
operational environment and alter the organization to fit within it remains the most 
critical aspect of leadership, an aspect that will be flushed out in greater detail in the 
following chapter.  Charisma turns out to have been most important as a leadership factor 
immediately before and during the initial phase of each campaign.  Management skills 
appeared to be a more important factor following the opening months of a campaign.   
Finally, recruitment techniques also proved necessary to sustain a campaign of 
terrorism.  Where racism remained prevalent, the Klan’s core message—fear of blacks—
worked well as a recruitment pitch.  What is more remarkable is that, where racism 
became less socially acceptable, successful Klans were able to bury their racist messages 
under more socially palatable and accepted themes.  The centrality of crafting a resonant 
message was powerfully demonstrated during the 1920s when publicity experts had a 
major impact on the success of that era’s Klan.  The inability of the 1970–1980s Klan to 
craft such a message all but ensured its failure.  Clinging to an openly racist message—
during a period when other right wing groups enjoyed immense success by adopting an 
anti-government, anti-tax message—proved to be the Achilles heel for modern Klans.  
Second, the ability to propagate the message also proved critical.  During the 
Reconstruction period, the Klan was able to transmit messages and coordinate activity 
through the use of Democratic newspapers.  The 1920s Klan took matters into its own 
hands and developed an external newsletter (sold at newsstands) and an internal one (sent 
to each den) to maintain both external expansion and internal cohesion.  In contrast, the 
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ability to control the message proved beyond the 1950–1960s and 1970–1980s KKK.  
Neither had the resources to generate quality newsletters.  Nor did they enjoy sympathy 
from media outlets that might have propagated their message for free.  Instead, the Klan 
relied on various leaflets and shoddy internal newsletters (which often attacked other 
Klan leaders) and phone networks (which automatically limited leaders’ span of message 
control). 
In summary, all organizational factors tested within this dissertation proved 
necessary and jointly sufficient.  This finding builds on the argument that terrorist 
organizations possess agency, and that terrorist campaigns owe more to the “pull” factors 
associated with organizations rather than to macro-level “push” factors found within 
society at large. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Following analysis of the tests conducted in each study, four variables—presence 
of safe havens, organizational structure, leadership, and recruitment techniques—proved 
necessary factors in explaining campaigns of Klan terrorism.  Although necessary, there 
is scant evidence to suggest that any one of the factors is individually sufficient.  The 
following chapter offers an argument which suggests two specific relationships between 
variables are required to make these individually necessary factors jointly sufficient.           
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CHAPTER VIII. THE ARGUMENT  
Thus far, evidence points to a strong interplay between one factor from the 
sponsorship approach (the presence of a safe haven) and three factors from the 
organizational approach (organizational structure, leadership, and recruitment 
techniques).  This chapter lays out the pathway—from initiation point to establishment of 
campaign—through which the Ku Klux Klan was able to string together acts of terrorism 
over multiple years in pursuit of organizational goals by combining these factors.  The 
first kind of interplay involves the presence or absence of safe havens in relation to the 
organizational structure chosen by Klan leaders.  The second kind of interplay focuses on 
the ability of the Klan to downplay its core ideology and effectively frame a recruitment 
message which resonates with a pre-existing dominant social narrative—a narrative 
usually based on mythologized history or an unfalsifiable belief system.     
A. TRIGGER POINTS FOR CAMPAIGNS OF TERRORISM 
The road to a terrorist campaign does not begin without a cause. Or, informally 
speaking, it takes a spark to start a fire.  In 1971, James Davies advanced the argument 
that “people who are insecure in the satisfaction of their physical, social-affectional, or 
dignity needs form the dry tender of revolution.”536  Christopher Hewitt advanced the 
idea, and concluded that terrorism is a product of “those who can see little chance of 
getting what they want through normal political channels.”537  In other words, societal 
insecurity born of political isolation (or marginalization) serves as the spark for terrorism.  
This dissertation’s findings support their argument, as political initiatives served, in one 
form or another, as the initiation points for all three Klan campaigns studied.  
If we understand Klan campaigns as wildfires, it is not necessarily the spark 
which determines the eventual scope of destruction, but the spark was nonetheless 
necessary to start the fire.  Each campaign described in this dissertation began with a 
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spark, but the duration and intensity of what followed were products of other factors 
(discussed in the following sections).  Although each period studied which had its own 
unique social, political, and economic context, they all shared one common factor: a 
distinct political cause which triggered the Klan’s terrorist campaign.  In each instance, 
there was a distinct threat of disruption to the societal status quo through either political 
initiatives or emerging social movements (which themselves threatened political 
disruption).  Violence flared in each campaign in the wake of Congressional action. 
The trigger point for the 1860s campaign is fairly obvious.  The 1867 passage of 
the First and Second Reconstruction Acts by a Republican-dominated Congress lit the 
fuse for what would become the first, most violent campaign of Klan terrorism.  The 
Reconstruction Acts effectively placed the South under military control and gave 
Congress final word on when a state could be readmitted into the national government.  
As chapter 3 discussed, the changes demanded by Radical Republicans were dramatic –
and the Klan professed to be the tool needed to prevent these changes.  History suggests 
the Klan was largely correct.     
Understanding what triggered the 1920s Klan proves slightly more difficult, as 
multiple societal changes swept the country simultaneously.  In contrast to what occurred 
in the 1860s, ideas in the 1920s were to be rallied around, not defended against.  The 
most obvious were amendments prohibiting the sale or production of liquor and those 
granting women equal voting rights.  The 18th and 19th Amendments were passed in 
October 1919 and August 1920, respectively, and both shook American society in 
dramatic ways. Through shrewd maneuvering, the Klan managed to capitalize on both.  
As Chapter 4 indicated, the most common tie between the Klans across the nation was 
their vigilante role as an under-the-table means to curb bootlegging.  As anti-bootleggers, 
the Klan derived ardent support from women, to whom they professed themselves to be 
champions of suffrage—as long as women voted to maintain Prohibition, maintain proper 
moral standards, and continue in their role as subservient housewives.  Female Klan 
auxiliary units were formed in the name of women’s suffrage, only to later be used 
exclusively for Klan purposes which had little or nothing to do with women’s rights.  In  
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fact, the Klan eventually took up arms against women it deemed too progressive. Voting 
in line with Klan views was one thing; women acting in non-traditional manners was 
something entirely different.   
Less studied, but perhaps more important for laying the groundwork for societal 
beliefs in the 1920s were wartime initiatives crafted to spur nationalism.  The 1920s Klan 
benefitted from the Sedition Act of 1918, an act originally designed in 1917 to curb pro-
German sentiments by compelling Americans to demonstrate their loyalty.  The 1917 act 
was amended in 1918 to urge citizens to take up arms against communists, and was both 
cause and effect of the communist Red scare that swept the country.  The Klan, “100% 
Americans” all, cast itself as anti-communist, and vowed to protect the country from 
overseas socialist programs, or any other threat to American life.  Remarkably, by the 
mid-1920s, the Klan had managed to merge a pro-American, pro-Prohibition, pro-
women’s suffrage, anti-women’s liberation, anti-communist, anti-black, anti-union, anti-
rich, anti-Jew, and anti-Catholic message into a popular recruitment program.   
The trigger for the 1950s Klan hearkened back to the original aims of Radical 
Reconstruction.  Nearly one hundred years after slavery ended, on May 17, 1954, the 
Supreme Court rendered a decision against segregation in public schools.  The Klan took 
arms to prevent desegregation.  For three years following the Brown v Board of 
Education decision, the Klan launched a bombing campaign, led primarily by Eldon 
Edwards’ U.S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.  Activity decreased between 
1958 and 1960, but picked up again within a year’s time, as the Civil Rights movement 
began to demand greater equality for Southern blacks.  Klan bombings, lynchings, and 
murder became the theme of resistance.  Ultimately, this Klan terrorism campaign would 
undermine its own stated objectives.  Here, it is ironic that the violence used to prevent 
racial integration may have played a major role in the eventual realization of Civil Rights 
by bringing national attention to the issue of Klan terrorism.  Says the head of the 





four little girls in the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church—a tragedy that drew 
national attention to the serious issue of Klan terrorism—we may still be living in a more 
segregated society.”538    
The Klan of the 1970s/1980s was unable to cast itself either in opposition to or 
support of a political initiative.  The Klan’s inability to weave its racist message into any 
prevailing social concern essentially spelled its demise.  While other competing groups 
began to promote a unified anti-government theme, the Klan remained in its own 
ideological purgatory, unable to effectively craft a message to fit the social issues of the 
day, or to graft a broadly accepted history onto its operations.  Whereas a keen ear 
regarding societal concerns and the ability to mobilize around political initiatives had 
once been the Klan’s strength, modern leaders proved themselves politically tone deaf. 
Igniting a fire is one thing.  Keeping it fed is a different matter.  This chapter has 
thus far explained how Klan terrorist campaigns were triggered; the following section 
focuses on campaign growth and sustainment. 
B. EXPLAINING CAMPAIGNS OF KLAN TERRORISM 
Given an almost 150-year existence, the Klan has managed to sustain terrorist 
campaigns for a little over fifteen percent of that time.  Naturally, would say “redneck 
violence” is unacceptable by today’s societal standards and, therefore, nothing to worry 
about.  The fact that there were over 750 racist hate groups in the United States in 2006 
indicates the racist message is not quite as unacceptable as many would like to think.539  
In fact, had a Klan member not gotten cold feet and gone to the FBI, it is likely a 1997 
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between 10,000 to 30,000 people as a huge fireball first engulfed the community and a 
then released a cloud of lethal “sour gas.”540  Domestic terrorism is not a threat we can 
discount as a relic of the past.             
Thus for practical and not just theoretical reasons, it is critically important to 
understand how and when the Klan had the power to string together acts of terrorism into 
a sustainable campaign.  This dissertation submits by taking into account organizational 
contingency theory as well as the Klan’s ability to effectively frame messages we can 
better understand Klan campaigns than by applying any other theory of terrorism 
commonly espoused today.  According to contingency theory, “the most effective 
organizational structure” varies “according to the situation of the organization.”541   If an 
organization seeks to maximize its overall performance, it must be sure that “there is a fit 
between the organizational structure and contingency.”542  Put another way, 
“contingency theorists try to predict the performance or effectiveness of an organization 
based on the extent to which the organization’s structure matches contextual 
contingencies such as organizational size, technology, and the environment.”543  In 2008, 
Abdulkader Sinno applied contingency theory to explain the outcomes of multiple 
Afghan conflicts.  His findings are impressive, as they explain the success or failure of 
multiple Islamic militant groups.  The fact he analyzed how organizational structures 
adapted to fit their given environment make his argument relevant to this study of the Ku 
Klux Klan.544  Whereas Sinno defined success as the political outcomes of battlefield 
engagements, success for the Klan as a terrorist organization can be measured according 
to its ability to sustain significant terrorist activity over the span of consecutive years.  
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According to Sinno the presence or absence of a safe haven is critically important.  
In Sinno’s words, a safe haven “is a portion of the contested territory where an 
organization’s rivals cannot intervene with enough force to disturb its operations.”545  By 
using this definition, Sinno is adopting a traditional (typically COIN-centric) view of a 
safe haven since his inclusion of the term “territory” automatically places primacy on 
control over a geographic area.  It is here where I part ways with Sinno.  This dissertation 
suggests there is value in broadening the notion of safe haven for application to the 
domain of terrorism.  From a terrorism studies perspective, Sinno’s definition is 
unnecessarily reductive, for terrorists rarely seek to establish or control territory from 
which to operate.  Paul Pillar, former deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center 
and now director of Georgetown’s Security Studies Graduate Programs, recently 
highlighted the limited usefulness of geography by asking “how important to terrorist 
groups is any physical safe haven?”546  His answer?  Not as much as we tend to believe.  
Michael Innes followed up on Pillar’s argument, asserting that “Washington needs to 
broaden and diversify its understanding of safe havens if it intends to end them.”547  This 
dissertation agrees, and, thus has considered safe havens to include legal, judicial, and 
societal factors which provide terrorist organizations the operational freedom necessary 
to carry out a campaign of terrorism. 
Definitional differences aside, Sinno submits that where a safe haven exists, a 
centralized organization will prove more effective than a decentralized one.  His 
argument rests on a widely held belief that a centralized organization is far more efficient 
at formulating and implementing a strategy, coordinating efforts among organization 
members, mobilizing resources, enforcing discipline, developing intraorganizational 
cohesion, and generating and preserving knowledge.548 Conversely, where there is no 
safe haven, a decentralized organization makes sense since it can be more resilient.  The 
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study of Klan terrorist campaigns supports these findings.549  The graphic depiction 
below, based off the findings of this dissertation, provides readers a basic overview of 
this argument.    
 
Figure 1.   The Pathway to Terrorism Campaigns 
1. The Relationship Between Organizational Structure and Safe Havens 
This dissertation finds that the presence of legal, societal, and/or judicial safe 
havens was a necessary condition for the emergence of a Klan terrorist campaign.  In the 
case of the Klan this meant the ability to carry out specific acts of terrorism when law 
enforcement, politicians, media outlets, and society either turned a blind eye or actively 
assisted.  When and where the Klan was provided such freedom of operational maneuver, 
a centralized organizational design proved far more effective in generating and sustaining 
terrorist campaigns.  To clarify the concept, a period-by-period overview is provided.    
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During the 1860s, the Klan enjoyed legal and judicial immunity throughout most 
areas of the former Confederate state.  Even before the Civil War began, paterollers—
groups of men that hunted down slaves or were called to “enforce discipline” on 
plantations—were an accepted facet of Southern life.  The fear of slave insurrections and 
the subsequent overthrow of the government were foremost in the minds of plantation 
owners and politicians of the day—a fear rendered real by the successful slave-led 1791-
1804 revolution in Haiti. 
Drawing from widely held convictions about scientific racism (discussed more 
fully below), violence committed against blacks was viewed as a necessary evil.  Among 
many whites, it was widely accepted as the only method through which to control a 
particularly dangerous segment of society.  In the words of Carl Schurtz, “the maiming 
and killing of colored men seems to be looked upon by many as one of those venial 
offenses which must be forgiven to the outraged feelings of a wronged and robbed 
people.”550  Following the emancipation of the slaves, anti-black violence was considered 
even more forgivable as blacks no longer had a “master” responsible for their actions and 
would thus require the collective; disciplining required collective efforts of the entire 
community.  Although blacks could be legally taken to court for their crimes, this was a 
time-consuming process, and community leaders felt more immediate, extrajudicial 
means of punishment were necessary to keep the black community in check.   
Only a small ideological shift was required to turn the wrath of the Klan from 
former slaves to the scalawags and carpetbaggers who advocated on their behalf.  To the 
white Southern community, this was the ultimate betrayal; the Radical Republicans were 
actively planting the seeds for a Haitian-like slave revolt in the South.  To make matters 
worse, these were whites who, in the eyes of many Southerners, should have had the 
intelligence to realize what they were doing.  The election of blacks to state offices—the 
first step towards “black rule” of the South—was viewed as a clear precursor to revolt.  
Disenfranchising Confederate soldiers was taken as further evidence of Northern hatred  
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for the South.  In an effort to maintain stability and prevent revolution, law enforcement 
organizations and politicians left the Klan to its work.  A safe haven was thus theirs for 
the taking, and the 1860s Klan made the most of this. 
Enjoying a virtual dominion over the South, the 1860s Ku Klux Klan was created 
on a military template.  The national organization—called the Empire—was designed to 
be run by a Grand Wizard; each state—or Realm—had a Grand Dragon who reported to 
the Imperial Headquarters.  Each realm was broken down into congressional districts, 
called Dominions, and further by counties, or Provinces.  Each level of command was 
assigned a certain number of staff positions to be filled, and all state officers and above 
had to be selected through an elaborate voting process.   
Historical accounts often portray the 1860s Klan as more organizationally 
decentralized than this dissertation finds it to have been.551 Accounts often claim the 
1860s Klan was organizationally tight at the local levels, but missing a link somewhere 
between the Dens and Realms.  These narratives also classify organizations such as the 
White Camellias and Pale Faces as rival groups to the national Klan.  This thesis deviates 
from these views of the Klan.  Ample evidence exists to suggest the Klan was capable of 
trans-Dominion and trans-Realm coordination.  The relationship between the Klan and 
other white supremacist organizations in the South also bore a greater resemblance to a 
semi-cooperative 1970s Palestine Liberation Organization than to any extant competing 
individual groups. Some historians argue that these other organizations were simply a 
front for a Forrest-controlled Klan; designed to create even greater confusion about Klan 
activity.552 
Although most communications records between the Grand Wizard, Grand 
Dragons, and Grand Titans were burned around 1869, evidence suggests Forrest and his 
Dragons played more of an operational role than they are normally credited with.  First, 
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Forrest filled each state leadership position with former Confederate generals, many of 
which were personal friends.  Second, he visited them on his normal railroad insurance 
rounds.  Men like General George Gordon (Tennessee Grand Dragon), General John 
Morgan (Alabama), General Robert Shaver (Arkansas), General John Gordon (Georgia), 
and General Zacariah George (Mississippi) were but a few of his personal associates.  
Operating under the military maxim “centralized control, decentralized execution,” these 
men were given initial marching orders via a Prescript, updated by periodic strategic 
guidance from the Memphis headquarters, and provided operational freedom of 
maneuver from Forrest.   
The Prescript and other documents were found in each Den.  Members knew their 
place in the hierarchy and acted accordingly.  The Prescript established a method of 
secret communications which allowed Klansmen—in theory at least—to meet and 
operations without curious bystanders knowing the actual content of the discussion.  
Prominent Klan leaders—many former Confederate officers themselves—ensured tight 
local hierarchy and obedience to the Grand Wizard through their respective Grand 
Dragons.  With this organization, and such a safe haven in which to operate, the 1860s 
Klan went on to lead what many consider a successful insurgent campaign which ensured 
that white supremacy continued for several decades thereafter. 
The 1920s Klan did not enjoy as free of a hand as its predecessor, but it still 
operated in an environment in which violence remained acceptable against certain people.  
For example, between 1882 and 1934 over five thousand people—mainly Southern black 
men—were murdered by lynch mobs.  In Georgia alone, 549 people were lynched, and 
the state responded by prosecuting a grand total of one person for the campaign of 
death.553  Although violence was still the norm between 1880 and 1915, very little should 
be attributed to the Klan as an organization; in the words of Klan historian David 
Chalmers “if the baser sort rode out at night, it was not as a Klansman.”554  Also, safe 
havens were still readily available.          
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For instance, more than 30,000 ministers, police and judges joined the 1920s 
Klan, a combination which simultaneously provided moral legitimization and legal and 
judicial safe havens.  In Atlanta, Georgia, “everybody in the courthouse belonged to the 
Klan, virtually every judge, the prosecuting officers…all the police and the mayor and 
the councilmen.”555  In Oklahoma, the Klan was used as an effective arm of the law 
bringing bootleggers to justice.  Further north, following multiple acts of Klan/police 
collusion, Oregon Governor Ben Olcott commented that “we woke up one morning and 
found the Klan had about gained political control of the state…not a word had been 
raised against them.”556  Thanks to the widely propagated, surprisingly popular myth that 
portrayed the Klan as “defenders of the Lost Cause,” the Klan found a sympathetic 
population nationwide.  Due to its broad appeal and ability to deliver votes, few 
politicians or law enforcement officials dared act against it.  The 1920s Klan was 
therefore able to break its Southern boundaries and find safe havens across the country.    
Choosing the proper structure in the presence of such safety, the 1920s Klan 
established an even tighter hierarchy than had its Reconstruction predecessor.  Imperial 
Wizard William Joseph Simmons would alter the national organization by only a few 
degrees with the release of new Klan policies contained in The Kloran (which like the 
new name for the organization’s leader, was apparently intended to be a grander title than 
Prescript.)  The organization was a rather simple one before 1920. But having grown 
from a mere 3,000 members in 1919 to over 800,000 by 1921, the Klan required a 
significant organizational redesign to manage its people.557  To better control its growing 
numbers (and its bankroll), Simmons authorized the establishment of the Propagation 
Department, and named Edward Clarke the Imperial Kleagle—or chief of staff—
responsible for managing finances and personnel.  Subsequently, each level of command 
received a staff responsible for personnel issues.  This staff was also responsible for 
coordinating events, scheduling educational seminars, and selecting ministers to spread 
                                                 
555 MacLean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry : The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan, 18. 
556 Thomas J. Shelley, “The Oregon School Case and the National Catholic Welfare Conference,” The 
Catholic Historical Review Vol 75, no. No. 3 (July 1989). 
557 Newton, The Ku Klux Klan : History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of 
America's Most Notorious Secret Society, 15. 
 206
the reach of the Klan.  Except for the addition of an “Emperor”—a figurehead position 
created to pacify Simmons after his ouster—and the addition of a logistical wing, the Ku 
Klux Klan retained a structure remarkably similar to that of the Reconstruction era Klan.  
The main difference was that more power was held at the top, requiring greater 
communication from the Realms to the Imperial Headquarters.  Again, this centralization 
proved effective as the Klan prospered throughout the country, swelling to over 
4,000,000 hooded members and gaining political prominence as it grew. 
Following the 1925 scandal involving Indiana Grand Dragon D.C. Stevenson, the 
once united organization began to unravel.  The benefits of centralized command would 
be further forfeited following the 1949 death of Imperial Wizard Dr. Samuel Green.  
Green was the lynchpin who held many Klaverns within the orbit of the Atlanta 
Headquarters.  After a heart attack unexpectedly took his life, many groups broke away 
from the national headquarters and set out on their own.  Decentralization was underway, 
and not by strategic design.  
Locating a safe haven from which to operate would grow increasingly difficult 
following the downfall of the 1920s Klan.  Whereas the 1860s Klan found refuge broadly 
throughout the South and the 1920s Klan flourished nationally, the 1950s Klan only 
found small pockets of sanctuary in the Deep South.  Most active in Georgia, Alabama, 
South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, and North Carolina, the Klan—for once—began to 
face broad opposition from a previously friendly law enforcement community, as well as 
from politicians (pressured by leaders of commerce) who realized racist violence was bad 
for their city’s trade.  By the late 1950s, the Klan no longer had the numbers—which 
could translate into votes—to appeal to politicians.  Caught in a broader environment that 
had largely turned against racist ideology and no longer protected by politicians at the 
national level, the Klan felt the pressure and only found relief in areas where lawmen 
remained sympathetic; havens had largely dried up to a few scattered locales.    
As 1954 approached with the Brown v. Board of Education ruling which triggered 
the third major campaign of Ku Klux terrorism, the Ku Klux Klan was in organizational 
disarray.  At least eight similar-sized Klan organizations existed in 1954, many of which 
would splinter further the following year.  This decentralizing trend was soon reversed 
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thanks to an auto mechanic from Atlanta.  By 1956, Eldon Edwards was able to reunify 
several of the independent Klans and could boast command over 10,000 Klansman in 
eight different states by the close of the year.558  Edwards’ unexpected death in 1960 
would lead to further consolidation under Robert Shelton.  Upon assuming the title of 
Imperial Wizard, Shelton went to work merging the competing Klans.  By 1964, Shelton 
commanded the allegiance of the largest unified Klan front—an organization consisting 
of approximately 4,500 members spread through one hundred and eleven Klaverns in 
seven different states.559 
Although Shelton commanded the largest contingent of Klansmen, his was not the 
only hooded organization to lay claim to the Klan brand.  At least fourteen other Klan 
organizations—most having fewer than one hundred members—were in competition with 
Shelton’s United Klans of America.   According to FBI reports, these leaders found little 
common ground: 
Klan leaders are opportunistic, unscrupulous, ruthless men who are 
constantly sparring for power and vying with each other for leadership and 
control of the various Klans.  Each organization engages in what amounts 
to guerrilla warfare with the others. 560 
The UKA boasted, by far, the largest membership among the rival Klans, but the 
moderately decentralized nature of the Klan prevented the same overall strategic mobility 
or coordinating prowess demonstrated by the 1860s and 1920s Klans.  Additionally, 
unable to enforce discipline within its ranks, the Klan was torn apart from the inside, as 
unsatisfied defectors gladly spoke with investigators, and FBI informants replaced those 
who left.  Even at its most centralized point, the Klan was no longer organizationally 
capable of coordinating and executing a strong, sustained campaign.  The constant 
infighting only exacerbated these shortcomings.   
Without a safe haven from which to operate, the post-Civil Rights Klan 
decentralized and, whether intentionally or as a byproduct of internal fisticuffs, adopted a 
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cellular structure which, in turn, maximized its chances of survival while minimizing the 
chances of sustainable terrorist actions.  Paranoia about law enforcement infiltration 
became the common theme of Klans throughout the country, and rarely would one group 
coordinate with another for fear of passing information to an FBI informant. The second 
order effect of this organizational decentralization was the wholesale inability of the Klan 
to direct or sustain a campaign of terrorism.  The atomized Klan of the late 1970s and 
1980s fostered sporadic “lone wolf” acts of terrorism, but following these acts, the 
offending Klansman would invariably be hunted down and jailed while the Klan to which 
he belonged would often disavow any relations with him.   
Gone too were the days of sympathetic mythologized history and political top-
cover.  Now in competition with neo-Nazi, militia, survivalist, and “Patriot” groups, the 
Klan became the laughingstock of the radical right.  Says one right wing terrorism expert, 
“the rest of the radical right looks down their noses at them today, seeing them, 
essentially, as buffoons or trailer trash.”561  In fact, the Klan itself became the victim of 
mythologized history, as many today view Klansmen—past and present—as uneducated 
rednecks, a claim that is more fiction than fact when considering the entire legacy of the 
Klan.     
 
Figure 2.   The Pathway to Terrorism Campaigns (2nd Stage) 
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2. The Power of Effective Framing 
Tailoring an organization’s structure to the presence of safe havens is critically 
important, but is only one piece of the puzzle.  A terrorist organization is destined to die 
without an effective method to sustain members and grow in size.  This points to a 
group’s ability to recruit.  The following section will explore both the content and the 
distribution methods of Klan recruitment messages.  Akin to the “fit” between an 
organizational structure and the environment, a recruitment pitch must possess a similar 
fit with beliefs at large in society.  A concept that social movement scholars dub framing, 
defines this interplay as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 
“world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, 
experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.”562  
Following the crafting of a proper frame, important aspects for terrorist messaging are 
specifying diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational tasks.  Diagnostic tasks pertain to the 
assigning of blame for whatever grievance the organization has decided to adjust its 
frame to.  For the Klan, African Americans have always served the lead role, although 
various other groups have has their turn as Klan targets.  Prognostic tasks define for an 
organization the remedies required to eliminate either the people or structures that have 
been assigned blame.  Finally, motivational tasks are those which keep individual 
members together in a cohesive unit and compel them to violence.563               
Klan recruitment messages have varied wildly according to the societal context at 
the time.  The most effective messages were ones in which leaders correctly assessed the 
ills of society, assigned blame for those ills, and offered the Klan as the remedy—
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meeting the framing, diagnostic, and prognostic task sets.  While recruitment messages 
were tweaked over the years, a few underlying concepts remained constant.  The first 
deals with a Klan promise to “defend the sanctity of white womanhood,” a concept which 
has appealed to white males throughout time.  Second is a promotion of the white race as 
superior to all others; this has had diminishing appeal since the 1860s.  The ability to 
weave these beliefs into recruitment messages—in some cases, purposefully downplaying 
them—has proven critical. 
The Reconstruction era Klan’s recruitment message focused on the Klan’s role as 
the last bastion of Southern defense against Northern aggression.  That the North was 
actually drawing down troop strength, packing up, and heading home, was irrelevant. The 
Klan capitalized Southerners’ conviction that the South was being forced into subjugation 
by Northern policies, and it manipulated its tone to fit the vocabulary of the southern 
gentleman.  Proclaiming itself, “an Institution of Chivalry, Humanity, Mercy, and 
Patriotism,” the 1860s Klan buried its racist ideology under a veil of Southern patriotism 
and defensive action.564 With this effective frame in hand, the Klan then addressed its 
diagnostic tasks.  The Klan effectively painted Union Leagues as the embodiment of 
Radical Republican efforts to undermine Southern society and demanded Klan members 
focus their violence on League members and supporters.  It was not difficult to expand 
the scope of violence by re-aligning these message frames to include scalawags, 
carpetbaggers, schoolteachers, and Republicans.  To rid the South of its problems, the 
Klan prescribed terrorist action, and motivated its members with the appeal of clandestine 
socialization and fraternity.    
In 1915, Simmons largely missed in matching the Klan’s message to the social 
narrative of the time.  Simmons sought to sell the Klan as the heir of the Reconstruction 
era’s saviors of the South.  Launched on the heels of The Birth of a Nation, this message 
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had some appeal, but not enough to spur rapid growth.  This would change in 1920 when 
broadly-crafted Klan messages—drafted by propaganda experts—fastened onto 
America’s dominant social narrative.   
The 1920s Klan led with a theme of “100% Americanism,” offering law 
enforcement a hand in cleaning the streets of bootleggers, loose women, communist 
sympathizers, and troublemakers.  Klan recruiters were given a broad theme and were 
told to adapt it to local conditions.565  According to one narrative, “there were no typical 
Klansmen and no single reason for belonging to the Ku Klux Klan...E.Y. Clarke and 
associates organized a highly flexible public relations campaign with appeals and 
propaganda that could easily be adapted to suit the distinctive moods, fears and desires of 
individuals.”566  Though this framing it produced situations in which the program in one 
area would contradict a program in another, the approach was successful in gathering foot 
soldiers under the Klan tent.  Where messages in support of Prohibition resonated, the 
Klan diagnosed bootleggers as the social ill.  Where an anti-Catholic message resonated, 
Catholics were targeted.  All immigrants, being non-American by Klan definition, were 
appropriate recipients of targeted terrorist action.  When the opportunity presented itself, 
the Klan reframed its message to better appeal to the emerging fundamentalist movement, 
shifting targets to include loose women, immoral men, and those who were perceived to 
not embody Protestant values.   
The recruitment content of the 1860s and the 1920s Klan resonated well among a 
broad population.  Recruitment efforts after 1950 had far less appeal.  The 1950s Klan 
reverted to an overtly racist recruitment pitch only to find it no longer resonated.  The 
Klan’s pool of respectable recruits had effectively dried up.  Here is the FBI’s 
description: 
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The Klan, for the most part, is composed of individuals of mediocre background, 
limited education, and an extremely narrow, fanatical outlook who, except for the 
Negro, are usually at or near the bottom of the social ladder567       
The Klan attempted to frame social problems in the form of school desegregation, a 
message that had limited appeal nationwide.  Preferred targets, of course, were African 
Americans—especially those who attempted to demand equality in social standing or 
education. Armed with a recruitment pitch that targeted only a narrow swath of society, 
the Klan could only muster about 15,000 scattered between its three strands.  With 
limited safe havens and only moderately effective message framing techniques the 1950–
1960s Klan was eventually defeated by the Civil Rights movement and national law 
enforcement. 
 If the 1950s and 1960s proved barren for Klan recruitment efforts, the 1970s and 
1980s were worse.  Due to its rigid adherence to racist messages, by the 1970s the Klan 
proved ineffective at locating mainstream beliefs to tap into.  Around 1960, after being 
shunned by Protestant churches, the Klan began to experiment with an ideology known as 
Christian Identity.568  Whereas earlier Klans had built recruitment efforts on a vision of 
American power that had been “lost,” modern Klans adopted revolutionary rather than 
restorationist ideologies.569  “History had moved against the Klan,” according to right 
wing expert Mark Potok. “The Klan became more and more desperate,” a desperation 
which revealed itself as the organization went from “defenders of mainline Protestantism 
to being very largely Christian Identity.”570  This ideological shift further crippled the 
Klan, prompting law enforcement officials to conclude that in the mid-1970s, “by and 
large, the Klan has been shunned by educated people, by members of the professions, and 
by business leaders.  Most Klan leaders and members were born and have lived most of 
their lives in areas where racial, ethnic, and religious prejudices are deep seated.  They 
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have limited educations and parochial outlooks and interests.”571  In the wake of a shift 
from mainstream Christianity to Christian Identity, the Klan no longer possessed a widely 
credible recruitment message. 
a. Getting the Word Out: Klan Message Dissemination 
Crafting an effective message is only one element of a successful 
recruitment effort; disseminating that message is equally important.  With the rise of 
instantaneous communications, we tend to overlook the importance and difficulty that 
information dissemination can pose, something most successful Klan organizations 
recognized.   
For instance, the Reconstruction era Klan, thanks to the broad support of 
the population, used local newspapers to send operational information throughout the 
South.  Uncooperative—mostly Republican—newspapers were routinely torched.  To the 
uninitiated, these messages might appear as garbled mumbo jumbo; to Klansmen, they 
had an operational meaning.  Also, Forrest, a travelling insurance salesman, could spread 
the word and establish new Klaverns in areas not be reached through sympathetic 
newspapers.   
Flush in cash, the 1920s Klan stood up its own information dissemination 
section under Edward Clarke.  Clarke broke his publications into two separate branches.  
The national periodical, The Searchlight was sold at newsstands and intended for a wide 
public audience.  Bearing the motto “Free Speech; Free Press; White Supremacy,” the 
newspaper targeted potential recruits and highlighted the benevolent deeds of the hooded 
empire.572  For internal information dissemination, the Klan relied upon The Imperial 
Knight-Hawk, a paper intended “to carry a weekly message from the Imperial Palace to 
every Klansman in the country.”573  This publication passed along notices about 
upcoming rallies and highlighted the activities of outstanding Klaverns across the 
                                                 
571 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Part 1: Klan Organizations” page 9, Topical Monographs, Box 
15, Record Group 65, National Archives Building, College Park, MD. 
572 Shotwell, “Crystallizing Public Hatred: Ku Klux Klan Public Relations in the Early 1920s,” 114. 
573 The Imperial Knight-Hawk, July 25, 1923. 4.   
 214
country.  In addition, local Klaverns were encouraged to produce their own newsletters 
tailored to local conditions as an additional means of recruitment.     
The Klans of the 1950- 1960s and the 1970–1980s were financially 
strapped, and their information dissemination methods reflected it.  No longer capable of 
using sympathetic newspapers free of charge, the Klan returned to newsletters, albeit in 
cheaper, more vulgar publications.  Telephone networks became the main method for 
passing information, a system which kept Klansmen relatively attuned to operations, but 
failed to expand the overall size of the Klan.  FBI informants routinely leaked the minutes 
from Klavern meetings, and the media picked up and ran stories mocking the Klan for its 
outrageous beliefs.  By the 1970s things had gone from bad to worse, as watchdog groups 
began to expose internal communications and pressure law enforcement officials to step 
up their monitoring efforts when these were found lacking.  Unable to extend its 
recruitment message beyond a small circle of friends and kin, the modern Klan entered a 
process of organizational decay. 
b. The Role of Intellectuals:  Enhancers of Klan Terrorism 
Thus far, we can say that what helps determine the sustainment of a 
terrorist campaign are the actions and decisions made by those in power.  One factor 
beyond the control of that organization, however, is the air of respectability provided 
through the writings, speeches, or public works of prominent socioeconomic elites.574  
The collective promotion of these works can create an intellectual environment 
conducive to or critical of campaigns of terrorism.575   
The 1867 Klan campaign, for instance, was enhanced by the near-
universal Western belief in scientific racism.  In fact, many of our esteemed founding 
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fathers ascribed to the tenets of scientific racism.  Michael Hunt hammers home this point 
in a 1987 work, bringing attention to the fact that even Benjamin Franklin “that paragon 
of Enlightenment optimism, versatility, and virtue, was also a racist.”576  Thomas 
Jefferson could be added to the list.  By today’s standards, even that paragon of Civil War 
liberalism, President Abraham Lincoln can be considered racist for his beliefs in racial 
inequality.577   
Originating in the early 1700s, scientific racism gained real traction with 
the mid-to-late 18th century works of Johann Blumenbach and Georges-Louis LeClerc.  
Both men promoted a theory according to which some races devolved since the creation 
of Adam and Eve, who were considered the first members of the (highest) Caucasian 
race.578  By the 1800s, scientific racism focused on uncovering the origins of humankind.  
An “American school” of ethnology emerged through the works of Samuel Morton, 
George Gliddon, Josiah Nott, and Ephraim Squier.  These men, between 1839 and 1859, 
advanced the theory of polygenesis; according to them the various human races were 
created separately.579 The societal impacts of such works was profound.  Scientific 
racism served as a justification for Southern claims that blacks must be watched over, 
since, as members of an inferior race, they were incapable of self-management and prone 
to violent revolt; slavery, therefore, was in the best interests of both blacks and society at 
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whites often disagreed on aspects of the ‘Negro Question,’ sometimes emotionally so, 
they nonetheless agreed almost universally on the fundamental issue of white supremacy 
and black inferiority.”581   
These ideas were so deeply imbued so that by the time of the American 
Civil War both academic writings and “folklore of the region stigmatized enslaved blacks 
as incipient insurrectionists and brooding rapists.”582  There should be no wonder, then, 
that the Klan was able to morally justify the violence it inflicted on blacks or those who 
sought to go against “science” through the promotion of the equality of races.  The 
intellectual environment of the time made it incredibly easy for the Klan to demonize and 
dehumanize its enemy, a factor, terrorism expert Mark Jurgensmeyer argues, that is 
necessary to sustain terrorism.583 
Moving onto beliefs at large during the 1920s, scientific racism had 
become more “scientific” with the promulgation of eugenics.  In an attempt to rid society 
of “unfit,” scientists like Charles Davenport promoted the idea that certain undesirable 
traits were hereditary and efforts should be made to purge communities of their 
undesirables.  If a person was deemed “feebleminded” or “sexually promiscuous” s/he 
should be sterilized in order to minimize the costs to society.  Eugenics was so broadly 
accepted that by the mid-1970s over 60,000 Americans had been involuntarily 
sterilized.584  The effects of American eugenics studies spilled beyond US borders; one 
study argues that it was these works that were the basis for later Nazi sterilization and 
eradication campaigns.585  So prevalent was the idea of eugenics and scientific racism 
that President Theodore Roosevelt threw his support behind it, writing a letter to 
Davenport agreeing that “society has no business to permit degenerates to reproduce their 
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kind.... Some day we will realize that the prime duty, the inescapable duty of the good 
citizen of the right type is to leave his blood behind him in the world, and that we have no 
business to perpetuate citizens of the wrong type.”586  Here is a clear example of the less-
than-scientific work of the scientific racists being promoted and validated by even the 
most educated and well respected members of American society.        
In addition to being able to draw comfortably on eugenics-based scientific 
racism, the 1920s Klan also enjoyed an extra layer of academic top-cover from 
unabashedly pro-South historians like William Dunning, Merton Coulter, C.W. Ramsdell, 
and Claude Bowers.  Their formulation of the romantic “Lost Cause” of the Confederacy 
helped the war’s losers to exonerate “the South from any responsibility in bringing on the 
conflict and helping Southerners then and later cope with defeat.”587  That such histories 
could be crafted should come as no surprise.  It is natural, even common, for the defeated 
in war to mythologize history in order to explain losses and reaffirm national and moral 
superiority.  Going beyond coping with wartime loss, this actually serves to “make defeat 
feel like victory.”588  The myth of the Lost Cause achieved these aims, and more.  The 
myth’s second order effect was to pave the way for the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan 
in the 1920s. 
It would be wrong to place the blame for the 1920s Klan campaign at the 
feet of Dunning school historians, just as it would be wrong to argue that they did not 
play an enabling role.  The less than neutral scholarship of these academics built a 
narrative—adopted in varying degrees nationwide—which transformed Confederate 
generals into demigods and portrayed the antebellum South as a pure and harmonious 
society.  In these works, too, the Klan was portrayed as being a purely defensive group in 
 
 
                                                 
586 S. Jay Olshansky, “Human by Design,” The Quarterly Review of Biology 79, no. 2 (June 2004): 
182. 
587 William C. Davis, The Cause Lost : Myths and Realities of the Confederacy, Modern War Studies 
(Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 177. 
588 Daniel Moran, “Book Review: The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and 
Recovery,” Strategic Insights III, no. 6 (June 2004). 
 218
the face of Union League atrocities and serving as a unifying factor between the North 
and South after the war, since it declared itself ready to defend and promote the entirety 
of the Aryan nation.   
Numerous scholars who disagreed with this revisionism failed to voice 
their criticism in the face of potential retribution.  Said one Georgia professor, “the 
trouble with us is that we have as little courage as we have voice, but with things as they 
are now in Georgia, more courage would mean martyrdom, not of the effective 
variety.”589  Thanks to the active efforts of pro-South scholars combined with the general 
timidity of those who opposed their work, a mythologized history was reinvigorated.  
Building atop this academically-validated myth, Thomas Dixon wrote a 
series of books which painted the Ku Klux Klan as freedom fighting saviors of the South.  
His 1902 book The Leopard’s Spots: A Romance of the White Man’s Burden portrayed 
the Klan as a purely defensive organization comprised of Southern patriots fighting to 
maintain morality in the face of unconstitutional Northern aggression.590  Although the 
book was well-received, his 1905 work The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku 
Klux Klan was even more significant, sparking the interest of movie producer D.W. 
Griffith.591  In turn, Griffith would produce the 1915 blockbuster The Birth of a Nation, 
which would push this romanticized ideal into households nationwide.  William 
Simmons, the Imperial Wizard of the “second wave” Klan, used all this publicity to his 
advantage, swelling Klan ranks to over 4,000,000 by 1924. 
Tapping into yet another well of beliefs, the Klan of the 1920s also grafted 
itself onto the burgeoning fundamentalist movement.  The relationship between 
Protestantism and militant Christianity provided the Klan with moral high ground that 
boosted its image as a organization of hooded white knights dedicated to the Lost Cause. 
From its role in defense of the Southern Lost Cause the Klan simply expanded its role to 
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defense of a much larger cause, that of holy nationalism.  To accomplish this, the Klan 
offered defense of “100% Americanism,” blending Protestant fundamentalism with 
ultranationalistic sentiment.  
Mythologized history and “intellectual top-cover” were largely absent—or 
discredited as the case may be—during the final two periods studied in this dissertation; a 
fact that helps explain their localized nature and/or overall failure.  The 1950s Klan 
returned to concepts of scientific racism only to find that American society had largely 
moved beyond such ideas.  No longer accepted or promoted by mainstream Protestant 
churches, Klan leaders found little social sympathy for their racist agenda.  During the 
1970s, one branch of the Klan would attempt to shift tracks and appeal to a more refined 
crowd.  Following David Duke’s failed attempt to appeal to white intellectuals during the 
1970s and 1980s, however, the Klan seemed to accept its fate and migrate to Christian 
Identity beliefs, a “religion” largely practiced only on the modern radical right. 
Unable to recruit as broadly as their 1860s and 1920s predecessors, the 
1950–1960s and 1970–1980s Klans could only attract either members of the lower 
economic classes (who tended to be less educated) or borderline sociopaths.  This trend 
endures today.  Of those considering themselves Klansmen, 0% are from advantaged 
backgrounds, 25% are from intermediate social classes, while the remaining 75% are 
considered disadvantaged.592  While the modern Klan—referring here to the post-1970 
variants which have adopted Identity beliefs—has struggled to build on its inherited 
mythologized histories, other right wing extremist groups have internalized the need for 
academic and intellectual backing and have been successful in recruiting engineers, 
scientists, small business owners, and soldiers by modifying recruitment pitches to built 
on a mythologized belief in “Christian Patriotism.”593 
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Mythologized history, far from being a sufficient cause of terrorism on its 
own, clearly served as an enhancing factor for the Klan.594  Without a base of widely-
held ideological support, organizations are forced to seek recruits from smaller (often 
psychologically riskier) pools of recruits.  Today we see that those who have broadly 
popular ideological justification for their programs of terrorism—see Hamas, Al Qaeda, 
or Lashkar-e-Toiba—are able to draw from a much deeper, much broader pool. 
3. Leaders as Lynchpins 
People matter.  More importantly, leaders matter.  A charismatic, intelligent, and 
savvy leader can mean the difference between success and failure, especially when it 
comes to such a high risk endeavor as managing and sustaining a campaign of terrorism.  
Much has been written about the effects of personal charisma on developing a 
charismatic community within an organization—a trait several Imperial Wizards 
possessed.595  In all phases of the Klan’s existence the quality of leadership proved a 
significant factor in determining the nature and trajectory of the Klan’s terrorism 
campaign.  More importantly still have been decisions made about determining the right 
organizational structure and the right recruitment pitch.  Though no Klan leader could be 
mistaken for a MacArthur or a Churchill, the overall effectiveness of each Klan campaign 
can be attributed to the leadership acumen of the men who supervised it, especially 
regarding decisions at two key junctures. 
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Figure 3.   The Two Leadership Decision Points 
a. The Two Critical Decision Points 
The two relationships described in earlier sections—the “fit” between 
organizational structure and environment, and the proper framing of messages—do not 
happen by accident.  They are both the product of leadership decisions.  Klan leaders that 
chose the correct organization and followed with an effective message with broad appeal 
proved most capable of launching a campaign of sustainable terrorism. 
The first decision point (labeled DP1 in the graphic above) involves a 
leader’s ability to recognize the dynamics of the environment and organize his group 
accordingly.  Should a leader choose to organize hierarchically in an environment lacking 
a safe haven, his organization is likely to be destroyed since law enforcement units will 
be able to penetrate and systematically eliminate sub-leaders at every level.  This is 
exactly what occurred to Robert Shelton during the FBI’s COINTELPRO initiatives.  By 
maintaining a hierarchical structure in the face of overwhelming opposition, Shelton 
made the FBI task of decapitation an easy one.  One by one, Klan leaders were arrested 
and prosecuted, and the now-leaderless Klan spun into disarray.  Looking more broadly, 





Karkaren Kurdistan, and the pre-1998 Abu Sayyaf.  All of these groups remained 
centralized even after they had been stripped of safe havens, and all fell victim to swift 
decapitation operations by the state.596 
Where a terrorist organization has a safe haven, the decision to organize 
hierarchically can dramatically improve its chances of sustaining a terrorism campaign.  
During both the 1860s and 1920s, Imperial Wizards were able to standardize public 
messages, develop secure internal communications, manage Klan financial operations, 
and (sometimes) keep their followers’ violence in check.  Their centralized organizational 
structures also allowed Klan leaders to have a hand in crafting recruitment messages and 
developing a “public face” behind which to hide the more nefarious aspects of Klan 
operations. 
This brings us to the second leadership decision point (DP2 on the model 
provided).  When provided a safe haven, Klan leaders had the opportunity to launch a 
campaign of terrorism, but the probability of its coming to fruition depended on how the 
Imperial Wizard and his Imperial staff framed societal issues (and how effectively the 
Klan was portrayed as an acceptable remedy to those issues).  Successful Klan leaders 
were able to hide some of the less appealing aspects of Klan ideology, focusing instead 
on the chivalrous, patriotic, defensive, or honorable aspects of the organization—false as 
that may have been.  Forrest, for instance, promoted his Klan as a defensive unit designed 
to protect a virtuous Southern society (and white womanhood).  Simmons and Evans 
painted the Klan as a morally upstanding group, tasked with defending the United States 
from drunkenness, sexual immorality, Communism, Catholicism, Judaism, and bound to 
uphold the Constitution as it was written by the forefathers.  Shelton was less successful 
in portraying continued segregation as a form of anti-communism (although defense of 
white womanhood sold fairly well).  Finally, although David Duke attempted to depict 
the Klan as “pro-White, not anti-Black,” the actions of rival Klan leaders undermined this 
message.  Consequently, the Klan became marginalized.   
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b. The Role of Charisma 
Max Weber famously detailed the effects a charismatic leader could have 
upon a collective in a series of posthumously published articles.597  Weber explained that, 
unlike traditional types of authority, through which power is passed down, transferred, 
and bestowed upon a leader by virtue of title or rank, charismatic authority is developed 
and maintained in an entirely different manner.  Charismatic authority derives from “a 
certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered 
extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”598  Admittedly a factor prone to subjective 
interpretation, nonetheless, the charismatic pull of a leader can help explain the appeal of 
the Ku Klux Klan as it embarked on its campaigns of terrorism.    
The 1860s campaign was run by Confederate hero General Nathan 
Bedford Forrest.  Known for his bold and ruthless maneuvers as a cavalry leader, Forrest 
became an easy choice for Grand Wizard due to his criminal actions at Fort Pillow in 
1864.  After capturing the Union garrison, Forrest ordered the outright slaughter of black 
Union troops who had already surrendered.  In a note back to Confederate headquarters, 
Forrest boasted, “the river was dyed with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred 
yards.  It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that Negro 
soldiers cannot cope with Southerners.”599  While some viewed the incident with disgust, 
a majority in the South viewed Forrest’s actions as warranted and exceptional. 
Little is known about Forrest’s actual role in coordinating the daily 
operations of the Klan, as most Klaverns burned their records in 1869, but by force of 
reputation alone he drew Southerners to the organization in droves.  A recruitment poster 
in human form, Forrest enjoyed strong support from a professional staff well versed in 
the management of armies.  Forrest drew upon his Confederate networks and, when 
“trusted Confederate officers could be persuaded to serve as Grand Dragons and Grand 
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Titans in their respective states, they could then undertake the formation of county and 
local units in their jurisdiction.”600  By personally selecting trusted and loyal lieutenants, 
Forrest ensured organizational cohesion and ensured competent management of those 
under his command. 
Forrest was also known for a darker side when it came to dealing with 
those who demonstrated disloyalty to the Klan.  Whenever individual Klaverns exceeded 
the boundaries set by Imperial leaders, the repercussions could prove fatal.  On one 
occasion, a Tennessee Grand Magi demonstrated a bit too much exuberance in his 
sanctioning of terrorism and, complicating his problems further, ignored Forrest’s calls 
for restraint.  In response “General Forrest revealed (and later denied) that three 
Klansmen in Tennessee had suffered death for refusal to obey such orders.”601  Forrest’s 
Prescript lays out in no uncertain terms his requirements for discipline and loyalty.  Most 
important, however, may have been Forrest’s own tight-lipped nature concerning his 
involvement in the Klan.  Although it was a well known fact that the General was the 
Grand Wizard, Forrest never admitted involvement in the organization.  Even when put 
under oath, Forrest denied all ties.  As he walked out of the Congressional hearing, 
Forrest smiled at a reporter and said he had “lied like a gentleman.”602 
Possessing neither the stature nor military reputation of Forrest, William 
Simmons did maintain at least half of the elements required for effective leadership of the 
Klan.  Known as an ambitious dreamer, Simmons spent time in the Army during the 
Spanish-American War before dabbling in the Methodist ministry.  After being defrocked 
for “moral impairment,” Simmons served in leadership posts in multiple fraternal 
organizations.603  Although these posts honed his charisma and charm, they did little to 
develop his managerial skills.  This would become evident in 1915 when Simmons 
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reestablished the Ku Klux Klan alongside the Knights of Mary Phagan during a 
ceremony on Stone Mountain, Georgia.  
Simmons’ managerial bumbling would be righted through the hiring of a 
professional publicity and management staff, which provided him the other aspect of 
effective leadership.  What Simmons lacked in organizational skills, Edward Clarke and 
Elizabeth Tyler more than made up for.  By carefully managing his public appearances, 
scripting his speeches, and opening his eyes to recruitment opportunities, Clarke and 
Tyler—as the behind-the-scenes power brokers—were responsible for the popularity of 
the Klan and assuring its success.  The duo effectively built a cult of personality around 
Simmons and maintained his public image as an almost supernatural entity. 
Simmons, blithely unaware of his power-hungry subordinates’ intentions, 
was deposed (through promotion to the hollow Emperor position) in 1922 by the fiery 
Texas dentist Dr. Hiram Wesley Evans.  Evans took a more hands-on approach to 
running the Klan, and under his command, the organization tapered down its terrorist 
activity and invested more effort into political initiatives.  Evans also possessed an 
unquantifiable appeal, demonstrated through his ability to draw over 40,000 Klansmen to 
Washington DC for a downtown march in 1925.  Under Evans, the Klan eventually 
collected the support of over seventy five congressmen, numerous senators, and at least 
eleven state governors.  Unfortunately for Simmons, another prominent leader—the 
previously mentioned Indiana Grand Dragon D.C. Stephenson—would bring the Klan 
tumbling down.  
Following the downfall of the ultra-powerful 1920s Klan, it would take 
leaders of great appeal to reunite the fractured front.  The partial reunification of the 
1960s Klan can be attributed to the appeal of two prominent individuals: first, Eldon 
Edwards and, following his death, Robert Shelton.  Little is known about Edwards, other 
than the fact his blue-collar background as an auto painter appealed to the recruits the 
Klan targeted.  By consolidating various local Klans, Edwards sat atop over 15,000 
followers by 1958.604   
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Stepping in after Edwards’ 1960 death, Robert Shelton further unified the 
Klans to become the most prominent figure among at least twenty other Klan 
organizations.  Shelton, although charismatic enough, achieved his stature in large part 
thanks to the complete ineptness of his rivals.  One FBI report captures the state of Klan 
leaders during the 1960s: 
Klan leaders are sadly lacking in the essential qualities of leadership.  
Indeed, measured by the most elementary standards of leadership ability, 
the leaders of today’s Klan organizations are a mediocre lot…Some of the 
individuals who are trying to organize the Klan in various areas of the 
country are pathetic.  One man who has tried unsuccessfully to organize a 
Klan group in Houston, Texas is ignorant, uneducated, and utterly lacking 
in organizational ability.605 
Following an FBI crackdown on White Hate groups throughout the United States, 
Shelton became paranoid and unable to openly discuss Klan campaigns or programs for 
fear of informants.  No longer the untouchable Klan demigod he once was, his 
charismatic appeal waned.  Threatening his followers with truth serum, Shelton soon lost 
the ability to lead and rival Klan leaders found themselves in jail.   By the late 1960s, the 
FBI had effectively destroyed the Klan by infiltrating the organization and separating the 
leaders from their followers—a campaign of cutting the head off the snake. 
It is theoretically possible to have a successful organization under poor 
leadership, but examples are few and far between.  Even rarer are examples of success 
when leaders are actually working at cross purposes to the group they profess to lead.  
Such was the case during the 1970–1980s.  Although David Duke appeared primed to 
lead the Klan’s resurgence, an outspoken and cunning Bill Wilkinson undercut Duke’s 
efforts and took control of the Klan.  Wilkinson’s tough talk and boisterous behaviors 
attracted members seeking violence, but once his affiliations to the FBI were made 
public, the Klan fell into further disarray.  As newspapers revealed Wilkinson to be a paid 
FBI informant, Klan members and leaders alike deserted the once-prominent 
organization.  In fact, it is no coincidence that a large number of domestic terrorist attacks 
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during the 1980s and 1990s were attributed to ex-Klansmen.  Klan leaders had been 
unable to keep these members in their orbit.  After they escaped, rival groups put them to 
use.  
C. SUMMARY  
 Klan terrorist campaigns result from three factors: a political initiative which 
serves as a “spark” to the violence; the presence of safe havens and the corresponding 
adoption of a hierarchical organization; and proper message framing and distribution of a 
socially palatable message.  The “spark” is beyond the control of the terrorist 
organization, but the final two factors and their interactions are products of a leader’s 
decisions.   The role of leadership is to recognize when and where safe havens are 
available and structure the organization accordingly.  Klan leaders must also understand 
the dominant social narratives of their time and frame a socially acceptable message 
which weaves Klan ideology into that narrative.  My findings suggest that the presence of 
a widely-held ideology or the crafting of a mythologized history served as an enhancing 
factor for successful Klan campaigns.   
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CHAPTER IX: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this dissertation, three commonly espoused approaches to explaining terrorism 
were compared side by side to determine the explanatory value of each approach.  This 
comparative setup was not accidental.  The three approaches represent different 
perspectives and, consequently, result in widely differing policy recommendations to 
curb terrorist activity.  Though each approach is entirely different, each has already 
significantly impacted American policy for dealing with domestic terrorism. 
The structural approach is most commonly used to justify long-term, multi-
dimensional policies couched under the label combating terrorism.606  Policies derived 
from this approach have been especially prominent in responses to global rather than 
domestic terrorism.  In an effort to “diminish underlying causes of terrorism,” significant 
national resources are set aside for economic development, the strengthening of 
democratic governance structures, improving literacy rates, developing education 
systems, and/or promoting the rule of law.607  Sponsorship approaches, on the other hand, 
urge policies designed to undercut state (or non-state) support of terrorism.  Policy 
initiatives that fall under the term countering state support of terrorism focus their 
energies on third parties—state and non-state—that associate with terrorist organizations.  
In his 2005 book Deadly Connections, for instance, Daniel Byman highlights the dangers 
of state sponsorship along with the significant obstacles in ending such support, while 
other works focus on closing the flow of financial resources.608  Finally, organizational 
approaches to understanding terrorism tend to advocate more offensive operations that 
directly target the organization and its leadership structures.  Under the rubric of 
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counterterrorism, such operations place primacy on actively targeting the organization 
itself and are less concerned with changing the environment which may have created it.  
Counterterrorism strategies largely focus on disrupting or destroying a terrorist 
organization’s command structure through “decapitation” operations, or, when waged 
against organizations lacking hierarchical structures, “crushing the cell.”609   
This project—admittedly narrowed to an exclusive focus on the Ku Klux Klan—
finds value in each of these three broad policy prescriptions, but counters that certain 
initiatives carry greater “bang for the buck” in preventing sustained campaigns of 
terrorism.  In an era of finite resources, it is imperative we use these limited resources 
appropriately.  By effectively pitting resources against the most prominent factors behind 
reemergence of terrorism campaigns, we can significantly enhance efforts to curb future 
terrorism.  While this author believes that the complete eradication of terrorism is a 
bridge too far, it should be possible, to prevent organizations from stringing together acts 
of terrorism into a sustained campaign.  From this perspective, an environment of 
sporadic acts of “lone wolf terrorism”—a situation the United States is currently 
experiencing—has to be considered preferable to facing an organization capable of 
coordinating attacks in a strategic manner, launching campaigns similar to those of the 
Ku Klux Klan during the 1860s, 1920s, and 1950–1960s. This final chapter presents a 
few of the practical implications to be drawn from the dissertation’s findings. This 
chapter also highlights a few of the potentially rewarding research avenues open to those 
with an interest in Ku Klux Klan terrorism.   
Turning first to policy implications, Steven Walt once claimed that “policy 
makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in IR, and many 
scholars seem uninterested in doing policy relevant work.”610  This is not a critique that 
can be leveled at the field of terrorism studies.  Following the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, an increased emphasis has been placed on research that bridges theory and 
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practice.  However, unlike the IR field, where, according to Walt, scholars seem 
uninterested in policy work, the field of terrorism studies faces the opposite situation.   
Studies of terrorism are frequently “captured” by research funding sources, 
generating pressure on researchers to ensure the results of their study are in line with the 
desired expectations of their sponsors.  It is therefore common to see terrorism studies 
conducted by nongovernmental organizations push economic development, education, 
and quality of life issues as the remedy for terrorist problems.611  Conversely, military 
reports often focus exclusively upon manhunting, targeting training camps, and 
decapitation operations as the ideal remedies.612 Diplomatic reports often focus upon 
denial of state or non-state support and the use of sanctions to discourage terrorist 
activity.  When these reports are consolidated and given to personnel tasked to craft and 
implement strategy, it is the overall power of the organization delivering the reports (not 
necessarily the power of the arguments presented within them) that often wins the day.  
Terrorism studies, therefore, must keep this kind of mission creep in mind.  The work 
produced must be policy-relevant, but also neutral.  This may be especially important 
when focusing on domestic terrorism and striving to understand groups that promote 
points of view antithetical to those of the researcher.  
A. IT TAKES A NETWORK TO PREVENT A HIERARCHY 
The first implication of this dissertation is that the eradication of safe havens from 
which race based hate groups can operate is of paramount importance.  This places 
primacy on the role of persistent conventional law enforcement efforts and requires 
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responsible bottom-up initiative.  One desired endstate should remain the prevention of 
mergers between terrorist organizations.  The Klan, along with all other organizations on 
the contemporary radical right, remains an atomized entity.  The primary emphasis of 
future counterterrorism against the radical right should be upon efforts which ensure it 
remains that way.  Any activity suggesting a group merger should serve as a warning sign 
of danger over the horizon. 
It has been said that “it takes a network to fight a network.”613  Proponents of this 
argument usually claim that, in order to defeat a terrorist network, counterterrorist forces 
must develop a similar network.  The operative term here is “defeat” and the accuracy of 
the argument depends on what that word actually means.  If defeat means the complete 
eradication of the networked organization, then the argument is spurious.  If defeat means 
the ability to prevent the organization from conducting systematic, sustained terrorist 
operations, the argument carries weight, to a point.  In the realm of counterterrorism, it 
may be more appropriate to say “it takes a network to prevent a hierarchy.”   
As this study suggests, the intensity and duration of Klan campaigns increased 
when there was organizational centralization, and when the Klan found a safe haven.  
When and where law enforcement attempted to confront the Klan, the Klan was routinely 
outgunned and overpowered.  As decentralization then occurred, the scope of the Klan’s 
campaign diminished and acts of terrorism became more sporadic and less strategically 
focused.  This, in turn, put local law enforcement units in a better position to confront and 
eliminate the threat posed by uncoordinated acts.  That modern law enforcement officials 
today are confronting a heavily decentralized threat should be viewed as a positive turn of 
events, as the threat of a sustained terrorist campaign from such an atomized entity is 
minimal.  This is one reason, we should continue to improve our counterterrorism 
coordination in order to prevent terrorist networks from becoming terrorist hierarchies. 
A follow up question worth asking is: now the Klan has become atomized, how 
do we keep it this way?  Professionalization and education of local police forces 
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(according to an established national standard) is the first step.  Linking them together in 
order to promote information sharing is the second.  This is harder than it may sound.   
Whenever terrorism is mentioned, there is an unfortunate tendency to respond 
with a top-down approach that focuses on killing or capturing senior leaders in the 
organization.  Against a hierarchical organization, this may be effective.  Against a 
decentralized one, resources are better spent elsewhere.  Equipment, training, and 
education must be pushed downwards to the lowest level.  Against a cellular 
organization, the beat cop is a more appropriate remedy than the FBI SWAT team.   
Thus far, the United States has performed admirably in this regard, and our 
success is reflected in the high number of terrorist plots disrupted or foiled through 
conventional law enforcement methods.614  Police are to be lauded for their efforts, but 
should not rest on their past accomplishments.  Technology is making it easier for 
terrorist organizations to coordinate and communicate instantaneously; to almost any 
location around the world.  Internet presence has allowed terrorists to increase levels of 
“virtual contact,” which, according to Hewitt, may increase levels of militancy within an 
organization.615  To counter these trends, local law enforcement units must also take 
advantage of the benefits offered by technology and information sharing systems.  Wiki-
style intelligence reporting should be encouraged to maintain databases which are 
updated frequently.  Such open source databases make it easier to monitor both local and 
regional trends in group activity, and encourage interaction between police forces that 
may be dealing with similar problems.  Additionally, web based education systems 
should be promoted to increase awareness about the radical right.  Finally, national 
pressure must be exerted upon local units to ensure standards of professionalism and 
ideological neutrality are maintained. Local units, in turn must keep national authorities 
aware of trends in racist hate group membership growth, as this serves as another 
indicator of potential terrorist activity.    
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B. GROUP SIZE MATTERS 
If the Klan’s history is anything to go by, initiating and maintaining a campaign 
of terrorism is a labor intensive undertaking.  In each period studied, the Klan possessed a 
significant number of mobilized followers; for each campaign, the Klan had over 20,000 
members in a single organization at its peak.  This finding supports Christopher Hewitt’s 
claims that individual levels of militancy are reinforced when immersed within a group 
context and the larger the group, the higher the degree of militancy generated, and the 
larger the group, the higher the number of terrorist acts committed.616  In short, the more 
contact terrorist members have with one another in a group environment, the more likely 
they are to embark on and support a campaign.   
Watchdog organizations have recently begun to sound alarms as the number of 
domestic militant organizations continues to rise.  Unsettling as this trend may be, the 
relatively small size of these individual organizations limits their ability to conduct 
multiple operations.  Rarely do these groups come together.617  This is good news for 
modern counter terrorism officials since estimated Klan strength is currently under 5,000 
members (a liberal estimate) spread between some thirty to forty different 
organizations.618  Simply put, no Klan organization currently has the degree of mobilized 
manpower needed to conduct a 1860s, 1920s or 1960s-style campaign of terrorism.   
Strictly from a membership perspective, the Brotherhood of Klans (BOK), 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (currently under Imperial Wizard Jeremy Parker) warrants 
the most concern as it remains the largest Klan organization today, and membership 
numbers are very hard to determine due to the group’s operational security measures.  
The BOK has attained its size by adopting an anti-immigration recruitment pitch, one that 
resonates well, as the Anti-Defamation league has reported continued growth in the BOK 
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since 2006.619  This growth is, in no small part, owed to the leadership of Imperial 
Wizard Dale Fox, who died of heart attack in late 2006.  His Imperial Klaliff, Jeremy 
Parker, assumed the mantle of BOK leader following Fox’s death.  Whether Parker is 
able to grow the Klan is debatable, but that he has vowed to do so primarily on the back 
of racism and anti-immigration rhetoric is of concern.  Concern, in this case, does not yet 
warrant alarm, as the contemporary Klan must confront the operational limitations posed 
by its organizational design.          
C. THE LIMITS OF LEADERLESS RESISTANCE 
As described by white supremacist (and former Klansman) Louis Beam, 
leaderless resistance is an organizational concept according to which “all individuals and 
groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a single headquarters or 
single leader for direction or instruction, as would those who belong to a typical 
pyramidal organization.”620  Beam goes on to hint that this form of “organization” is 
particularly effective since “the last thing Federal snoops would have, if they had any 
choice in the matter, is a thousand different small phantom cells opposing them.”621 If 
federal agents are truly more concerned with a thousand different groups than a single 
one, then 2011 marks a troubling year. Reports indicate that domestic hate groups have 
recently topped 1,000, so, according to Beam’s logic, America should be on the verge of 
right wing revolt.622  But Beam—at least according to this dissertation—is wrong.  
Organized decentralization and the adoption of leaderless resistance indicate an overall 
absence of safe havens and the resultant implementation of a survival strategy as opposed 
to strategic preparation for a sustained terrorist campaign.  Decentralization sacrifices 
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several advantages a centralized power structure and hierarchy possess.  The efficient 
implementation of strategy, supervision over poorly trained subordinates, and 
accountability are lost.  What is gained are only resiliency and environmental 
adaptability.623  By gravitating toward leaderless resistance, the Klan (and others), trade 
effectiveness for survivability. 
As David Tucker highlights, for a decentralized organization to be effective, it 
must have skilled professionals at the head of each node.  Skilled professionals are in 
short supply in the contemporary Klan, as it has neither the message to recruit already 
trained professionals or the training resources necessary to professionalize them in-house.  
Leaderless resistance is—for an unskilled Klan at least—a design born of necessity, one 
not designed for sustainment of systematic terrorism aimed at achieving political ends.  It 
is a design that was forced upon them.  As Sageman elaborates, the (d)evolution from 
hierarchy  to leaderless resistance is “the natural outcome of a bottom-up mechanism of 
group formation in a specific environment shaped by top down counterterrorism 
strategy.”624  In this case, the specific environment offers no safe haven, the result of an 
effective national strategy focused on law enforcement. 
What are the policy implications?  For one, the United States should recognize it 
is waging a successful campaign against domestic right wing terrorism.  The fact that 
there are over 1,000 extremist groups could point to further atomization of groups rather 
than overall growth in terms of membership numbers.  As long as these groups are 
composed of what Bruce Hoffman calls “amateur terrorists,” there is a diminished cause 
for alarm.625  The alarm should ring once these groups either begin the process of 
professionalization, or we see a reunification of once-competing groups.  One way of 
depict such trends is by constantly monitoring these group’s websites.  Often, they will 
publicize mergers.  This was the case when the United Northern and Southern Knights of 
the Ku Klux Klan (UNSK) recently merged with the Four States White Knights.  From 
their website, the UNSK’s Imperial Wizard proudly announced: 
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This latest merger between the UNSK and the FSWK, we have gained 
some excellent and qualified members and officers. We have increased 
our territory and linked Klan brothers to work as one! We are now able to 
reach farther into the north and east and to link up territory between our 
northernmost Realms.What we are and have been doing is for the 
betterment of the white race. We fight almost insurmountable odds to win 
this struggle. Fight we will. Some will criticise, some will condemn our 
actions, some will even accuse us of unimaginable falsehoods. That is ok. 
Jealousy of our successes will bring out the bad in many. So be it. We will 
continue our battle to accomplish what is right. I, myself as well as all 
UNSK members really look forward to working together with our new 
brothers in this great struggle. Together we will be victorious.626    
Following his announcement comes a discussion of how important it is to have a 
large, unified group that is capable of coordinated actions.  Per the Imperial Wizard, “The 
NAACP has had great success by doing just what some in the Klans do not want to do, 
UNITE as one brotherhood…if we could just get the glory seekers to look past today and 
realize what strength and power we could wield united, this battle would be very easy.”  
Indeed, until Klan leaders overcome organizational issues—an unlikely occurrence—they 
will have to remain resigned to an overall program of leaderless resistance.   
Because the Klan is stuck in its leaderless resistance bind with too few 
professionals in its ranks, and a recruitment message that does not resonate, it should not 
be considered the prevalent threat on the contemporary revolutionary right.  Militia 
organizations—many of which host weekend training events and paramilitary camps to 
increase their member’s skills– are likely the most dangerous organizations on the radical 
right.  Coordinate actions still remain an obstacle for them since most are primarily 
concerned with state-related issues.  Militia’s local focus seems unlikely to solidify into a 
national campaign which would have to fall under a national hierarchy.  Militias are most 
likely to remain regional in nature and to act in response to local federal intervention.  
Although we should not expect a sustained campaign, even uncoordinated acts from 
amateurs can now have a devastating effect.  
Contemporary terrorists—Klansmen included—may not need to string acts of 
terrorism together into a sustained campaign to achieve their aims.  Increased lethality 
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and availability of weaponry might mean a single attack can generate an effect that took 
past organizations a campaign to achieve.  While the State Department focuses on 
incidents of international terrorism, reports indicate individual terrorist attacks are 
growing more lethal thanks to technological improvements in weaponry; we should 
expect future attacks will result in an even higher average per-attack body count.  
International attacks during the 1980s produced a casualty rate of around two casualties 
per attack, while terrorism of the 1990s and early 2000s averaged over eight.627  
Depending on the database used, that number ranges from ten to twelve during the first 
decade of the 21st century.628  There are no indications that this trend will reverse itself 
over the next few years.   
Thus far, the Klan continues to prefer individual attacks, relying on weapons with 
limited lethality.  In this regard, the Klan has actually regressed from the 1960s when the 
organization favored dynamite and explosives, which were far more lethal than nooses, 
shotguns, razorblades, or e-mail threats.  Of course, it wouldn’t be hard to shift away 
from this, since fertilizer, diesel fuel, and icing sugar are relatively easy to purchase—all 
ingredients that could be used to manufacture very lethal explosives.  Largely due to the 
efforts of conventional police methods and judicial prosecution, the Klan has been wary 
of moving beyond minor assaults and threats.  Nonetheless, it is only prudent to assume 
there may yet be lone wolfs attacks made on behalf of race based hate groups that push 
domestic terrorist attacks into this realm. “Lone wolf” terrorism is never to be desired, 
but is at least preferable to sustained campaigns of terrorism; the lesser of two evils, if 
you will.   
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The fear of operational alliances being formed between organizations of radically 
different ideological persuasions is also of growing concern.629  Increasingly, as George 
Michael argues, groups of radically different ideological persuasions are realizing the 
potential gains to be made through temporary alliances against common enemies.  For 
both jihadists and members of the radical right, this common enemy most often takes the 
form of Judaism.  In a study of European right wing organizations, Bale and Ackerman 
demonstrate that radical right/Jihadi alliances have occurred, although they currently 
exist at the level of rhetorical and legal support for one another.630  The Klan has yet to 
go this far, although it has demonstrated a desire to turn White Nationalism into White 
Internationalism by creating logistical and communications links to racists overseas and 
in Canada.  Again, websites and communications must be monitored to provide ample 
warning should the Klan begin to make connections to more capable terrorist 
organizations.      
In short, the good news is that the current state of organization on America’s 
radical right—Leaderless Resistance—is unlikely to generate anything more sustainable 
than acts of lone wolf terrorism.  The bad news is that these acts of terrorism can be 
extremely lethal and their effects can be magnified by a rapacious media.  To thwart the 
potential for such attacks, another strategy is needed. 
1. Fine Tuning “The War of Ideas” 
Recent studies of terrorism have begun to address the role of ideology to either 
help promote or retard terrorist activity.  Usually focused on religion, these studies 
emphasize the need to wage an effective counter-ideological campaign against terrorist 
organizations.631  Many clear-eyed assessments have advocated the need to delve deeply 
into the core of a group’s ideology because “in order to counteract extremist’s ideological 
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influence, [one] must engage in argument with the extremists.”632  If done incorrectly, 
this is a recipe for disaster.  I submit that who does the arguing, and how that argument is 
delivered are two critical, yet often overlooked, aspects to “counterideological 
campaigns.”      
Effectively countering the messages of terrorist organizations remains critical to 
being able to minimize the size and scope of future race-based terrorism.  Daniel Byman, 
for one, discusses the centrality of winning “The War of Ideas” in his 2008 work The 
Five Front War.633 Byman argues that the United States must reinvest time and resources 
in information operations, public diplomacy, and media campaigns designed to counter 
terrorist narratives—a conclusion this dissertation agrees with.  The findings of this 
dissertation also bolster his recommendation that free media outlets should be leveraged 
to carry counter-extremist narratives.  Pushing this recommendation one step farther, I 
would submit that one must also consider both the mouthpiece and venue for the media 
outlet being leveraged.   
Extremist narratives can be challenged through popular media venues.  Recent 
examples include major motion pictures like American History X, a movie which details a 
racist skinhead’s turn away from White Nationalism.634  The fact that this Academy 
Award-winning movie was produced by an independent, non-government source and 
featured an actor as talented as Edward Norton, likely did more to undercut racist 
recruitment messages than any government-funded educational program.  In a sense, it 
served the same purpose but to opposite ends as The Birth of a Nation.  Though it may 
speak poorly of our society that the words of an actor are likely to have a greater direct 
impact than those of a right wing watchdog like Morris Dees, a clever counterterrorism 
strategy would take advantage of this.  One policy recommendation that emerges from 
this dissertation is an increased emphasis on working through influential social actors 
with no governmental affiliations to promote anti-extremist messages.  The better known 
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and respected those social actors are by those whom extremists are likely to recruit, the 
more effective a counter extremist campaign would be.  For instance, a counter-extremist 
message from Chuck Norris, Ted Nugent, or Dwayne “the Rock” Johnson would resonate 
far better than a message from Janeane Garofalo, Tim Robbins, or Rosie O’Donnell.  The 
opposite, of course, would hold true for messages targeting the extreme left.    
Not only do actors count, but so does the venue in which a counter narrative is 
delivered.  Government-led initiatives through official channels—especially when 
government leaders are considered left-leaning—will generate backlash and fan the 
threat.  Relying on the government bureaucracy to generate and disseminate messages 
with resonance and “stickiness” is a recipe for mockery and failure –Nancy Reagan’s 
“Just Say No” campaign being a good example.  Although preferable to government 
channels, initiatives from watchdog organizations like the ADL and SPLC are still 
subject to criticism.  For instance, following an SPLC-supported documentary entitled 
Erasing Hate: The True Story of a Skinhead’s Redemption aired on left leaning MSNBC, 
the response from the racist right could be summed up as “more of the same from Jewish 
liberals.”635  Because this documentary was delivered by a (perceived) leftist source, the 
message was automatically mocked and swept aside in typical conspiracy-theory fashion 
by the radical right.  Had this program been aired on the right-leaning Fox News 
Network, it is likely to have had a greater impact on its real target audience—recruit able 
youth.  Or, at a minimum, it would have been harder for the radical right to dismiss.  
Byman also addresses the concept of propaganda campaigns “going negative” 
against terrorist organizations.  Byman notes the futility of trying to win a debate by 
being defensive.  He advocates instead that counterterrorist officials change the terms, go 
on the offensive, and “accelerate public aversion to violence” by highlighting the 
negative aspects of the group in question.636  This approach has proved remarkably 
successful against the contemporary Ku Klux Klan. In keeping with Byman’s observation 
that “it is easier to make your opponent hated than to make yourself loved,” the SPLC’s 
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Intelligence Project uses journalistic style reports to target the racist right, an approach 
the United States government may find impossible to adopt.  Although the U.S. 
government may find this route blocked, other types of counterterrorism organizations 
may not.     
D. EXPANDING THE COUNTERTERRORISM MARKET  
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can serve a remarkably powerful role in 
countering terrorism.  First, NGOs can get away with strategies that a national 
government cannot.  NGOs can play dirty, for lack of a better term.  The Southern 
Poverty Law Center routinely goes on the attack against radical right wing groups, 
promoting a three-pronged approach of “information, education, and exposure” in its 
fight. Along with weekly e-mail updates and website postings, the SPLC publishes The 
Intelligence Report, a journal that focuses specifically on the radical right.  The Report 
“employs the techniques and forms of serious journalism, but uses them to support a 
specific agenda—the attempt to roll back racist hate groups and their ideologies.”637  
This sort of exposure, according to the lead investigator of the Intelligence Division, “is 
kind of like shining a light on cockroaches…under such intense scrutiny, they 
immediately scatter.”638   
Exposure of extremist behavior works not only on extremist organizations, but on 
negligent law enforcement units as well.  Former detective Joe Roy recalls a 1985 case 
from Kentucky in which the SPLC discovered a police-led Klavern called the 
Confederate Officers Police Squad (COPS).  In this particular case, the group would meet 
at public facilities and members were suspected of accessing national criminal computer 
databases on behalf of the Klan.  The SPLC became aware of the situation, and swung the 
“light” on the police force, ensuring that the COPS’ leader, Alex Young, was dismissed 
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and that the other police members’ identities were exposed.639  The public revelation and 
subsequent federal intervention to break up the wayward police force ensured elimination 
of a Klan safe haven.         
NGOs also enjoy the distinct advantage of organizational agility and can adapt 
more quickly to social dynamics than can any governmental bureaucracy.  NGO 
organizational design, as well as a wide diversity in funding sources, “does invite a sort 
of nimbleness, if something happens to come up, we can talk about going after some 
group in the morning, and we can move on it very fast shortly thereafter.”640  This does 
not happen in a government bureaucracy, where permits must be obtained, and plans are 
heavily screened up and down the chain of command.     
The Southern Poverty Law Center has had great success as an NGO, since it also 
uses the legal system to effect.  By 2008, the SPLC had conduced successful lawsuits 
against forty six individuals and nine white supremacist organizations; many of these 
legal battles ended in bankrupting the defendants.641  Well financed by multiple donors (a 
factor which prevents the organization from being captured by a single source), the 
Center is able “to spend a dollar to every nickel we pull out of racist organizations to 
make them toe the line…these lawsuits have been a giant hammer.”642  U.S. tax codes, 
which encourage private donations to organizations like the SPLC or ADL, are unique, 
and should be retained at all costs. 
E. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The longitudinal study of Ku Klux terrorism undertaken in this dissertation offers 
data missing from several longstanding academic debates in terrorism studies.  Although 
the topics which follow were not the primary focus of this project, further investigation 
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may yield significant new insights.  As English-speaking Americans can easily read the 
writings of the Ku Klux Klan, further study of this group can easily be undertaken.    
One of the more promising areas for future research focuses on bolstering the 
arguments made in Audrey Kurth Cronin’s 2009 work How Terrorism Ends.643 Cronin 
highlights six methods by which terrorist campaigns have been terminated; capturing or 
killing a group’s leader, entry of the group into politics, successful achievement of goals, 
organizational implosion or loss of public support, defeat by brute force, and transition 
out of terrorism into other forms of violence or criminality.644  Although Cronin briefly 
touches on the Ku Klux Klan in her footnotes and appendix, a deeper analysis of Ku Klux 
campaigns may point to a more nuanced understanding of campaign termination. 
The Ku Klux Klan campaigns studied in this project all ended for different 
reasons.  The 1860s campaign of terrorism ended, primarily due to the fact it had 
achieved it aims and restored white supremacy throughout the South (though some may 
argue the campaign ended due to brute repression through the Ku Klux Acts).645  The 
1920s campaign ended thanks to organizational infighting and overall loss of popular 
support following the D.C. Stephenson murder-rape scandal and the public exposure of 
Klan fraud and greed.  The termination of the anti-Civil Rights Klan campaign can be 
attributed largely to the relentless, sometimes unconstitutional efforts of the FBI and its 
White Hate Counter Intelligence Programs (what Cronin might label a brute force counter 
strategy).  Specific studies dedicated to understanding how each Klan campaign ended 
would enhance the power of Cronin’s findings. 
Secondly, as described throughout this work, members of the Ku Klux Klan 
performed acts of intensely personal violence.  From whippings, to lynchings, to 
burnings, to castrations, to disembowelments, to beheadings, Klansmen demonstrated a 
propensity to inflict tremendous pain on others.  Why?  How can we account for this?  As 
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I am not trained in psychology, this is an aspect not explored in this study.  I anticipate 
future research might reveal one of three possibilities. 
First, the willingness to commit such up-close-and-personal violence may owe a 
lot to friendship and kinship pressures for the modern Klans, since recently they’ve 
“gotten more family and neighbors than anything else.”646  The Klan is noted for a 
relatively high degree of generational turn over between mothers and fathers and their 
children.  Violence may therefore be attributed to childhood learning and familial 
pressures.  Kinship ties and the subsequent pressure to perform in front of family (not 
disappoint loved ones) may play a role in the willingness to engage in terrorism.   
The second possible explanation may deal with a line of thought begun by Stanley 
Milgram and Hannah Arendt that promotes the idea that acts of violence can become 
“normalized” as part of an organization’s standard operating procedures.647  Adopting 
this line of thought, violence is a product of an organization’s ideological indoctrination 
program and its ability to make violence appear as part of a routine.  Whether true or not, 
the SPLC has scored several court successes by arguing along these lines.  Employing the 
concept of “vicarious liability,” lawyers from the SPLC have been able to hold the 
Imperial Wizards of various Klans responsible for the actions of their members.648 
Third, the clearly racist nature of the Klan may hold some clues.  Social 
psychologists have long emphasized the differences between “in-groups” and “out-
groups.”  There may be something about differences in racial, ethnic, or religious identity 
that makes it easier for people to fear and dehumanize others, thus, justifying acts of 
violence against them.  Literatures on racism, ethnic conflict, and genocide might hold 
useful insights for terrorism studies.         
A third avenue for future research deals with the dynamics of change: what 
factors impact an organization’s ability to innovate, adapt, or improvise.  Recently, the 
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field of terrorism studies has started to more deeply investigate the drivers of terrorist 
innovation, especially as they relate to WMD development and employment.  The Klan 
could serve as an outlier case as the group has largely failed to innovate in any significant 
operational manner.649  Nor has the Klan appeared to adopt what many are now calling 
“new” forms of terrorism.  Many post-modern terrorist organizations have already 
transitioned out of “old” forms of terrorism and have adopted what several argue to be a 
more lethal, more ideologically driven from of terrorism which seeks global change.650  
Immune to this modernizing trend, the Ku Klux Klan has remained operationally 
stagnant, relying on old styles of attack, weaponry, ideology, and message distribution 
channels.  In fact, the Ku Klux Klan is typical of the American radical right, which has 
demonstrated an overall inability to develop, attain, or employ weapons of significant 
lethality or alter operational patterns in adaptive or innovative ways.651  The Klan could 
be useful for future study as a negative case, used to test theories of innovation through 
an appreciation of why innovation can fail to occur.      
Fourth, a reconsideration of how we code domestic terrorism could reveal some 
startling findings about American society. In light of the massive “War on Terrorism” the 
United States has undertaken since September 11th, many scholars have decried the 
terrorist threat—and, more specifically, the costly response to it—as overblown.652  The 
target of these criticisms is usually our expenditures on overseas efforts, but these 
critiques should also call into question the appropriateness of our response to domestic 
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racist terrorism.  As one examines our attitudes, it becomes apparent that we are caught in 
a paradox.  As stated earlier, the study of domestic racist violence is difficult due to the 
fact it is coded not as terrorism, but as hate crimes.  This form of criminal coding 
encourages bottom-up responses from local law enforcement, a wholly appropriate and 
highly effective strategy to prevent re-emergence of a sustained campaign.  However a 
problem arises once you begin to look deeper into these “racial hate crimes” and see how 
many fall within the realm of terrorist acts.653 
Our coding is both a blessing and a curse; a blessing in that we may have 
“lucked” into the appropriate strategy to combat terrorist activity, but a curse to those 
who try and track terrorist incidents.  Should we code these acts correctly (and, by 
correctly, I mean terrorist acts as defined in this dissertation) it is highly likely the results 
would shift the way we understood terrorism in America.  Christopher Hewitt attempted 
such a recoding, and came up with over 3,000 domestic terrorist acts since 1953, far more 
than any government organization would ever claim.654 
The under reporting of certain domestic terrorist acts (racist, gay, anti-immigrant, 
gendered) means we may be over-reporting attacks in other realms—for instance, acts of 
Islamic terrorism.  A recoding of acts would likely bring about a dramatic shift in 
counterterrorism efforts to focus on what are now referred to as “hate groups.”  Although 
this would bring a more sensible (and honest) balance to the study of violence.  Worth 
noting is that any recoding effort could also have an unintended consequence.  Should 
terrorist acts be coded more accurately, it is likely domestic terrorism would merit a more 
robust response.  This, in turn, could mean a more top-down, more direct action focused 
response—one this dissertation argues is inappropriate against an unskilled leaderless 
resistance.  The paradox this presents is interesting because it suggests we have largely 
gotten the response right by coding these acts incorrectly. I argue, therefore, that, for now 
at least, we should be happy with improper coding and an effective response.      
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Finally, terrorism studies would benefit from a broader critique of the argument 
provided in this dissertation.  Such a critique is both invited and welcomed.  The 
conclusions reached here was designed to better explain a fairly narrow set of 
phenomena, campaigns of Ku Klux terrorism.  I advocate that they be exported and tested 
to determine their applicability more broadly.   To those looking for campaigns of 
domestic right wing terrorism, the 1983-1984 case of Brüder Schweigen (Silent 
Brotherhood or The Order) may offer a promising venue.  William Potter Gale’s Posse 
Comitatus offers a second.  My conclusions may also prove useful for right wing cases 
abroad, as well as the study of left wing domestic terrorist organizations such as the 
Weathermen. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
The modern Ku Klux Klan is down, but far from out.  If history shows us 
anything, it is that the Klan has a remarkable ability to emerge from periods of relative 
inactivity, reinvent itself, and mobilize followers to carry out sustained acts of terrorism.  
The fact that the contemporary Ku Klux Klan is branded as a collection of clowns and 
viewed as common criminals is a good thing.  It is indicative of the success the American 
law enforcement community—in conjunction with various NGOs—has had against the 
hooded menace.  Success, in the case of the Klan, has historically proved evanescent.   
There are over two hundred active Klan groups in the United States today—one 
hundred and six falling within the states of Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida.  In addition, there are over fifty 
Klan-specific websites on the Internet, a tally that does not include either the one hundred 
eighty seven White Nationalist or the sixty seven Neo-Nazi websites.655  The overall 
numbers of those who call themselves Klansmen is, unfortunately, unknown.  This lack 
of information makes it impossible to track trends in Klan growth and most estimates 
remain educated guesses.  We must realize that it is not necessarily the diminished appeal 
of the Klan that prevents campaign resurgence.  The Klan remains a marginal entity 
 
                                                 
655 Potok, “The Year in Hate and Extremism: Hate Groups Top 1000.” 
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today because of the unyielding efforts of professional law enforcement organizations 
and the relentless work of nongovernmental organizations to prevent pockets of safe 
havens from reforming. 
Although the United States has a relatively good story to tell with regard to race 
based extremist organizations, the writing of this dissertation is being concluded in the 
wake of the July 22, 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway.  This dual-attack resulted in the 
deaths of over seventy people, the majority of whom were children.  Although 
investigations into the attack are ongoing at the time of writing, initial reports paint the 
suspect as a right wing ideologue with a strong nationalistic bent, combined with 
pervasive anti-Islamic beliefs.  Our hearts and thoughts should go out to those affected by 
the attack, while it behooves us to redouble efforts to prevent such events on American 
soil.  It is hoped that this dissertation will assist in those efforts.     
In sum, terrorism is not an “if.”  It is a “when,” “how badly,” and “for how long.” 
This dissertation concentrated on understanding what affects the “how long” aspect of 
terrorist campaigns. “How badly” is determined largely by the weapons and placement 
available.656 Deny groups any form of safe haven and you can stymie them.  Deny their 
recruitment messages resonance and you can effectively prevent them from finding 
support.    
                                                 
656 For an expanded assessment of the chances of modern organizations waging a campaign of 
terrorism, see:  Paul Brister, “Patriotic Enemies of the State:  Assessing the Threat of America's 
Revolutionary Right,” The Homeland Security Review 4 no. 3 (Fall 2010). 
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